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This dissertation discusses choices for hierarchical entry modes and ownership 
adjustments from a technology and knowledge transfer-linked productivity growth 
perspective using Japanese high-tech companies in China as examples.  A quantitative 
analysis of panel data from the Toyo Keizai Kaigai Shinshutsu Kigyo Soran comprising 
data of 1881 Japanese companies’ subsidiaries from the high-tech industry in China 
which covers intervals of 17 years is linked with qualitative findings. 
Several important contributions to the research on entry mode choice, ownership 
structures, and quantitative modeling using econometric and qualitative approaches are 
made. 
 
Motivation for the research 
In order to upgrade internal technological capabilities, the Chinese government 
has frequently made it mandatory for foreign companies to transfer new technologies 
and managerial knowledge to China by giving incentives in the form of favorable tax 
treatment and more liberal ownership structures to those foreign companies that were 
willing to transfer the highest technologies.  In order to judge the utility of foreign 
technology transfer, the Chinese government required newly implemented technology, 
knowledge, production or managerial processes to raise the productivity of domestic 
input factors.  However, no specific framework on how productivity growth that is due 
technology transfer was provided.  This is where the dissertation follows up on.  
In transferring new technologies, however, foreign companies face the problem 
of leakage of proprietary technologies and knowledge.  They must therefore balance 
the need to transfer enough technologies to meet the requirements set by the Chinese 
 xvi 
government while protecting proprietary know-how and minimizing transaction costs in 
setting up and maintaining subsidiaries.  Using the example of Japanese high-tech 
companies in China, the dissertation also addresses the concerns of companies that 
transfer technologies abroad by proposing that high productivity growth that is due to 
new technologies and knowledge can be achieved if ownership structures in subsidiaries 
are set or adjusted over time in order to remain at optimal levels. 
The dissertation utilizes a residual measure for productivity growth that is 
unexplained by changes in labor and capital and must therefore be due to other factors 




With regard to quantitative modeling, the dissertation introduces an 
econometric approach to business research by using the concept of residual productivity 
growth within a statistical application of panel data comprising 17 yearly intervals from 
1986-2003.  Existing business research rarely incorporates econometric approaches. 
Likewise, the field of economics rarely applies its theoretical concepts by using 
concrete data. 
A quantitative framework that measures the degree of efficiency in technology 
and knowledge transfer in the form of a residual productivity growth variable is 
developed and linked to ownership structures in subsidiaries.  Since knowledge 
transfer, and increasingly, technology transfer can be a two-way process between both 
foreign and local partners in equity-based subsidiaries (i.e. joint ventures), ownership 
structures are viewed as a tool to control them and a price to pay in order to obtain them.  
The quantitative model can thus be considered a framework for assessing transaction 
 xvii 
costs of those assets.  Furthermore, hierarchical entry modes and subsequent 
ownership structures are discussed with respect to transacting them most efficiently.   
Previous research has addressed subsidiary performance mainly on the basis of 
financial measures (e.g. profitability, return on assets - ROA, return on equity - ROE, 
return on investment - ROI, etc.), instability, and lifespan.  This dissertation extends 
existing research by providing a specific quantitative framework for optimizing 
technology/knowledge-based productivity growth and indirectly minimizing transaction 
costs.  This is an important contribution to both business research and economics. 
Another important contribution of the dissertation is the linkage of the 
quantitative results to their potential for practical implementation by discussing case 
studies of Japanese subsidiaries in China.  Additionally, other factors important in the 
implementation and internalization of new technologies and knowledge, such as 
employee structures, have also been analyzed quantitatively and linked to specific cases 
qualitatively. 
Furthermore, an important contribution to existing qualitative business research 
is made in a framework which categorizes Japanese majority-owned joint ventures into 
types of relationship structures with Chinese partners and provides links to 
corresponding productivity growth values and therefore information about transaction 
costs. 
Using these approaches the dissertation concludes that indeed shared equity 
entry modes yield the highest rates of technology and knowledge transfer, but optimal 
ownership structures need to be chosen and adjustments to ownership structures should 
be made over time in order to account for learning effects. 
 xviii 
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Foreign high-tech firms in China have long faced the trade-off between 
transferring and protecting technologies more so than in other countries.  The legal 
framework for foreign investment (FDI) in China has long been geared towards 
obtaining new technological and managerial knowledge through foreign joint venture 
partners and allowed for sole ownership only with great difficulty.  In setting up 
subsidiaries in China, foreign companies face several dilemmas.  Those companies 
that are required to set up joint ventures are faced with the choice of a local partner 
and how to structure a joint venture with regard to optimizing its performance while 
keeping key technological know-how safe. 
Despite government pressure or legal frameworks defining FDI, many foreign 
companies choose to set up joint ventures with local partners because they realize they 
need to obtain certain complementary assets that they may not possess, and that the 
perceived cost of obtaining them through a local partner justifies the set up of a joint 
venture (JV). 
Several problems for companies transferring technologies arise from the 
aforementioned.  First, they need to balance the risk of leaking proprietary 
technological knowledge with the need to obtain complementary assets.  Second, 
they need to determine ownership structures that are best suited to obtain 
complementary assets and protect proprietary technologies.  Third, they need to find 
a local partner and decide which areas of the subsidiary to involve the local partner in, 
which can be achieved through ownership structures and/or the degree of management 
involvement in the joint venture by the local partner.  Fourth, a foreign company 
needs to understand that the learning process by both partners may increase 
technological capabilities of the local partner on one hand, while allowing the foreign 
 2 
company to absorb and process knowledge on the other.  The learning process may 
affect the type of complementary assets needed by both partners over time, which the 
entry mode and ownership structures need to reflect.  Fifth, these processes take 
place under exogenous constraints such as government influence, which may have an 
impact on learning processes. 
The dissertation addresses the issues of entry modes choice and ownership 
structures from a quantitative and a qualitative aspect. 
 
Motivation for research 
The motivation for selecting this topic is the phenomenon that Japanese 
companies have historically assumed a lower ownership share in their subsidiaries 
compared to their counterparts from western countries.  Moreover, the history 
between China and Japan has tended to be more complicated.  Even though the thesis 
does not explore historic implications in greater detail, the motivation to find reasons 
for existing ownership structures of Japanese companies' subsidiaries in China has 
been one focal point.  Even though ownership structures allowed by the central 
government in China depend on the type of technology and knowledge transferred, 
bias has existed on the part of Chinese officials when negotiating with Japanese 
companies for higher ownership structures, impacting the type of technology and 
knowledge transferred by Japanese companies. 
 
1.1 Short background of issues concerning entry modes in China 
Economic reforms in China began in 1978, when Deng Xiao Ping proclaimed 
the Open Door Policy.  The first law on foreign direct investment (FDI) under the 
Open Door Policy was the Law on Equity Joint Ventures passed in 1979.  Legislation 
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for wholly-owned subsidiaries (WOS) was not passed until 1986.  Even when the 
Open Door Policy was amended to allow WOS, requirements remained ambiguous, 
and joint ventures (JVs) remained the clearly favored entry mode until 2001 when 
China entered WTO (Wang, 2006).  The decisive factor for the under-representation 
of WOS has been China’s policy of learning new technologies and managerial 
know-how from foreign companies in industries with a high degree of proprietary 
knowledge.  The main vehicle to accomplish this goal has been joint ventures.1
The Chinese economy has gradually been steered away from being 
assembly-based to developing its own technological capabilities with the help of new 
technologies and processes from abroad.  Since the Open Door Policy of 1978, 
subsequent amendments were implemented that favored the development of key 
industries in promoting national development through the extraction of new 
technologies and managerial knowledge from foreign companies in specific 
industries. 
  
Wholly-owned subsidiary status was granted only under exceptional circumstances. 
The importance of technology transfer can be seen by the words of Li Peng, 
formerly the Vice Premier of China, who predicted: ‘In future, one of China’s key 
criteria in evaluating a potential partner will be whether he is willing to transfer 
technology through design and production’ (Li, 2006). 
Initially, joint ventures were subject to approval by the central government 
based on the degree of their benefit with respect to the amount of foreign funds 
invested and local employment created.  However, the central government has since 
taken incremental steps to amend conditions for FDI to include wholly-owned 
                                                   
1 This dissertation refers to joint ventures and international joint ventures as JVs and IJVs, respectively. The usage of the terms 
‘joint venture(s)’, ‘international joint venture(s)’, and the acronyms ‘JV(s)’ and ‘IJV(s)’ normally refers to equity joint ventures, 
unless cooperative (contractual) joint ventures are specifically mentioned.  International joint ventures have at least one foreign 
partner. The main focus of the dissertation is equity joint ventures. 
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subsidiaries (WOS), but made the type of entry mode dependent on the amount of 
technologies and new knowledge transferred.  Higher foreign ownership has often 
been allowed only in exchange for higher technology transfer, and WOS required the 
transfer of very advanced technologies and high potential levels of productivity 
growth in local factor inputs due to their transfer. 
Even though the government has required productivity growth in local factor 
inputs as a result of technology imports, it has not specified any quantitative method 
for such measurement.  Consequently, the process of establishing a subsidiary in 
China has remained opaque and left the Chinese government with a considerable 
amount of discretion in deciding entry modes and ownership levels of foreign 
subsidiaries.  Even though WOS were allowed on paper, China has promoted the 
learning of new technologies through the use of international joint ventures (IJVs) 
with local partner companies - mostly state-owned enterprises (SOEs) - and 
discouraged the set-up of wholly-owned subsidiaries (WOS).  In response to the lack 
of a quantitative performance criterion by which the Chinese government measures 
the amount of productivity growth achieved through technology and knowledge 
transfer, this dissertation develops a quantitative method to measure the effects of the 
implementation of new technologies and knowledge with data of Japanese high-tech 
companies’ subsidiaries. 
Subsidiaries of Japanese high-tech companies have generally shown lower 
ownership levels compared to subsidiaries owned by companies from western Europe 
and the United States - partly as a result of Chinese government policies and partly as 
a result of Japanese companies’ own preferences.  According to my research, many 
Japanese companies’ subsidiaries have achieved increases in productivity growth 
levels in local factor inputs - as required by Chinese policymakers - which, to some 
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extent, however, appear to be incongruent with their choice of low-ownership entry 
modes.  The dissertation offers a quantitative and qualitative investigation. 
 
1.2 Contribution and structure of the dissertation 
The dissertation provides several important contributions to the research on 
entry mode choice and ownership structures from both quantitative and qualitative 
aspects.  As the first contribution, the dissertation develops a quantitative framework 
which measures the performance of technology transfer and knowledge exchange, in 
the form of a residual productivity growth variable that explains the presence of 
learning and knowledge absorption processes. Ownership is introduced as a medium 
of exchange for complementary assets (tangible and intangible) while productivity 
growth achieved from the transfer of technologies and implementation of new 
knowledge is used as a validating factor for the transaction cost involved in the 
exchange of complementary assets.  Previous research has dealt with performance 
and whether subsidiaries are managed successfully mainly on the basis of financial 
aspects (e.g. profitability, ROI, ROA, etc.) or instability and lifespan.  In contrast, 
this dissertation provides a specific quantitative framework for optimizing ownership 
structures through productivity growth that is due to the transfer and acquisition of 
complementary assets from both the technology transferor and transferee points of 
view. 
The second important contribution of the dissertation is the linkage of the 
quantitative framework and results to their applicability and potential for 
implementation in subsidiaries with a qualitative discussion of initial entry mode 
choice and ownership restructuring.  Four cases of Sino-Japanese IJVs will be 
discussed.  In addition to categorizing IJVs into types of relationships with their 
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Chinese partners, the case studies provide likely quantitative results for technology 
transfer and knowledge exchange while discussing the feasibility of implementing the 
findings of the quantitative chapter in practical terms.  The application of the 
quantitative model to actual examples of subsidiaries is thus an important 
contribution. 
Moreover, the quantitative framework uses the economic concept of residual 
productivity growth and applies it to panel data.  In so doing, I connect an economic 
concept with quantitative business research, which is another significant contribution 
to both the fields of economics and business.  Economics literature seldom uses data 
to apply in its theories while business literature does not use enough econometric 
concepts and theories in its research, relying heavily on statistical methods instead. 
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1.2.1 Quantitative modeling 
With regard to quantitative modeling, the dissertation employs an approach 
that was previously developed by economists to model macroeconomic progress.  
However, in most economic literature, the approach has been developed only in 
theory and actual usage on time-series macroeconomic data has been limited in 
economic literature.  As such, business literature has lacked approaches to 
econometric modeling, while econometric literature has lacked applications of its own 
models.  This dissertation seeks to bridge the gap. 
 
1.2.2 Structure of the dissertation 
The first chapter will provide an overview of China’s industrial development, 
policy of technology imports, and the situation of Japanese high-tech companies’ 
subsidiaries in China. 
It is then followed by a theoretical part which is divided into three main 
chapters - namely a chapter on literature review (Chapter 2), a chapter on quantitative 
methods (Chapter 3), and a qualitative chapter (Chapter 4).  A conclusion (Chapter 
5) will form the last chapter. 
The quantitative chapter links productivity growth to ownership levels, and 
discusses the role of ownership adjustments and productivity growth. 
The qualitative chapter includes case studies which discuss models developed 
in the quantitative chapter in the context of actual examples of Japanese high-tech 
companies’ subsidiaries in China. 
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1.3 China’s industrial policy 
1.3.1 FDI legislation 
The first wave of amendments to the 1979 Law on Equity Joint Ventures was 
made in 1983, which further clarified details on technology transfer.  The law 
designated the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade (MOFERT)2
A third reform in 1986 allowed wholly-owned subsidiaries for the first time.  
The Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprise Law and corresponding Article 3 permitted 
foreign companies to bypass a Chinese partner (Lehman et al., 2001).  The law was 
important for those companies with advanced technologies seeking to invest in China 
but reluctant to reveal proprietary knowledge or technologies.  This law, however, 
did not come free to foreign investors.  In order to be allowed to establish WOS, the 
law made the transfer of advanced technologies mandatory.  A notable and intended 
ambiguity of this law, however, was its non-specification of advanced technologies.  
It therefore left the Chinese government with significant control in deciding which 
foreign companies to grant wholly-owned subsidiary status because it was able to 
compare technologies to be transferred against one another and select among several 
foreign companies’ applications.  Although considered high-tech or advanced in their 
home and other countries, many foreign companies were not able to gain WOS status 
because other foreign companies pledged to transfer more or higher-valued 
technologies.  As a result, most companies still had to set up joint ventures, even 
 as a 
facilitating agent for sourcing raw materials and labor after this ministry had screened 
a foreign joint venture application.  In a second amendment, decisions involving 
investment of US$ 5 million or less were decentralized and passed on to municipal 
organs. 
                                                   
2 This Ministry became Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation in 1993 (MOFTEC) and was subsequently 
consolidated with other agencies into the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) in 2003, a name under which it is still known. 
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though it was not their preferred choice. 
 
1.3.2 Technology access through FDI and technology transfer 
In almost every manufacturing joint venture, transfers of technological, 
managerial, and marketing-related knowledge form an integral part of the JV contract.  
A survey of foreign companies in China by China Research Unit (2006) revealed that 
72% of US companies and 61% of Japanese companies agree with the statement that a 
key success factor for entry into China is for the foreign company to “offer latest 
technology”.  The same survey also showed that Japanese companies are concerned 
about the lack of protection of property rights and the motives of the Chinese joint 
venture partner, which raises the issues of information asymmetry and bounded 
rationality – aspects I will address in the theoretical chapters.  Moreover, Lu and 
Child (1995) suggest that suspicions towards the Law of Foreign Joint Ventures are 
fuelled by the “inadequacies of Chinese law” (Campbell, 1996).  Despite these issues, 
another factor in the propensity of Japanese companies to seek joint ventures is the 
result of cultural factors which include an emphasis on relationship building and 
networking, and thus greater appreciation for the importance of guanxi (Campbell, 
1996). 
Luo (2002) finds that technological capability, foreign marketing power, and 
international marketing expertise strongly motivate Chinese companies to enter into 
joint ventures with foreign companies.  A traditional reliance on state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) and past practices of delegating foreign trade to a small number of 
specialized SOEs has created little opportunity for Chinese managers to acquire 
international management and marketing experience.  However, weak intellectual 
property laws have diminished incentives for foreign companies to transfer new 
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technologies and knowledge and to develop technological capabilities locally. 
Bishop (2007), in contrast, argues that not every Chinese joint venture 
partner is motivated by the acquisition of technology and know-how.  A study by 
Young and Lan (1997) found that at least one-third of local joint venture partners did 
not hope to gain new technology from the joint venture, and instead entered the joint 
venture to gain access to more capital. 
Authorities in China only have a limited set of guidelines to evaluate 
technology transfer other than those proposed by the ‘863’ and ‘Torch’ technology 
programs.3  However, they make decisions based on a number of other qualitative 
factors.  Factors include the potential of the foreign company to improve the local 
partner’s technological, strategic, organizational and financial capabilities.  
Furthermore, a foreign company’s nationality, localization strategy, and management 
style also play a role.  Therefore, ‘Japanese-style management’ and its perceived 
effectiveness in transferring essential knowledge can be subject to preconceptions and 
possibly prejudice by authorities that approve new investment (Roehrig, 1993).4  
Even if these requirements were met, few Japanese companies managed to obtain full 
WOS approval before 2001.5
                                                   
3 The ‘863’ Program promoted research in advanced technologies, while ‘Torch’ program was aimed at applying research 
conducted under ‘863’ commercially through cooperation with foreign companies. This usually included joint research projects. 
  The only alternative to a JV was an export-oriented 
WOS, with the major drawback being that the subsidiary had to export at least 50% of 
output, which severely restricted it from entry to the Chinese market.  Depending on 
the time of market entry, this restriction could be more or less significant since early 
manufacturing-oriented subsidiaries were more export-oriented when purchasing 
power in China was still weak.  The practice of restricting access to the Chinese 
market was a “fee for not working with a Chinese partner” (Vanhonacker, 1997).  
4 Roehrig (1993) states that Chinese authorities have been known to be prejudiced towards Japanese companies in the past. 
5 As a result of China’s accession to WTO, investment requirements have gradually been liberalized. 
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However, many companies now seek access to the market in China.  By enacting this 
restriction, the Chinese government wanted to make JVs more attractive. 
 
1.3.3 Bargaining process for FDI 
The bargaining process for the entry mode and thus the ownership share is 
significantly influenced by perceptions about the nationality, corporate identity, and 
international reputation of the foreign company (e.g. Roehrig, 1993). 
My discussions with managers revealed that there was a strong inclination by 
the Chinese side to categorize foreign investors according to nationality.  In addition, 
Roehrig (1993) claims that foreign investors are categorized into two other groups: 
“those who sincerely hope to cooperate with us [the Chinese],” and those who “resort 
to dishonest means and extort Chinese resources” (Roehrig, 1993: 31).  Generally, 
there has been greater respect towards and desire among Chinese companies to do 
business with investors from the United States, Europe (mainly France, Germany, and 
UK), and Australia than with companies from Japan, Korea, and Hong Kong (Pang, 
2002). 
 
1.3.4 Categories of FDI in China 
The central government’s stated intention was to channel FDI into building 
infrastructure and developing advanced technologies and high value-added products.  
Chinese city and state-level government agencies have since enforced compliance of 
FDI with economic development objectives. As a result, the number of large-scale, 
technologically-advanced, and capital-intensive projects has increased (Luo, 2002; 
Sigurdson, 2005).  The following table lists those industries that are encouraged, 
restricted and prohibited. 
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Table 1.1: Categories of FDI in China 
Categories Encouraged Permitted Restricted Prohibited 
Description FDI encouraged in 
areas in which 





and more efficient 
use of domestic 
resources and raw 
materials 
Not specified – 
projects not listed 
in the other three 
categories are 
“permitted” 
FDI restricted in 
areas in which 
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Privileges/treatment Financial incentives 
and tax breaks, 
swift approval 













Source: Own compilation of various sources (e.g. Sigurdson, 1995; Luo, 2000; 2001; 
2002) 
 
1.3.5 R&D policies in China 
Before China proclaimed the Open Door Policy in 1978, it had already 
established the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) in 1976.  CAS resembled R&D 
clusters, from which a number of well-known high-tech companies emerged later 
when CAS-affiliated researchers and engineers started their own companies.  The 
most well-known example is Lenovo (formerly Legend Group), which has its roots 
within CAS (Sigurdson, 2005). 
The Open Door Policy gave rise to a number of other reforms with respect to 
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technological know-how.  Further reforms focused on tax incentives for certain types 
of FDI and the abolition of ministries’ direct control of most enterprises.  
Corporatization and stock exchange listings followed even for state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs). However, the state retained majority control at virtually every level - national, 
provincial, and municipal. 
The second important contribution of the Open Door Policy included the 
overhaul of the university system in order to upgrade local universities’ international 
competitiveness in the fields of scientific and technological research.  It would later 
make universities attractive to foreign companies as research collaborators and future 
absorbers of advanced technological knowledge. 
The third important contribution of the Policy was the development of 
cohesive national R&D capabilities.  Until the 1980s, R&D had been completely 
controlled by state institutions.  Under the new Policy, the state gave up its direct 
control over R&D, and many industrial research institutes were transferred to 
manufacturing plants. 
Prioritizing technology transfer and improvements in the knowledge of the 
workforce through FDI later resulted in an emphasis on the commercialization of 
research and development (Liu and White, 2001).  Between 1990 and 1992, four 
important plans were implemented: the National Science and Technology 
Achievements Spreading Program, the Science and Technology Development Loan 
Program, the National Engineering Research Centers Program – all of which 
intended to speed up the commercialization of academic research results.  
Furthermore, collaboration between universities, research institutes and private 
enterprises was promoted by the Plan for Joint Development and Engineering 
Projects. 
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In 1996, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress approved 
the Law for the Commercialization of Science and Technology Research Results, to 
provide a legal basis for dealing with problems relating to the commercialization of 
results.  Moreover, in 2002, the Small and Medium Enterprise Promotion Law came 
into effect.  It specified that relevant government agencies were to promote the 
establishment of technical services institutions, productivity centers, and provide 
access to information, consulting, and technology transfer for local companies. 
R&D policy was then centralized in the Ministry of Science and Technology 
(MOST), away from various line ministries.  R&D funding has since increased more 
rapidly than economic growth (Luo, 2002).  However, this figure is to be treated 
with caution since funding has not necessarily been used effectively with many SOEs 
“still too poorly organized to exploit R&D results efficiently.” (Sigurdson, 2005)  As 
a result, most Chinese companies have remained weak even in mature and maturing 
technologies (Luo, 2002).  However, in economic terms, the state sector had been 
reduced from 80% to below 40% of GDP by 2003 (Sigurdson, 2005). 
 
1.3.6 Tax incentives 
Between 1996 and 1999, new policies were implemented that introduced 
further incentives for investment in high-tech industries.  These incentives included 
priority treatment in obtaining basic infrastructure services in addition to reduced 
income taxes, land fees, import and export duties.  Moreover, high-tech companies 
could receive further tax benefits by reinvesting profits, which could amount to a full 
tax refund.  Consequently, many foreign high-tech companies adopted strategic plans 
for China that included the reinvestment of profits for growth and expansion.  Tax 
policies achieved an adjustment of the focus of foreign companies in the ‘encouraged’ 
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industries to a more long-term, value-added commitment. 
Some specific tax policies include the following: 
-  Exemption from import tariffs and other taxes on equipment and parts (for 
technological innovation) 
-  Full value-added tax refunds for foreign companies that buy equipment made 
locally 
-  Business tax exemptions for technology transfer 
-  Exemption from corporate income tax if technologies transferred are advanced6
-  50% income tax discount for R&D expenses if they rise by at least 10% versus the 
previous year 
  
Under the obligations of China’s entry into the WTO, these tax incentives 
have gradually been applied to all companies in the ‘encouraged’ category, regardless 
of foreign or domestic status. 
 
1.3.7 A note about WTO 
Participation in the WTO has resulted in more liberal investment terms for 
foreign companies.  Requirements for joint ventures have been gradually relaxed 
since. To some extent, however, accession to the WTO has been in contrast to China’s 
emphasis on preserving social stability while introducing a market-based economic 
system.  Loss-making SOEs had frequently been assigned to foreign companies as 
local JV partners in order to prevent mass layoffs and social unrest (EIU, 2006).7,8
Many SOEs have become more productive as a result of their role as IJV 
 
                                                   
6 This policy was reversed in 2007 – foreign and local companies are now subject to the same corporate tax rates. 
7 As the largest employer in China, the State employed half of China’s 750 million workers and controlled over 50% of all assets 
(Chen and Shih, 2005).  SOEs dominate vital industries such as electronics/electrical equipment, telecommunications, power, 
financial, and automotive industries (Chen and Shih, 2005).  SMEs tend to be large by employee numbers.  Keeping these 
employed is a priority for the Chinese government (Desvaux et al., 2004).   SOEs must also provide numerous employee 
benefits that are not required of private firms. 
8 From the point of view of China, making foreign companies enter partnerships with SOEs is a convenient method of keeping 
the officials and SOE staff employed while receiving capital, technologies, and managerial know-how from the foreign partner. 
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partners.  The important point to note is: when setting up subsidiaries in China, 
foreign high-tech companies should not automatically eschew joint ventures in which 
the local partner is an SOE.9
Luo (2000) has argued that the technology and skills gap, however, created 
asymmetry in strategic needs for both sides in partner selection, formation, and 
management of the IJV.  An important method of overcoming asymmetry was to 
align interests by ownership adjustment (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Luo, 2000). 
 
 
1.4 The role of shared-equity entry modes 
Three features of China’s rapid economic growth have been especially 
noteworthy.  First, the benefits of growth have been widely shared among China’s 
country-sized provincial economies.  Although FDI has mostly concentrated in the 
coastal regions, enabling them to grow at an average rate of 9.7% a year, other 
provinces also fared well.  In fact, if China’s thirty provinces were counted as 
individual economies, twenty of them would be among the fastest growing in the 
world (Desvaux et al., 2004). 
Second, Chinese economic development has coincided with a sharp cyclical 
pattern of economic growth.  The economic growth cycles have been accompanied 
by similar fluctuations in the rate of inflation, revealing faults in macroeconomic 
management resulting from partially completed reforms in the fiscal, enterprise, and 
banking systems. 
  Third, China’s growth has been less dependent on volume increases in inputs 
of capital and labor than on productivity growth (Desvaux et al., 2004).  This 
                                                   
9 The type of local company to partner with a foreign company will likely depend on the foreign company, including the foreign 
company’s reputation, technological sophistication, size of investment, and proposed ownership share, and to some extent the 
foreign company’s nationality. The competition among industrialized countries often permits the host country to play one foreign 
investor off against another to secure terms most advantageous to itself (Wank, 1996; Xin and Pearce, 1996). 
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suggests that factors other than capital accumulation have been important 
determinants of China’s economic growth.  In this dissertation, I will examine the 
factors of such productivity growth using the example of Japanese high-tech 
enterprises in China. 
Overall, the Chinese economy is still only about halfway through its 
transition from a centrally-planned economy to a market economy (Luo, 2002).  
Reforms that are difficult to implement are still in progress.  Particularly challenging 
is the development of a legal, administrative, and regulatory framework, as is the 
often cited lack of progress in reforming SOEs (Chen and Shih, 2005).  However, it 
is also this system that can lead to certain ownership advantages through 
shared-equity entry modes that can result in higher productivity growth due to 
knowledge exchange and technology transfer.  On the other hand, significant 
disadvantages in having an SOE as an IJV partner also exist. 
A lack of progress in reforming SOEs has been a major obstacle in reforming 
the business environment in China overall.  The delay in SOE reforms has largely 
been responsible for delays in fiscal, financial, and trading-system reforms.  
Liberalization of bank interest rates and trade protection has been slow because of a 
potentially adverse impact on SOEs with capital shortages.  The state bank sector is 
not yet adequately capable of imposing financial discipline on SOEs, and government 
agencies continue to interfere with SOEs’ management.  Even so, several SOEs have 
successfully been restructured into limited liability stock companies. 
A challenging task has been deciding who will efficiently manage state assets.  
Currently, of those SOEs that have not been privatized, the State Management Asset 
Commission and its sub-commissions have been managing state assets.  They have 
managed inefficiently, however, due to a lack of professional knowledge, 
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organizational responsibility, and managerial incentives.  The key to solving this 
problem has been to gain access to the professional, managerial, and technological 
knowledge of foreign companies.  With an SOE as local IJV partner, foreign 
companies would likely face the aforementioned issues. 
There are also substantial benefits to forming IJVs with SOEs, however.  
Foreign companies can gain access to land, factory space, labor, and intangible assets 
such as guanxi with relative ease. 
 
1.5 Investment options10
The following section will provide and overview of the main investment 
options available to foreign companies in China and discuss advantages and 
disadvantages of wholly-owned subsidiaries and joint ventures in more detail.  
Chinese law defines five basic company structures: 
 
 
• Sino-foreign equity joint ventures (JVs): 
These are limited-liability firms in which profits are distributed in proportion 
to the partners’ equity stakes. Traditionally, this has been the most common type of 
foreign business structure in China, encouraged by the central government as a 
method of transferring cash and expertise to domestic enterprises. 
 
• Contractual (or cooperative) joint ventures: 
They offer more flexibility, but are protected by a less comprehensive set of 
regulations and guidelines. Profits are distributed according to contractual agreement, 
which can specify an accelerated return on investment for the foreign investor. A 
                                                   
10 Information in this section up to section 1.6 is taken mainly from Economist Intelligence Unit (2006). 
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summary of equity and contractual joint ventures is provided in Table 1.2 (below). 
 
• Wholly-owned subsidiaries (WOS): 
WOS do not require a local partner, and as wholly foreign-owned entities are 
entirely under the management of the foreign investor. 
 
• Joint-stock companies: 
Joint-stock companies allow investors’ interests to be defined by shares, 
issued either internally or through a stock market listing.  MNCs, such as Kodak of 
the US, have invested in such joint-stock companies although their numbers are small. 
More foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) are expected to convert into joint-stock firms, 
the first step towards a listing on the domestic stock markets. 
 
• Holding companies:  
These are also referred to as “investment companies” in Chinese law, offer a 
convenient way to group together multiple investments.  However, they lack many 
of the advantages of a holding company in the western sense.  Capitalization and 
other requirements are also steep, limiting this option to companies with an extensive 
presence in China.  Group finance companies can be established as adjuncts to 
holding companies to handle some — but not all — finance functions for subsidiary 
ventures. 
Other structural options in China include: 
 
• Buying into state-owned enterprises (SOEs): 
Companies buying into SOEs generally use traditional JV or joint-stock 
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company vehicles to do so. In rare cases, they may be able to purchase the assets of 
already bankrupt SOEs. Another option for taking a stake in a SOE is acquiring shares 
in a domestically listed one. 
 
• Limited-liability companies:  
All FIEs allowed under Chinese company law are limited liability companies. 
An investor’s stake in a limited-liability company, for which no shares are issued, is 
defined by the amount of capital invested. 
 
Table 1.2: Equity vs. contractual joint ventures 
 Equity JVs Contractual JVs 
Legal basis Sino-Foreign Equity JV Law (March 
2001); 
Implementing Rules (July 2001) 
Sino-Foreign Equity JV Law (March 
2001); 
Implementing Rules (not updated 
since 1995) 
Form Legal person status with limited 
liability 
Legal person status with limited 
liability; or non-legal person status 
without limited liability 
Financing Capital contributions (both cash and 
in-kind) 
Capital contributions (both cash and 
in-kind); and “cooperation 
conditions” (assets made available to 
JV but not legally contributed) 
Profit distribution In accordance with agreed terms and 
each partner’s respective share in the 
JV 
Foreign partner may recoup its 
investment during the term of the 
project 
Management Board of directors is highest organ of 
authority 
Board of directors; or joint 
management committee 
Dissolution Unanimous board resolutions 
required in order to apply for 
approval to dissolve JV 
In the event of breach of JV contract 
by one partner, any other partner may 
unilaterally apply for approval to 
dissolve JV 
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit (2006) 
 
 
1.5.1 Structural preferences among investment options 
Table 1.3 summarizes structural preferences for FDI between 1997 and 2005 
by WOS, equity JVs (IJVs), and contractual JVs.  Contractual JVs appear to have 
become obliterated as FDI has been dominated by equity-based entry modes, with an 




Table 1.3: Changes in preferences of FDI structures 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Total FDI 
(billion USD) 
45.3 45.5 40.3 40.7 46.9 52.7 53.5 60.6 60.3 
Equity joint 
ventures (%) 




19.6 21.3 20.3 16.2 13.2 9.7 7.1 5.1 3.0 
Wholly-owned 
subsidiaries (%) 




0.6 1.5 0.7 0.3 1.1 1.3 0.6 1.3 1.5 
Others (%) 0.7 0.5 1.1 0.9 1.1 0.5 1.1 0.2 0.0 
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit (2006) 
 
 
1.5.2 Joint ventures 
A joint venture (JV) is often the only investment vehicle permitted for some 
industries, although the list of industries requiring JVs has shrunk considerably with 
China’s accession to WTO. Wholly-owned subsidiaries (WOS) are still prohibited in 
certain industries, however.  The main types of joint venture formats are discussed 
below. 
 
1.5.2.1  Equity joint ventures 
In equity joint ventures, profits are divided among partners in direct 
proportion to their equity stakes.  In China, equity JVs in which partners share 
profits and risks according to their respective stakes are similar to those abroad.  
Foreign participation in an equity JV must be at least 25% in order to qualify for 
preferential tax treatment. In some industries specified in the Catalogue for Guiding 
Foreign Investment in Industries (including certain types of mining, auto 
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manufacturing, transport related services and medical institutions), the foreign 
shareholder is limited to a minority stake.  Equity can be contributed in the form of 
foreign currency, equipment, buildings and (subject to certain limits) even intangible 
assets, such as industrial property, provided their value is recognized by both the 
approving authorities and the local partner. 
 
1.5.2.2  Contractual (cooperative) joint ventures 
Contractual joint ventures allow for profit distribution according to a formula 
specified in the JV contract rather than according to equity stakes of the partners. The 
contractual JV structure is most useful for companies that need flexibility in the 
allocation of returns, such as infrastructure projects. There are two basic models.  In 
one, the Chinese partner makes a limited-equity investment, has little say in 
management and receives a fixed periodic payment. This arrangement is suited for 
retail ventures in which a foreign partner seeks maximum control but is required to 
have a JV partner. In the other, the foreign partner is allowed to retain a 
disproportionate share of the profits for a fixed period of time, after which most or all 
profits go to the Chinese partner. This might be used in large infrastructure projects 
where foreign companies need to recoup their investment on an accelerated time 
frame and are willing to forego long-term profits to do so.  The co-operative form of 
partnership has been declining in popularity since 1998 when it hit a record high of 
US$9.3bn in utilized FDI and accounted for 21.3% of the total FDI used (Table 1.3, 
above).  In 2005, they accounted for only 3% of foreign investment. 
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1.5.2.3  Main reasons for entering into a joint venture partnership 
• Real estate acquisition: 
A JV makes it possible for a foreigner to acquire prime land in China. Local 
partners can provide land in crowded or expensive development areas.  In many 
cases land is the sole asset of value contributed by the Chinese partner.  Investors, 
however, must also be vigilant when accepting land from a local party, and make sure 
that the party’s allocated land-use rights have been converted into granted rights and 
have been legally transferred to the JV. 
 
• Guanxi (connections) or brand: 
The most valuable contribution of the Chinese partner in a JV may not be in 
the assets it contributed to the company, but in its network of connections, sales and 
distribution clientele, or its strength as a brand name. Equity JVs can be an important 
method of cementing strategic alliances, particularly in industries which are 
dominated by one or two major state customers.  Although regulations governing 
JVs have been relaxed, several disadvantages of JVs are still in place: 
 
1.5.2.4  Main reasons for eschewing joint ventures 
• Inflexibility: 
Joint venture operations are governed by the initial JV investment contract, 
which is quite difficult to change. Changes in the contract require a unanimous vote of 
the board of directors, which includes representatives of both the local and foreign 
partners, plus government approval.  JVs are therefore often slow in adapting to 
changes in market conditions. 
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• Difficulties in expanding investment: 
Foreign investors seeking to expand their JV operations often meet with 
resistance from their Chinese partners who are unable to contribute the additional 
capital. The only useful method to get around this, therefore, is for foreign companies 
to increase their equity stake in the venture. 
 
• Conflict of interest between partners:  
The strategic outlook and management philosophies of Chinese and foreign 
JV partners may differ.  While foreign companies are driven by profit, local partners 
must answer to a complex set of demands and responsibilities, in addition to keeping 
their workforce employed.  Even where interests coincide, differences concerning 
strategy and management control can be frequent. 
 
1.5.3 Wholly-owned subsidiaries 
Wholly-owned subsidiaries (WOS) are no longer bound by as many 
restrictions as before and their access to the domestic market has improved 
significantly.  Some constraints remain, however. The central government continues 
to steer foreign investors into areas where it considers foreign funds and expertise 
useful.  In sectors where output capacity has exceeded demand or where they are 
deemed sensitive, the government will apply restrictions on investment structures and 
tax breaks. Therefore, certain industries are open to WOS while others are restricted 
to JVs. Information on new restrictions or the relaxation of existing limits are 




1.5.3.1  Main advantages of wholly-owned subsidiaries 
• Complete management control: 
Foreign investors opt for WOS structures rather than cede control over 
critical functions to a partner with fewer skills, or too many competing demands. 
 
• Simpler establishment procedures: 
The negotiation and approval process may take less time without a partner. 
 
• Ease of termination: 
A JV can only be liquidated prematurely on the agreement of both parties or 
through court order.  Dissolution of a WOS still requires government approval, but, 
in principle, it is not difficult to obtain. 
 
• Protection of intellectual property:  
Proprietary technology is easier to protect at a WOS plant. 
 
1.5.3.2   Main disadvantages of wholly-owned subsidiaries 
• Official hostility: 
Many officials, especially those in inland areas, still prefer to see a Chinese 
partner involved. 
 
• Lack of a Chinese “protector”: 
As a wholly-owned subsidiary, negotiating with the bureaucracy can be 
cumbersome and the outcome less predictable.  However, this is becoming less of a 
disadvantage since administrative measures have been codified more clearly and 
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foreign companies have established government relations departments or outsourced 
this function to public relations firms. 
 
• Inability to obtain stock market listing: 
Unlike WOS, JVs may convert to joint-stock companies and issue shares on 
the Shenzhen and Shanghai stock exchanges.  WOS may achieve this end, however, 
by forming JV holding companies that seek a domestic listing and still represent the 
interests of their subsidiary ventures. 
 
1.6 Selecting an IJV partner11
Key areas to examine when selecting an IJV partner are: 
 
• Industrial plant: 
This includes the type, age and value of equipment, as well as land or 
existing factory space.  In most cases, the foreign partner will prefer to import much 
or all of the equipment required.  Although some Chinese partners may have 
appropriate equipment, the factory they provide is often used by the venture only 
during the initial stage. The foreign partner should also verify the nature of the 
potential partner’s land-use rights. Only officially granted land use rights may be 
transferred to the IJV.  There have been instances in which the local IJV partner hid 
the nature of the land-use rights when they were non-transferable in order to avoid the 
expense of converting them (Luo, 2002). 
 
• Labor force: 
Some Chinese companies still expect the foreign partner to absorb redundant 
                                                   
11 Information in this section is taken mainly from Economist Intelligence Unit (2006). 
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labor.  A foreign company needs to negotiate to obtain only the number and quality 
of workers needed.  Identifying the employees worth keeping, however, is difficult, 
and resistance should be expected from the local partner.  As state-owned entities, 
SOEs are often told by the government to ensure continuous employment for large 
numbers of workers to minimize the potential for social unrest (Luo, 2002). 
 
• Strength of management: 
Investors should try to gauge the Chinese partner firm’s adaptability to the 
management culture of the foreign partner, and vice versa. 
 
• Access to suppliers and customers: 
Few Chinese companies have competent marketing departments (EIU, 2006). 
Instead, a foreign company should look for existing relationships with suppliers, 
customers and distributors that would form the foundation of future marketing efforts. 
 
• Guanxi: 
Personal connections are less important now than they used to be.  However, 
they are an integral part of daily life and remain vital in influencing the outcome of 
negotiations.  Many large foreign companies (MNCs) have been in China long 
enough to have established good relations with local and central-level officials.  
However, the right partner can still provide valuable political clout with industry 
officials for any size of company, especially in restricted industries, such as telecoms 
and automobiles (EIU, 2006). 
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1.6.1 Chinese side’s partner evaluation criteria 
Managerial attributes: 
In addition to new technological knowledge, a foreign firm’s management 
capabilities are also of great importance to a potential Chinese partner firm.  
Management capabilities can be grouped into strategic, organizational, and financial 
capabilities.  As for strategic capabilities, a foreign firm’s marketing competencies, 
international marketing expertise and brand strength will be of importance to a 
prospective local JV partner. 
 
Organizational attributes: 
Organizational attributes the local partner may look for in a foreign firm 
include formal and informal planning systems, controlling systems, as well as 
informal relationships within the sphere of the foreign firm’s activities; such as 
different groups within a firm and relationships with other firms.  
 
Financial attributes: 
Chinese firms have increasingly paid attention to the development of their 
financial management skills.  Financial capabilities sought by Chinese firms include 
risk management, financial appraisal, investment assessment, budgeting, and the 
controlling and monitoring of working capital (Luo, 2000). 
 
1.6.2 Japanese side’s partner evaluation criteria 
To Japanese companies, the Chinese joint venture partner has always retained 
its relevance despite Japanese companies’ increasing experience in China.  The high 
degree of tax law changes, law ambiguity, complex labor relations, and high 
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discretionary powers of local authorities have preserved the importance of a local JV 
partner and its guanxi.  Several studies argue that local partners’ guanxi significantly 
facilitate IJV’s performance including return on investment (ROI), sales growth, and 
risk reduction (e.g. Shenkar, 1990; Chen and Shih, 2005). 
With regard to labor relations, there is higher distrust among Chinese workers towards 
Japanese companies than towards western companies (e.g. Yeung, 2007).  Therefore, 
a local IJV partner remains beneficial as a proxy. 
However, data from Toyo Keizai Kaigai Shinshutsu Kigyo Soran (1986-2003) 
suggests a trend towards upward ownership adjustment by Japanese IJV partners, 
which may reflect their higher levels of confidence in doing business in China. 
 
Industrial experience and market position: 
A local partner’s industrial experience is also of importance in the IJV setup 
process.  In China, a local partner’s market share, market experience, and knowledge 
of the industry can enhance an IJV’s bargaining power vis-à-vis the government and 
enable it to achieve greater efficiency. 
 
Strategic orientation: 
The consistency of local and foreign partner’s goals and behaviors, 
cooperative culture, and investment commitment are important to the success of an 
IJV (Miles and Snow, 1978; Luo, 2000).  These may pose a challenge with regard to 
both partners’ short and long-term goals.  The Chinese partner may be more likely to 
expect to see higher profits in the short term, whereas the Japanese partner will be 
more likely to put emphasis on the pursuit of greater market share and network 




Organizational level includes both business level and class in China (Luo, 
2000).  SOEs are generally ranked into the following levels: national, provincial, city, 
and county.  At the national and provincial levels, SOEs can further be classified into 
first, second, and third class companies.  The higher-class companies usually have 
higher product quality, better internal management, faster customer responsiveness, 
and higher organizational performance.  Potential local JV partners are likely to be 
first-tier companies.  Moreover, each level entails a certain degree of support from 
the government.  First-class companies receive the most generous financial support 
but often face high interference from the government (Luo, 2000). 
 
Local partner’s learning ability: 
IJV literature has noted that complementary needs create interpartner fit 
which has a synergistic effect on firm performance (Buckley and Casson, 1988).  
However, asset complementariness and meaningful learning will not materialize 
unless a certain level of knowledge and skills are already in place (Luo, 2000).  
Similarly, Kremic (2003) has argued that a large skills gap inhibits technology transfer 
and weighs on the productivity of IJVs.  The success of an IJV will thus largely 
depend on the local partner’s ability to acquire and internalize new knowledge and 
skills based on its default knowledge level with which it enters an IJV. 
 
1.7 Japanese investment in China 
Japanese investment in China has ranked second after Hong Kong since 1988, 
when Japan surpassed the US as the second-largest investor in China (e.g. Luo, 2002).  
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Japanese FDI in China peaked in 1995 and 1996, but fell subsequently, until 
recovering in the year 2000, continuing to do so until 2004.  In 1998, for instance, 
Japanese foreign direct investment in China dropped by 21% to US$2.7 billion.  This 
figure was less than half the FDI rate of 1995 (Figure 1.1).  Between 1990 and 1995, 
Japanese FDI to China increased rapidly and was 10 times higher in 1995 compared 
to 1990.  By the second half of the 1990s, those companies that had already 
established subsidiaries in China were building more factories, adding local suppliers, 
and expanding product ranges. 
Japanese companies in China also faced increasing competition from Chinese 
manufacturers.  By the early 2000s, Chinese companies had become competitive 
with their Japanese counterparts in several product categories, notably electrical 
appliances in the maturing stage of the product life cycle.  A case in point is the TV 
market.  China was once a large market for Japanese TV sets, but nearly 80% of TV 
sets made in China at the turn of the millennium bore Chinese brand names, which 
was an increase of more than 60% compared to 1995 (Luo, 2000).  Japanese 
companies therefore faced more challenges in gaining local market share.  Rising 
technological capabilities in China that have resulted in globally marketable products 
have since extended to state-of-the-art high-tech industries.  In the microelectronics 
sector, notable examples of globally recognized brands include Lenovo, Huawei, and 
ZTE groups. 
Furthermore, the 1990s recession in Japan affected small and medium 
businesses particularly adversely since they encountered difficulties in receiving bank 
loans.  In the context of Japanese companies, this was important because small and 
medium-sized companies account for more than 70% of Japanese FDI in China.  
Combined with other obstacles such as opaque legal and tax systems, some companies 
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shelved plans for expansion.  For instance, Sharp established its first subsidiary in 
China in 1992 opening five subsidiaries since then, but has had no plans of opening 
more subsidiaries.  Likewise, Hitachi has not opened another subsidiary in China 
since 1997 (Luo, 2002).  Figures 1.1 and 1.2 illustrate the development of Japanese 
FDI in China from 1980 until recent years. 
 
Figure 1.1: Annual Formation of Japanese companies’ subsidiaries in China 
 









North = Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Shanxi, Inner Mongolia 
Northeast = Liaoning, Jilin, Heilongjiang 
East = Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Fujian, Jiangxi, Shandong 
Mid-south = Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Guangdong, Guangxi, Hainan 
Southwest = Chongqing, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Tibet 
Northwest = Shaanxi, Gansu, Ningxia, Xinjiang 
 
Source: Delios et al., 2009, p. 332 
 
 
1.7.1 Structural pattern of Japanese manufacturing companies in China 
In the early 1980s Japanese companies committed much less money in China 
than elsewhere in Asia.  The result was that supporting networks were better 
developed in Southeast Asian countries than in China.  For future entry mode 
choices in China, this meant that Japanese companies had to rely more on Chinese 
partners.  As a result, the proportion of Japanese shared equity companies was higher 
in China than elsewhere in Asia.  In addition, higher resistance from the Chinese 
government in allowing Japanese companies to set up WOS was also a factor in the 
high proportion of IJV setups in China. 
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1.7.2 Sharing of control 
Foreign companies continue to prefer strong management control and have 
taken advantage of China’s policies allowing for greater flexibility in establishing 
wholly-owned subsidiaries.  Japanese companies have been an exception.  Despite 
new policies, most Japanese investment has remained in the form of shared 
ownership. 
Equity-based JVs and contractual JVs have been the major forms of 
investment by Japanese companies in China.  They comprised 80% to 90% in the 
1980s and still remain an important investment vehicle today at about 70% of all 
Japanese investment in China.  In non-high-tech industries, the vast majority of 
Japanese companies (approximately 85%) still prefers to take minority positions at 
below 50% ownership (Toyo Keizai Kaigai Shinshutsu Kigyo Soran, 1986-2003).12
 
 
1.8 Further issues 
Many high-tech companies have been reluctant to share ownership in China 
due to technology protection motives as well as other disadvantages associated with 
IJVs and potentially strong government involvement.  Japanese investment, in 
particular, has been cautious with regard to taking even majority ownership shares, 
often preferring to accept minority shares and minimize risk.  As a result, Japanese 
companies have also shown remarkable restraint in transferring value-added activities 
and preferred to use China as a production base for export more so than western 
companies. 
This dissertation, however, focuses on subsidiaries in which the Japanese 
                                                   
12 By contrast, other foreign companies (western companies) have preferred strong management control and encountered less 
government resistance in obtaining approval for higher-control equity arrangements.  Since 1996, WOS have become favored 
entry modes for western companies and now make up more than 50% of FDI in China.  Presently, about 34% of total western 
FDI is made up of equity IJVs. 
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company holds a majority equity share, and therefore includes majority 
Japanese-owned IJVs and WOS.  Specifically, the dissertation will focus on the 
transfer of high-value-added activities by Japanese high-tech companies, the 
performance of which can be affected by the choice of entry mode and subsequent 
ownership structures. 
The next chapter will review the literature on entry modes, ownership 
structures and subsidiary performance.  Furthermore, it will define productivity 
growth that is due to technology and knowledge transfer as a new type of subsidiary 
performance measure and establish links between entry modes, ownership structures 
and measures of subsidiary performance.
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2. Literature review 
In this chapter, I will review the literature underlying the choice of the 
general theoretical framework for my model.  The chapter begins with a historical 
overview of trade and FDI theories and proceeds to identify transaction cost (TC) and 
internalization theories as the foundations for a new model that combines hierarchical 
ownership with a view to minimizing transaction costs for complementary assets, and 
tacit knowledge in particular.  The main purpose of this chapter is to review FDI and 
entry mode theories and give a full account of the complexities involved in the 
exchange of knowledge under different entry modes and ownership conditions within 
high-tech companies in which a high degree of tacit knowledge is present. 
The chapter will start by charting a historical account of FDI and early entry 
mode theories before discussing internalization and transaction cost theories in more 
detail.   Internalization and transaction cost theories form the foundation for the 
development of my theory, in which ownership levels are linked to efficiency in 
transaction processes, particularly for tacit knowledge. 
Following a discussion of internalization and transaction cost theories, I will 
then address equity-based entry modes and ownership levels as a medium for the 
control and exchange of complementary assets. 
The issue of tacit knowledge with respect to levels of ownership is then 
discussed within the context of knowledge dynamism.  In other words, 
organizational learning may cause knowledge levels present at the time a subsidiary 
was formed to change significantly over the lifetime of the subsidiary.  Therefore, 
entry modes and ownership levels with which a subsidiary was originally established 
may need to be adjusted later in order to ensure efficiency in transacting 
complementary assets.  This chapter will discuss the role of ownership in transacting 
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complementary assets and prepare the foundation for a more in-depth discussion of 
transaction costs and their proxies in the quantitative chapter. 
The literature review begins with a historical background of entry modes and 
proceeds to reviewing internalization and transaction cost theories before linking them 
to entry modes and ownership levels.  This is done in section 2.2 and its subsections.  
Section 2.3 will talk about hierarchical entry modes in several steps. The section 
begins with a discussion of equity-based joint ventures and wholly-owned subsidiaries 
within the context of internalization and transaction cost perspectives and develops 
into a discussion of ownership levels and subsidiary performance that is attributable to 
efficient transaction of technology and knowledge as complementary assets.  The 
concept of technology/knowledge-based productivity growth as a proxy for 
transaction processes will be introduced.  This concept will form the basis for a 
quantitative analysis and further discussions in case studies in chapters 3 and 4, 
respectively.  Finally, the literature review will discuss the concept of knowledge 
dynamism as an essential element in the adjustment of ownership structures that can 
cause variations in the growth of technology/knowledge-based productivity. 
 
2.1 Entry modes: historical overview 
The following sections will review theories of entry modes and provide a 
basis for the discussion of the particular contributions this dissertation will make to 
existing theories on entry modes.  Sections 2.1.1 to 2.1.4 will provide an overview of 




                                                   
13 Sections 2.1.1 to 2.1.4 are based on an overview of a history of entry mode theories compiled by Zhou Nan (2005) for a 
graduate research seminar at National University of Singapore. 
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2.1.1. Vernon’s product life cycle 
Vernon’s Product Cycle (1966) theory distinguishes three main phases in the 
life of a product: new product, maturing product, and standardized product.  Each 
stage of the cycle requires a different location strategy.  His theory successfully 
explains the post-war acceleration of US foreign investment as a response to either a 
reduction of lag between innovation and non-standardization or to increasing 
consumer preferences for new products.  However, it cannot explain foreign 
investment which is not export-substituting, and products which do not follow this life 
cycle.  However, the location advantage of Dunning’s (1976) eclectic theory builds 
on this theory by focusing on host country advantages.14
 
 
2.1.2  International trade aspect 
The International Trade Aspect derives from the traditional international trade 
theory. This theory views foreign direct investment as capital movement.  It therefore 
explains why there is capital movement across borders.  Accordingly, there will be 
capital flows to the place where the return of capital is higher (e.g. Dunning, 1958; 
Brash, 1966; Safarian, 1966).  This theory, however, is rudimentary and does not 
recognize different forms or motivations for FDI.  For instance, it does not talk about 
the attributes of different locations, ownership and control forms, nor does it account 
for other strategic and non-financial decision factors such as expansion of market 
share or accumulation of knowledge and experience.  It also does not take into 
account the time required in their accumulation.  Moreover, the theory also cannot 
explain simultaneous FDI decisions (e.g. Musgrave, 1969; Freeman, 1971).  
Therefore, this theory is no longer useful. 
                                                   
14 Dunning’s (1976) eclectic theory is also known as the OLI paradigm. The acronym refers to a firm’s ownership, location, and 
internalization advantages. 
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Similar to the above theory, Aliber’s (1970) theory regards FDI as a 
currency-area phenomenon.  Aliber (1970) argues that American firms can finance 
more cheaply outside the US because the currency premium on the dollar is lower.  
In other words, the US dollar is strong in the sense that it is unlikely to depreciate. 
This theory successfully explained the post-war expansion of US multinationals in 
Europe in the 1950s and 1960s and Japanese MNEs in Southeast Asia in the late 
1960s.  However, Aliber’s theory cannot explain investment within currency areas or 
inverse investment (to the US) partly due to the long-term depreciation of the US 
dollar, while also failing to account for non-financial aspects of international 
investments. 
Another notable early scholar of international trade is Kojima.  Kojima 
(1978) views FDI as an instrument by which the comparative trading advantages of 
nations may be enhanced.  He posits that the home country should invest abroad in 
sectors that require intermediate products which the host country is capable of 
producing and supplying.  His theory mostly explains Japanese FDI in the 1960s and 
1970s.  However, his approach is deficient in that his theory cannot explain or 
evaluate welfare implications of FDI induced by the desire to rationalize production, 
and he ignores the internalization of the intermediate product market.  Therefore, his 
theory is locked into a neoclassical paradigm of perfect markets and competition and 
ignores the possibility of market failure. 
 
2.1.3  Behavior and reaction aspect 
Early studies on the background of FDI theories focused on the behavior and 
reaction aspects and later the international trade aspect.  Scholars of the former 
included Aharoni and Knickerbocker.  Aharoni (1966) posited that FDI is a 
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behavioral process whose timing depends on chance stimuli and in the process 
management converts these stimuli into decisions to invest.  Therefore, investment 
decisions may be biased because of the self interests of managers.  This self interest 
of managers is also one of the earliest considerations given to the later concepts of 
bounded rationality and opportunism in later studies of entry mode decision making 
processes (e.g. Delios and Beamish, 1996; Daellenbach and Davenport, 2004).  As 
one of the earliest theories on entry modes, the Behavior and Reaction Aspect was 
flawed in the sense that it was manager-biased and that its underlying sample only 
included companies that were new to international markets.  It was thus a relatively 
simple attempt at explaining initial causes for a company to invest outside its home 
market. 
 
2.1.4  Oligopolistic reaction theory 
Knickerbocker (1973), another notable representative of the early behavior 
and reaction aspect theories, extended Aharoni’s explanation for FDI in his 
Oligopolistic Reaction Theory.  In it, Knickerbocker (1973) focuses on companies by 
industry and posits that firms within a given industry tend to follow the industry 
leader to invest abroad.  By contrast, early entry mode studies assumed the foreign 
market entry of a firm to be an independent decision.  Knickerbocker (1973) 
pioneered the notion of interdependent foreign market entry behavior (Chan et al., 
2006: 644).  According to Knickerbocker (1973), competing firms will imitate 
incumbent firms in the same industries as a competitive response to prevent 
pioneering firms from monopolizing the market.  His theory was marked by the 
achievement that it explained the bunching/agglomeration of FDI in oligopolistic 
industries.  It thus takes the action of competitors into consideration.  The theory’s 
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weakness, however, is in the fact that the objective of the firm is not clear and the 
theory offers no explanation of the investment behavior of the initiating firm.  
However, later studies have used and extended Knickerbocker’s (1973) theory into 
transaction cost-based studies that examine followers’ entry mode decisions based on 
factors such as the ability to acquire experience and understanding of the local market 
and institutions as intangible assets (e.g. Johanson and Vahlne, 1977; Delios and 
Beamish, 2001; Chan et al., 2006).  With regard to a market follower’s behavior, 
other scholars have noted synergy effects derived from replicating other firm’s entry 
modes such as shared supplier networks and/or economies of scale (e.g. Buckley and 
Casson, 1988; 1996). 
 
2.2 Entry modes: theoretical overview 
 Conceptual and empirical work has appeared in studies by Buckley and 
Casson (1976) and Hennart (1982), who have sought to explain the firm-specific, 
transaction-related motives for full or shared ownership in foreign subsidiaries (Delios 
and Beamish, 1999) extending Hymer’s (1976) study that discussed the frequency of 
the transfer of firm-specific advantages when firms make direct foreign investments.   
Grossman and Hart (1986) discuss links between ownership and control.  Delios and 
Beamish (1999) analyze the relationship between degree of control and protection of 
proprietary assets on foreign market entries.  Acquisition of complementary  assets 
on foreign market entry, the international experience levels of the foreign firm, and 
the institutional environment in the foreign country exert great influence in a firm’s 
foreign entry mode decision process.  I will first discuss the development of entry 
mode decision theories in the three main categories, namely, OLI, internalization and 
transaction cost theories.  They form a foundation for my own concept which is then 
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developed and put into the broader background of these theories within the 
quantitative chapter. 
 
2.2.1  Eclectic theory (OLI paradigm) and its origin 
Dunning (1976) created the OLI paradigm, which addressed the decisions of 
companies to invest abroad based on companies’ ownership advantages, location 
advantages, and internalization advantages, hence the acronym.  Its origins can be 
traced to monopolistic advantage theory, also known as the Hymer-Kindleberger 
Theory (1969).  In this theory, the reason why firms invest abroad is that they can 
earn a higher return than the local firms.  Since there are additional costs associated 
with producing in international markets, there must be some kind of advantage that 
cannot be obtained by local competitors.  This advantage stems from the imperfect 
competition of goods and factors, internal and external economies of scale, and 
government limitations (market imperfections).15
Dunning’s (1976) OLI paradigm successfully explained why a foreign-owned 
firm is able to compete with local firms in the host country.  This theory was based 
on findings by Johnson (1970), Caves (1971), and Hirsch (1974), all of whom 
emphasized different sources of a firm’s advantage. 
 
Johnson (1970) highlighted the marginal product of education and 
managerial knowledge inherent to those firms that are able to introduce new 
techniques of production, giving them their competitive advantage and justification 
for entering and existing in a foreign market.  Caves (1971) afforded several 
advantages to a multinational firm that established a subsidiary overseas.  These 
                                                   
15 Dunning (1995) segmented imperfect markets into those with structural market failure and those with natural market failure.  
In the former, participants in or outside the market distort supply and demand conditions, such as government regulations, tax 
rules, or other legislation relevant to FDI.  Natural market failure refers to the difficulty of predicting the behavior of market 
participants, and includes information asymmetry, opportunism, and bounded rationality. 
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included economies of scale, brand differentiation, spillover effects from marketing 
activities, and/or its stock of superior information and experience versus local firms. It 
was these advantages, he argued, that allowed the foreign firm to overcome its 
liability of being foreign. 
Hirsch (1974) advanced prior theories by developing a model of 
low-hierarchy entry modes, in which a foreign firm faced the choice of either 
exporting to another country or manufacturing in that country.  He argued that 
different processes of production would take place where conditions were most 
suitable, i.e. if costs of knowledge creation, costs of marketing, or costs of exporting 
were higher than costs of manufacturing and marketing in the host country, the firm 
would choose to manufacture in the host country, with the idea that marketing costs in 
the home country would eventually decline as a result.  In a multi-product firm, the 
result was that lower marketing costs would make products that the firm could not 
export or produce abroad more exportable in the future.  Dunning (1976, 1997) 
blended these theoretical foundations in the OLI paradigm. 
Buckley and Casson (1976) explained the rationale behind the existence of 
multinational enterprises (MNEs).  According to them, an imperfect market 
increases transaction costs and if transaction costs are greater than the cost of 
internalization, the company will internalize.  The importance of their theory is its 
explanation of the rapid growth of MNEs after World War II by internalization of the 
market for knowledge.  The demand for research and development (R&D) and new 
knowledge increases while the cost of R&D decreases, therefore resulting in the need 
for large-scale R&D.  Buckley and Casson (1976) posited that the benefits of 
internalizing knowledge were large and firms thus tended to internalize knowledge 
and/or R&D before creating an MNE.  Their theory also served as one of the pillars 
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for Dunning’s OLI theory by focusing on internalization advantages. 
Dunning’s (1976) OLI paradigm (eclectic theory) provides a comprehensive 
and testable paradigm to study FDI.  In general, it answers the question of why firms 
invest abroad.  Ownership advantage explains who invests, location advantage 
explains where to invest, and internalization advantage explains how to invest.  
Ownership advantages may result from the exclusive or privileged possession of or 
access to particular income-generating assets.  Location advantages refer to the 
beneficial attributes of a host country while internalization advantages refer to the 
benefits of adding value to assets through their hierarchical management, rather than 
by selling assets or rights to other firms.  In sum, the OLI paradigm synthesizes 
several theories and can therefore explain various types of FDI. 
 
2.2.2   Internalization theory 
FDI has been conceptualized as a firm’s response to advantages (e.g. 
Dunning, 1995).  Early scholars, such as Caves (1971) and Hymer (1976) argue that 
firms that possess advantages invest abroad, while Dunning et al. (1977) add that 
countries with favorable resource endowments and geographical locations become 
sites of inbound FDI, and where there is market failure in the trade of a firm’s 
proprietary knowledge, the recipient firm that internalized this knowledge will have 
an advantage (Buckley and Casson, 1976; Rugman 1981; Hennart, 1982).  Where 
market failure, structural and/or natural, requires one (transferring) firm to give up 
knowledge free of charge, efficiency in knowledge exchange is compromised as the 
firm will stop transferring advanced technology/knowledge and become cautious 
towards the partner.  Therefore, the internalization-advantage point of view within 
Dunning’s OLI framework would assume that a firm is better off owning the 
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production function (internalizing) if there is a high possibility that market agents 
would take advantage of the entrant's incomplete knowledge (information asymmetry) 
and if the firm cannot anticipate all possible future market transactions.  As noted by 
Delios and Beamish (1996), the OLI paradigm melds these views.  Location and 
internalization together with ownership advantages affect multinational companies’ 
actions and patterns of FDI.  With regard to the discussion of OLI and Hymer’s 
(1976) thesis, Kogut and Zander (1993) note that the central issues with regard to FDI 
have been ownership advantages. 
Likewise, Casson (1990), an internalization theorist, criticized Dunning’s 
OLI paradigm for double meaning concerning ‘ownership advantages’.  He argued 
that ownership advantages were strongly related to internalization; therefore there was 
ambiguity.  Dunning (1995), however, responded in a later paper arguing that 
ownership advantage was more – it included endogenous and exogenous factors and 
thus concerned itself with the firm’s unique resources and competencies, he argued – 
a factor which is important in transaction cost theory (TC), particularly with regard to 
the transfer of intangible assets (e.g. tacit knowledge).  The concept of knowledge 
transfer has been increasingly important with regard to the transfer of technology and 
managerial knowledge, which are central issues of this dissertation.  The OLI 
paradigm as such has retained its relevance and forms an umbrella for other FDI 
theories, two of which – internalization and transaction cost theories - are most 
relevant to my dissertation. 
 
2.2.3 Utility of internalization theory 
Internalization theory provides an economic rationale for the existence of 
MNEs and their tendency to establish local operations to serve a foreign market.  
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The theory assumes that due to imperfect markets such as those outlined by Dunning 
(1995), a foreign firm is better off using internal structures rather than arm’s length 
market intermediaries in the host country.  A firm is thus better off owning the 
production function (internalizing) if a) there is a high possibility that market agents 
would take advantage of the entrant’s incomplete knowledge (information asymmetry) 
and b) if the firm cannot anticipate all possible future market transactions. 
Morck and Yeung (1991) make an important argument with regard to the 
transfer and acquisition of intangible assets.  They posit that hierarchical entry 
modes should be chosen whenever a firm can increase its value by internalizing 
markets for certain intangible assets.  These commonly include: 
 
 Technological know-how 
 Marketing ability 
 Effective management 
 
The above can be considered tacit knowledge, which is an intangible asset.  
Internalization theory assumes that intangible assets have some of the characteristics 
of public goods in that their value increases in direct proportion to the scale of the 
firm’s market.  Since these assets are based mostly on proprietary information, they 
cannot be exchanged at arm’s length for reasons arising from the economics of 
information, also known as information asymmetry, bounded rationality, and 
economics of public goods (Morck and Yeung, 1992).  They also find that there is no 
reason for a firm to expand internationally in the absence of acquirable intangible 
assets.   
Caves (1989) attributed the lack of intangible assets by the foreign firm to the 
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lack of a basis for utility maximization together with the presence of high transaction 
costs associated with new market entries.  Likewise, Caves (1989) argued that utility 
from a market entry will be enhanced if intangible assets can be gained from the 
foreign partner; however, intangible assets are unlikely to be exchanged or processed 
effectively if either partner does not possess them.  Therefore, the utility to be gained 
from any particular entry mode has to exceed the transaction costs associated with it. 
In the early stages, internalization theory was concerned with discussing 
equity versus non-equity entry modes (Morck and Yeung, 1992; Tallman and Li, 
1996).  Non-equity entry modes included contractual arrangements such as exporting, 
licensing, franchising, distribution, technical contracts, and contractual joint ventures. 
  Non-equity entry modes were suitable where knowledge, skills, or 
technology were known exactly and future market transactions could be foreseen with 
relative certainty.  As such, they were more suitable with regard to the transfer of 
explicit knowledge, i.e. knowledge that is codifiable in the form of manuals, rules, 
and patents.   
Equity-based (hierarchical) entry modes, on the other hand, which include 
international joint ventures (IJVs) and wholly owned subsidiaries (WOS), were more 
useful with regard to knowledge transfer that could not be predicted with precision 
and which included high amounts of tacit knowledge that was subject to information 
uncertainty.  These were difficult to fix contractually beforehand.16
Entry mode studies by internalization theorists concentrated on the choice 
between licensing and direct investment (Buckley and Casson, 1976, Rugman, 1982); 
 
                                                   
16 Tacit knowledge refers to that part of knowledge/technology transfer which is not codifiable, i.e. it cannot be put on paper and 
thus cannot be transferred through arm’s length transactions.  Tacit knowledge encompasses the “know-how” of doing things, 
and is thus an integral part of company culture (Hennart, 1988). Polanyi (1958) defines it as the intimate knowledge of local 
customs, market, politics, and people.  Since tacit knowledge cannot be codified, its exchange/transfer thus relies on human 
contact and communication, instead of manuals and patents (e.g. Morck and Yeung, 1992; Kremic, 2003).  It is therefore subject 
to information uncertainty which Hennart (1988) has described as: 
“The buyer of knowledge cannot be told prior to the sale the exact characteristics of what he is buying.  If the seller were to 
provide that information in order to educate the buyer on the value if know-how for sale, he would, by revealing the information, 
be transferring the know-how free of charge.” (p. 365) 
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although other scholars began to concentrate on the question of level of ownership, 
specifically the choice between wholly-owned subsidiaries and joint ventures 
(Hennart, 1982).  These and other studies in the internalization stream explained 
higher ownership levels as being a response to the need to protect firm-specific 
knowledge from unwanted dissemination, protecting which could result in higher 
transaction costs.  Therefore, internalization theory stated that full ownership and 
control would be observed when a firm transferred unique, firm-specific knowledge to 
the host country when making foreign investments.  Similarly, Hagedoorn and 
Narula (1996) argued that in industries with high R&D intensity, technology 
partnering agreements will be marked by the retention of high ownership levels by the 
technology transferor for reasons of organizational flexibility.   Moreover, Japanese 
companies more frequently engage in equity arrangements as these arrangements 
offer a larger degree of control over technology sharing than non-equity partnerships 
(Hagedoorn and Narula, 1996).  This is in line with findings by internalization 
theorists (e.g. Buckley and Casson, 1988; Dunning, 1995; Rugman, 1980). 
Internalization theory is useful for providing an economic rationale for 
foreign companies to establish presence abroad.  The theory is concerned with 
minimizing location-based disadvantages and imperfect markets, whereby it takes the 
general view that a foreign firm is better off using internal structures rather than arm’s 
length market intermediaries in a host country.  Generally, internalization theory 
takes the view that imperfect markets increase transaction costs and if the cost of 
arm’s length market transactions is greater than the cost of internalization, the foreign 
company will internalize.  Per internalization theory, a company is thus better off 
owning the production function as a result of imperfect markets arising from the 
difficulty of anticipating all future market transactions.  The theory therefore 
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addresses whether a foreign company should choose an equity-based mode or a 
non-equity-based entry mode.  Internalization theorist’s notable preference for 
wholly-owned entry modes to JVs, however, raises a problem with regard to 
knowledge-intensive industries and their resource commitment in the transfer of 
explicit and tacit knowledge.  Resource commitment does not apply to the foreign 
firm unilaterally. 
Although a fundamental tenet of internalization theory is the reduction of 
location-based disadvantages through the acquisition of local knowledge, the 
fundamental assumption of internalization theory is that the foreign firm will increase 
its resource commitment in the host country as location-based disadvantages diminish, 
or local knowledge is acquired through experience.  The disadvantage, however, is 
precisely that the theory views knowledge acquisition as an inevitable process 
whereby experience is simply gained by being in the host country.  It does not, for 
instance, view the sources of local knowledge as entities with their own motivations 
(i.e. bounded rationality), and thus does not address the interaction between the 
sources of local knowledge (e.g. local IJV partners) and the foreign entrant itself.  
The amount of local knowledge that the foreign firm is exposed to may depend on its 
ability to contribute its knowledge or other assets to the local subsidiary, including the 
JV partner.  This is why internalization theory is not adequate in explaining entry 
mode choices within equity-based entry modes.  Particularly where JVs are chosen 
as entry modes, it is not adequate to explain the level of control (e.g. level of foreign 
ownership).  A significant disadvantage of internalization theory has thus been its 
limitation in explaining technology transfer in more knowledge-intensive industries 
with high levels of tacit knowledge, which has also been referred to in the literature as 
asset specificity (e.g. Delios and Beamish, 1997).  It means that the asset has limited 
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or no use if it leaves the firm which owns and understands it (e.g. Delios and Beamish, 
1999; 1999; Dhanaraj and Beamish, 2003; Delios and Henisz, 2002).  As such, the 
choice of control level within equity-based entry modes becomes important.  It is 




2.2.4  Transaction cost (TC) theory 
In transaction cost (TC) theory, the focus of entry modes shifted to equity 
participation, explaining the choice between JVs and WOS, and later ownership levels 
within JVs.  The theory could address the transfer and internalization of tangible and 
intangible assets.18
Transaction cost theory is thus concerned with finding the most efficient 
structures under which to govern a specific set of transactions.  Many studies have 
used ownership as a proxy for such governance.  For example, Grossman and Hart 
(1986) have found that proprietary assets form the ownership advantage of the firm 
and that the level of ownership assumed in the foreign subsidiary “confers a 
proportional degree of control over the uses of firm-specific assets.” (Grossman and 
Hart, 1986; Delios and Beamish, 1999).  Delios and Beamish (1999) mention in their 
research on IJV ownership structures that the control and protection of proprietary 
assets is only one consideration in “structuring a foreign market entry,” and that the 
need to acquire complementary assets is a key motivation behind the structure of 
 
                                                   
17 For this dissertation, I want to establish at which ownership structure the most efficient transfer rate between sources of 
knowledge can thus occur.  I distinguish between two types of knowledge: Explicit and tacit knowledge.  Explicit knowledge 
is codifiable knowledge contained in patents, technical drawings, manuals, etc.  Explicit knowledge can be transferred in both 
hierarchical and non-hierarchical entry modes.  Tacit knowledge refers to company culture, values, management style, 
experience, and connections.  Tacit knowledge is not codifiable in manuals or patents and can only be exchanged through 
human contact and communication.  Therefore, the choice of a correct equity-based entry mode becomes critical, where the idea 
is that in lieu of an arm’s length market transaction (i.e. a monetary transaction), a local partner’s resource commitment 
(commitment to contribute intangible assets), including the local partner’s, will depend on some other proxy - equity in the case 
of this dissertation.  Assessing the value of knowledge becomes a critical issue. 
18 Tangible assets include land, machinery, factories, as well as explicit knowledge.  Intangible assets include tacit knowledge, 
and those assets that are not tangible “objects”, such as government connections, a large client base, or access to and knowledge 
of the market and suppliers. 
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ownership, moderated by endogenous and exogenous factors, such as the firm’s 
international experience and the institutional environment in the host country. 
Other transaction cost scholars such as Chan et al. (2006) view entry modes 
as organizational responses to imperfections in the goods, knowledge, and capital 
markets.  Therefore, the ideas of transaction cost theory run parallel to those of 
internalization theory (e.g. Williamson, 1975; 1985).  Accordingly, scholars writing 
on entry mode strategies (e.g. Anderson and Gatignon, 1986) and scholars writing on 
the theories of JVs based their ideas of transaction cost theory on previous work on 
internalization theory.  Buckley and Casson (1976) and Hennart (1982) argue that 
firms make foreign investments to minimize market transaction costs by internalizing 
transactions other than cross-border “interdependent economic activities” (Chan et al., 
2006: 644). 
 
2.2.5  Utility of transaction cost theory 
Transaction cost theory can be applied to determining an efficient governance 
structure for a specific set of transactions.  Chan et al. (2006) view foreign direct 
investment as an organizational response to imperfections in the goods, knowledge, 
and capital markets.   
Studies on the theories of joint ventures (e.g. Beamish and Banks, 1987, 
Hennart, 1988, Kogut, 1988) and entry mode strategies (Anderson and Gatignon, 
1986) combined the ideas of transaction cost theory with internalization theory.  
Previously, Buckley and Casson (1976) and Hennart (1982) had argued that firms 
make foreign investments to minimize market transaction costs by internalizing 
transactions and other cross-border “interdependent economic activities”  (Chan et 
al., 2006: 644).  A problem that remains, however, is the choice of an optimum 
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equity-based platform for such foreign investment. 
Many theories exist as to the entry mode behavior of foreign companies, with 
consideration to nationality or culture (e.g. Delios and Beamish, 1999, 2001), 
experience in foreign market entries (e.g. Delios and Beamish, 1999, 2001; Buckley 
and Casson, 1976, 1996), industry (e.g. Chan et al., 2006), and possession of 
ownership advantages, including those of the local partner.  Likewise, scholars of 
trade theory, economic geography, and strategic management view foreign direct 
investment as a platform from which firms can gain access to location-specific assets 
including tangible assets such as raw material, labor, or knowledge, and other 
strategic assets owned by firms in the host country (Dunning, 1995).  Such local 
assets can generate rents if combined with specific non-transferable intangible assets 
of the foreign firm such as technological and managerial know-how, international 
marketing expertise, and experience in foreign markets (Asiedu and Esfahani, 2001). 
Other studies indicate that certain types of local assets are costly to obtain 
through market transactions – these are mainly intangible assets.  For developing 
countries including China these will mostly include local market knowledge, access to 
the local market and suppliers, and government connections (e.g. Luo, 2001).  
Although experience in foreign market entries and experience accumulated over time 
in a foreign market (e.g. China) can mitigate the need for a local partner to provide 
these, the local partner’s acquisition of knowledge and improvements in technologies 
in the same time period often leads to a renewed utility for the local partner with 
regard to technologies and new uses for intangible assets. These can include finding 
new suppliers, providing new market access and knowledge that was previously not 
required and potentially re-negotiating with government agencies as subsidiaries 
assume new and higher value-added projects such as research and development 
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(R&D) (Asiedu and Esfahani, 2001). 
The cost of transacting intangible assets can be particularly high due to faulty 
ownership structures that do not, for example, address inadequacies in the institutional 
environment of the host country (Asiedu and Esfahani, 2001).19
In a later study, Buckley and Casson (1996) proposed that the rationale of joint 
ownership is that it allows both partner firms to acquire some of the benefits of 
internalizing knowledge flows without incurring the full set-up costs if they were to 
establish as WOS (p. 859). 
 
In conceptual and empirical entry mode studies, however, transaction cost 
theory has been particularly useful in understanding the determination of ownership 
levels (e.g. Anderson and Gatignon, 1986; Gatignon and Anderson, 1988; 
Gomes-Casseres, 1989).  Asiedu and Esfahani (2001) noted that in transaction cost 
theory of ownership structure the choice between sole and joint ownership depended 
on the benefits of avoiding costly arm’s-length transactions relative to the costs of 
sharing ownership, which include impeded decision making, reduced incentives, and 
free riding by partners (p.648).   
Gatignon and Anderson (1986) equated the amount of equity ownership to 
the amount of control a firm can exert over its subsidiary’s operations.  They 
consider control important as it provides the foreign parent with the ability to 
influence systems, methods, and decisions (Anderson and Gatignon, 1986), while 
Davidson (1982) remarks that control is a means to resolve disputes arising in the 
joint management of an enterprise. 
Other research has implicated IJVs to be an important strategic tool to 
                                                   
19 Grossman and Hart (1986) claim that ownership is purchasing control of “residual” rights – those rights that are difficult to 
define in advance in contracts and applicable to high-tech industries where product life cycles are short and development fast.  
This basic principle is applied in this dissertation. 
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overcome resource constraints at the time of foreign market entry, and a preferred tool 
to WOS when the cost of acquiring complementary assets on the market exceeds the 
cost of acquisition through joint venturing (e.g. Beamish and Delios, 1999). 
With transaction cost theory, the focus shifted to equity participation that 
explained the choice between JVs and WOS first.  A logical extension to the choice 
between sole ownership and shared ownership would be to determine optimum levels 
of shared ownership (within JVs).  Transaction cost theorists viewed JVs as a better 
structure for the transfer of knowledge that was difficult to obtain through market 
transactions.  Transfer of technology and knowledge can be used as a reference by 
which to determine optimal ownership structures. 
Moreover, Beamish (1988) focused on the role of IJVs as a means of local 
knowledge acquisition by positing that some types of knowledge cannot be obtained 
through market transactions or experience accumulation.  Such knowledge can be 
obtained through shared equity (e.g. IJVs).  Therefore, ownership becomes a proxy 
for the exchange of knowledge, particularly tacit knowledge. 
Beamish (1988) found that the need for a local firm is a significant factor that 
influences IJV performance.  Makino and Delios (1996) remarked that this need 
became more pronounced when foreign firms operated in developing countries.  
Gomes-Casseres (1989) noted that access to information about the local environment 
was the main criterion for US companies to set up IJVs with local partners in 
environments where information was difficult to obtain and the infrastructure 
generally weak.   
In a study of US-Japanese IJVs in the automotive industry, Inkpen (1992) 
found that US partners required the Japanese partner’s technological knowledge, 
while the Japanese partner required knowledge about how to operate locally.  In 
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addition, Nitsch et al. (1995) found in a study of Japanese companies with several 
alliances in Southeast Asia that access to local knowledge was the primary concern. 
 
 Firm experience and knowledge 
The construct of firm experience and knowledge acquired from previous 
market entries abroad remains unclear despite previous studies on the topic (e.g. 
Makino and Delios, 1996).  Local knowledge has been examined under the umbrella 
of local experience and generally quantified in the number of years that a foreign 
company has accumulated in a particular location (e.g. Makino and Delios, 1996).  
The acquisition of local knowledge through the accumulation of operational 
experience in the host country has also been considered to free a foreign firm from the 
need for a local partner (Makino and Delios, 1996).  Within tacit knowledge, the 
amount of experience, however, has had an inconclusive effect on the choice of 
control with positive (e.g. Davidson, 1980; Gatignon and Anderson, 1988), negative 
(e.g. Stopford and Wells, 1972; Davidson and McFetridge, 1985), and neutral effects 
(e.g. Sharma and Johanson, 1987; Kogut and Singh, 1988).  Erramilli (1991) 
provides a more conclusive explanation on the relationship between experience and 
control, in which he identified a U-shaped relationship.  Unlike Erramilli’s (1991) 
study, I seek to establish a relationship between ownership level (control) and the rate 
of technological progress that implies an efficient rate of knowledge exchange among 
the participants in the JV. 
Hagedoorn and Narula (1996) argue that in industries with high R&D 
intensity, technology partnering agreements will be marked by the retention of high 
control (i.e. ownership levels) by the technology transferor to ensure organizational 
flexibility.  Moreover, Hagedoorn and Narula (1996) point out that Japanese 
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companies more frequently engage in equity arrangements as these offer a larger 
degree of control over technology sharing than non-equity partnerships. 
 
2.2.6  Network theory 
Another stream of research has focused on the MNC-centered network theory.  
Teece (1991), Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989), and Gupta and Govindarajan (1991) 
explain that an MNC is a network of capital, product, and knowledge transactions 
among units located in different countries.  Root (1987) classifies entry mode 
strategies into three broad categories: export entry modes, contractual entry modes, 
and investment entry modes.  Under network theory and Root’s (1987) progressive 
framework of entry modes, export entry modes involve product flows from the home 
country to foreign markets.  Contractual entry modes involve knowledge flows from 
corporate headquarters to foreign contractors/contractual partner.  Investment entry 
modes are characterized by capital and knowledge flows from the parent company to 
foreign subsidiaries.  The latter would resemble my approach to ownership levels 
within equity-based entry modes, even though I will not specifically use network 
theory. 
 
2.2.7  Other factors relevant to theories on entry modes 
Many studies exist as to the entry mode behavior of foreign companies that 
take into account moderating factors such as nationality (culture) (e.g. Delios and 
Beamish, 1999; 2001), experience in foreign market entries (Delios and Beamish, 
1999, 2001; Buckley and Casson, 1976; 1996), a firm’s industry (e.g. Chan et al., 
2006), and possession and interaction of tangible and intangible assets across borders 
(e.g. Inkpen and Beamish, 1997; Doukas et al., 1999; Makino and Inkpen, 2003).  
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Other scholars view FDI as a means by which firms can gain access to 
location-specific assets including factor endowments such as raw material, labor, or 
knowledge, and strategic assets owned by other firms in the host country (Dunning, 
1995).  According to Dunning (1995), such local assets can generate rents if 
combined with specific non-transferable intangible assets of the foreign firm such as 
technological and managerial know-how, international marketing expertise, and 
experience with foreign markets (Asiedu and Esfahani, 2001). 
Asiedu and Esfahani (2001) also argue that the cost of transacting intangible 
or knowledge-based assets is often high due to opportunistic behavior which stems 
from a lack of sufficient control mechanisms within the subsidiary as a result of 
unsuitable ownership structures.  In addition, Asiedu and Esfahani (2001) point out 
that the cost of transacting intangible assets is high if ownership structures are not set 
correctly for a given subsidiary. 
Ownership structures depend on the amount and type of tangible and 
intangible assets held by both equity partners.  Several factors are important such as 
tacit knowledge (experience in foreign markets, innovativeness, connections) as well 
as tangible assets such as capital, technologies, and processes and other factors such 
as industry, firm size, and R&D intensity. 
Buckley and Casson (1996) propose that the rationale for joint ownership is 
that both partner firms can acquire some of the benefits of internalizing knowledge 
flows without incurring the full setup costs had they established as WOS. 
Gatignon and Anderson (1986) and Grossman and Hart (1986) relate the 
amount of equity ownership to the amount of control a firm can exert over its 
subsidiary’s operations.  Ownership is directly linked to the level of control, 
providing the foreign parent with the ability to influence systems, methods, and 
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decisions (Gatignon and Anderson, 1986).  Moreover, Davidson (1982) remarked 
that control/ownership is a means to resolve disputes arising from the joint 
management of a subsidiary. 
Other research has implicated IJVs to be an important strategic tool to 
overcome resource constraints at the time of market entry, and a preferred tool to 
WOS when the cost of acquiring complementary assets through arm’s length market 
transactions exceeds the cost of acquiring them through joint venturing (e.g. Delios 
and Beamish, 1999).  I use transaction cost and internalization theories as the basic 
concepts from which I develop further quantitative models. 
 
2.2.8  Existing entry mode models and transaction cost theory 
While earlier entry mode models argue from a product differentiation 
perspective (Agarwal and Ramaswami, 1992), most subsequent entry mode models 
take a hierarchical view in which entry mode choice is a decision between low-control 
and high-control entry modes (Anderson and Gatignon, 1986). 
In this thesis, I link control and ownership by setting ownership as proxy for 
control.  Ownership is thus a purchase of residual control rights that cannot clearly 
be defined at the outset, and would therefore be expensive to obtain through arm’s 
length  transactions subsequently (Grossman and Hart, 1988). 
  Other models that extend entry mode choice to transaction cost factors (e.g. 
Buckley and Casson, 1981, 1996) are limited to choices within low-control entry 
modes (e.g. Buckley and Casson, 1981), although they extend their later model (1996) 
to include joint ventures as the next higher-control entry mode choice.  Kim and 
Hwang (1992) find prior experience in market entry and interaction between 
subsidiaries in different countries to be the main factor behind subsequent entry mode 
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decisions. Pan and Tse (2000) further specify the previous model with respect to entry 
mode choices within the low-control entry mode option (licensing and exporting) and 
high-control entry mode options (JV, WOS) based on transaction cost factors.  Later 
entry mode models argue for control factors as motivators behind entry mode 
decisions (e.g. Pan and Tse, 2000; Chang and Rosenzweig, 2001).   
Agarwal and Ramaswami’s (1992) entry mode model determines a company’s 
mode choice based on their asset specificity, size, and prior experience in foreign 
market entries.  Companies with high asset specificity have a higher ability to 
develop differentiated products and are not likely to show preference for any specific 
entry mode (hierarchical context) in the absence of other variables.  However, in the 
presence of institutional risk, these companies will choose sole ventures as they place 
a premium on control over valuable assets and skills (Agarwal and Ramaswami, 
1992).  Prior foreign market entry experience also increases a firm’s propensity to 
choose a wholly owned mode of entry versus joint venture.  In general, large firms 
will have more foreign market entry experience than small firms, and thus large 
companies are more likely to form sole enterprises.  In the Japanese context this is 
moderated by supplier firms or firms that are part of a vertical keiretsu structure in 
that they will often follow the supplier to a similar location and cluster.  Furthermore, 
as a result of clustering and knowledge pooling, smaller companies will tend to follow 
a similar entry path as the larger MNCs (Maitland et al., 2005). 
Additionally, Kim and Hwang’s (1992) study identifies country risk, location 
unfamiliarity, demand uncertainty marked by industry growth rate and frequency of 
major technological changes, competition intensity (e.g. number of existing and 
potential competitors, instability of market share, fixed costs relative to value added), 
value of firm-specific know-how (e.g. international recognition of brand name, 
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technological innovativeness), and the tacit nature of know-how as key variables in a 
firm’s entry mode choice.  Their model shows that wholly-owned subsidiaries place 
greatest importance on global synergies and the tacit nature of their know-how while 
location unfamiliarity will moderate the previous effects and result in a preference for 
lower-control entry modes through joint ventures. 
Chang and Rosenzweig (2001) further advance the research on entry mode 
modeling by developing a sequential model of a firm’s entry mode.  Their model is a 
first construct in modeling sequential entry. They find that although transaction costs 
and cultural factors are important influences in the initial choice of entry mode, these 
factors tend to become less important as a firm accumulates experience in the host 
country and experience with specific entry modes.  Thus, their study provides an 
important contribution of the effect of experience across entries over time (i.e. that 
firms learn from earlier entry modes).  Their model analyzes sequential entries of 
high-tech companies into the US from 1975 to 1992 from Japan, the UK, and 
Scandinavian countries.  Since their study is based on empirical data, their model 
does not include details about the strategic motivations behind entry mode choice, and 
thus does not mention whether firms set up joint ventures with the intention to acquire 
them later and continue as sole enterprises.  Chang and Rosenzweig (2001) also do 
not include data on performance either at the firm or industry level, and thus do not 
explain whether companies chose entry modes successfully.  In this dissertation I 
seek to close this gap by applying a productivity-based model. 
 
2.3 Joint ventures vs. wholly-owned subsidiaries: transaction cost and 
internalization perspectives 
Hymer (1976), Makino and Delios (1996), and Buckley and Casson (1996) 
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stress that a local joint venture partner is an immediate source of locally-relevant 
knowledge and “provides other valuable resources such as capital, technology, 
customers, and employees.”  On the other hand, the fit between contributed assets 
and complementary assets has been identified by Yan (1999) and Delios and Beamish 
(1999, 2001) as a significant constraint on the productivity and survival of joint 
ventures.  Accordingly, Delios and Beamish (1999) have conducted an empirical 
investigation into the relative importance of three factors – transactional, experiential, 
and institutional – on the ownership strategies of Japanese companies on nine 
countries in East and Southeast Asia, in which they stipulated the percentage of equity 
holding within Japanese subsidiaries at the time of market entry.  Delios and 
Beamish (1999) argue that the topic of ownership levels has received “scant attention 
in the empirical literature” despite the leading position of Japanese firms as foreign 
investor in Asian countries (UNCTAD, 1996).  In all, studies by Gatignon and 
Anderson (1988), Gomes-Casseres (1989) and Hennart (1991) have empirically 
examined ownership strategies of non-Japanese firms outside their home countries 
from a transaction cost-based approach to ownership levels in foreign subsidiaries.  
Delios and Beamish (1999) extended those studies to Japanese companies’ ownership 
levels in Asian countries using a transaction cost approach. 
Further research (e.g. Lu and Beamish, 2006) advances previous transaction 
cost approaches in several ways.  Experience and tacit knowledge brought to a new 
subsidiary depend on how they were gained – whether the foreign firm had obtained 
these intangible assets through IJVs, WOS, or a combination of both in previous 
foreign market entries.  Different experiences let the firm develop country-specific 
and collaborative know-how such as identifying and selecting potential IJV partners 
and the ability to negotiate the terms and structure of a collaborative agreement, 
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knowledge in monitoring the JV partner and knowledge of when and how to exit 
collaborations (Simonin, 1999).  Greater IJV-specific host country experience should 
result in improved subsidiary performance and lower transaction costs in future IJV 
set ups (e.g. Simonin, 1999; Lu and Beamish, 2006). 
Their research, however, raises two questions: First, what are transaction 
costs and how can they be measured?  Second, how can subsequent effects of 
acquiring intangible assets on the subsidiary be measured? 
Hymer (1976) notes that the cost of acquiring complementary assets can be 
considerable, but “once acquired it is a as a fixed cost and need not be incurred 
again.”  His view is static and does not take the effects of learning and subsequent 
changes in knowledge and capabilities into account.  The transaction of tacit 
knowledge that is non-static (and the transaction of intangible assets), however, is 
important in assessing/estimating further transaction costs. Therefore, a suitable 
proxy for transaction costs under circumstances where intangible assets are transacted 
in non-arm’s length transactions is needed. 
 
2.3.1  Further considerations regarding non-arm’s length transactions 
Non-arm’s length transactions are transactions that do not take place on the 
open market and where no exchange of money is involved in order to transact assets.  
Therefore, the value of transactions is difficult to quantify.  For WOS, transactions 
are simpler.  Without a local IJV partner, WOS need to obtain the assets they do not 
already possess through arm’s length transactions; therefore, transaction costs are 
easier to quantify.  For example, if a WOS does not possess an intangible asset, such 
as experience necessary to operate in the host country, knowledge of its market or 
economy, or connections to key people or institutions, a WOS will need to ‘purchase’ 
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that knowledge by hiring the relevant people.  In an IJV, however, this knowledge 
can often be acquired without the need for arm’s length transactions (e.g. hiring), 
since the local partner’s knowledge can be tapped.  It does not mean, however, that 
such knowledge comes free of charge (i.e. free of transaction cost).  Bounded 
rationality, opportunism, or simply irrelevant knowledge can lead to indirect costs.  It 
is therefore difficult to assign a monetary value to such costs.  What can be done, 
however, is to minimize transaction costs through an indirect measure.  An indirect 
quantitative measure would be embodied in a performance-related variable, such as 
residual growth in productivity (due to technology and knowledge flows) for the 
subsidiary which would depend on ownership as the transaction value.  Different 
approaches to performance are discussed subsequently. 
Since ownership is control (Grossman and Hart, 1987), it can also be 
assumed that partner behavior can be controlled through the right choice of ownership.  
The partner wants to obtain certain complementary assets, and ownership can be a 
tool to control the motivation of the local partner.  If ownership for the local partner 
is too little, the local partner will be less motivated to contribute its knowledge, 
guanxi, etc. to the IJV.  The Japanese partner may lose some trust in the local partner 
and become more cautious in its contributions to the IJV.  Consequently, 
implementation of new knowledge would decline, which would affect the value of the 
technology/knowledge-based productivity growth variable.   
In this dissertation, knowledge is viewed as non-static.  Effects of learning 
can result in changing perceptions as to the need for complementary knowledge and 
therefore affect the value of complementary knowledge or assets.  In other words, a 
higher level of knowledge by the local partner will make it more valuable to the 
Japanese partner.  The local partner could become a potential higher value-added 
 64 
partner such as supplier of components or an R&D participant.  This would require 
an adjustment to the value of the medium of exchange (i.e. ownership) for new 
knowledge and complementary assets.  An efficient transaction of those assets would 
result in higher technology/knowledge-based productivity growth.  Accordingly, in 
addition to knowledge, ownership should also be viewed as non-static, and subject to 
change according to the perceived value of tacit knowledge and other intangible assets 
to each partner over time as a result of learning effects. 
To summarize, ownership is used as a proxy for the price or cost of 
transacting complementary assets in non-arm’s length transactions.  The second 
measure - technology/knowledge-based productivity growth - is used to quantify the 
performance of a transaction and therefore validates the cost of the transaction (i.e. 
ownership).  In other words, technology/knowledge-based productivity growth can 
establish whether the cost of the transaction is high, medium, or low relative to what 
is being transacted; and thus whether a transaction is worth proceeding with. 
 
2.3.2  Hierarchical (equity-based) alliance formation 
Alliances have been suggested as one important means of overcoming 
resource and capability constraints and enhancing the likelihood of success for 
internationalizing firms (Jarillo, 1989; Zacharakis, 1997; Beamish, 1994).  Prior 
research on alliances points to several benefits including minimization of transaction 
costs, increased market power, shared risks and better access to key resources – both 
tangible and intangible – such as capital and information (Kogut, 1988; Lu and 
Beamish, 2001).  Therefore, entering into alliances and having access to alliance 
partners’ resources offers a potentially efficient way to overcome resource and 
capability constraints. 
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While the correct entry mode and ownership structure need to be chosen at 
the time of entry, the ownership structure also needs to reflect future contributions and 
knowledge gain by each partner if knowledge is considered to be non-static (Gupta 
and Govindarajam, 1991; Kremic, 2003). 
Each partner’s share should thus reflect the amount of its resource 
contribution.  However, goal misalignment may occur if the partner’s ownership 
share does not reflect its real value or contribution to the joint venture or the other 
partner’s goals.  Ownership share therefore needs to be calibrated in order to align 
interests among joint venture partners. 
The further literature review will discuss existing literature on specific entry 
modes and ownership strategies with respect to joint ventures and introduce the 
concept of knowledge flow and capability building in the context of developing 
countries such as China. 
 
2.3.3  Ownership and measures of performance in the literature 
Existing business literature has referred to different measures in order to 
establish the performance of joint ventures and frequently expressed them in terms of 
financial performance (e.g. Makino and Beamish, 1998), instability or survival rates 
(e.g. Barkema and Vermeulen, 1997; Makino and Beamish, 1998).  Productivity 
measures were used as an extension of the former (e.g. Chen, 2002).  Kogut and 
Zander (1996) measured the growth rate of IJVs in terms of employee numbers.  
Other studies have used profitability and productivity as proxies (e.g. Delios and 
Beamish, 2001; Buckley and Casson, 1996). 
Scholars that have analyzed both performance and ownership include Hamel 
and Prahalad (1989), Calof (1993), Makino and Delios (1996), and Delios and 
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Beamish (1996), and Lu and Beamish (2006).  However, their studies have not 
accounted for the effects of knowledge transfer on performance – in other words, they 
have not considered that part of productivity of an equity-based subsidiary that is due 
to the transfer of tangible and intangible assets.  I will start by reviewing the 
literature on performance-related measures and their influence on ownership. 
 
2.3.3.1  Performance and financial measures 
The transfer of complementary assets has been examined in the context of 
ownership/entry mode choice and a subsidiary’s performance - measured by financial 
measures (e.g. profitability, sales), survival rates (instability), knowledge and 
technology spillovers (learning), and productivity.  Earlier entry mode studies used a 
variety of financial indicators typically employed in business research.  These 
included profitability, growth rates of sales, and cost structures (or lower costs) (e.g. 
Lecraw, 1984; Hamel and Prahalad, 1989; Calof, 1993; Makino and Delios, 1996).  
Later studies measured performance in terms of subsidiary survival rates and duration 
of joint ventures (e.g. Killing, 1983; Kogut, 1988; Yan, 1999), while Delios and 
Beamish (2001) examine performance from perspectives of IJV survival and 
profitability relative to a subsidiary’s (IJV’s) host country and entry mode experience.  
More recent studies have shown that the likelihood of a firm’s entry into a market is 
influenced by external and internal factors and previous decisions of related firms, 
such as those within the same business group (keiretsu) or supplier companies (Martin 
et al., 1998; Chan et al., 2006), extending research done previously (e.g. Delios and 
Beamish, 2001) with respect to different types of experience on subsidiary 
performance. 
Lecraw (1984) discusses the profitability of subsidiaries under a 
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structure-performance framework in which structure refers to the structure of tangible 
assets of the firm such as capital, physical and human assets in relation to financial 
performance.  Lecraw’s (1984) study is an extension of Caves’ (1980) study, which 
was one of the earliest studies to combine transaction cost and internalization theories 
in explaining a subsidiary’s financial performance. 
Delios and Beamish (1997) discuss internal and external factors as 
transactional, institutional, and experience influences on the foreign partner’s equity 
share within an IJV.  Further discussion points they mention include dependence on 
the local partner’s complementary assets and asset specificity.  The former will 
require the foreign partner to give a greater equity share to the local IJV partner.  The 
latter, however, will positively influence the foreign partner’s ownership choice.  
Asset specificity with regard to the IJV as an integrated unit and resulting ownership 
division has rarely been discussed in the literature.  Asset specificity as a component 
of the tacit knowledge of a company will therefore be discussed in the section on 
sequential entry modes, which also covers arguments for why an IJV should continue 
to revise ownership structures after entry. 
In a further study, Delios and Beamish (2001) extend subsidiary profitability 
as a performance measure to include subsidiary termination rates, or survival, as a 
measure of a subsidiary’s performance relative to its intangible assets and entry mode 
choice. An important intangible asset, experience is partitioned into host country and 
entry mode experience.  As for the former, Delios and Beamish (2001) find that in 
IJVs, the level of a firm’s host country experience has no influence on profitability 
although it has strong influence on IJV survival.  As for the latter, they find that 
experience with a particular entry mode has a positive effect on both profitability and 
IJV survival.  Host country experience therefore appears to remove the liability of 
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foreignness and lower transaction costs for new intangible assets (Hymer, 1976; 
Delios and Beamish, 2001). 
Lu and Beamish (2001) discuss the effects of hierarchical and 
non-hierarchical entry mode choice on the financial performance (profitability) of 
Japanese SMEs that either decided to either export or to invest in another country.  
They argue that higher FDI and alliance formation with local partners helps overcome 
deficiencies in resources and capabilities (tangible and intangible assets) in the initial 
entry mode choice. Likewise, higher FDI results in higher subsidiary profitability 
while low FDI levels result in declining financial performance.  However, the 
relationship between FDI and performance is nonlinear.  Performance increased 
when the number of FDI countries exceeded five, before which the relationship was 
negative. 
Lu and Beamish’s (2001) results are also limited by the time frame of the 
study which was conducted during a period when the yen experienced sharp 
appreciation (1986-1996), which has resulted in Japanese exports becoming less 
competitive from a price perspective.  From the viewpoint of profitability, they 
suggest Japanese companies may have been inclined to choose IJVs.  Moreover, they 
find alliances raise financial performance (profitability) by helping the foreign firm 
overcome resource constraints with regard to local knowledge.  With regard to new 
foreign markets, they further argue that companies face two liabilities (i.e. shortages 
or mismatch of tacit knowledge) – one of being foreign and one of being establishing 
a new business.  In the former liability, significant differences between foreign 
markets means that the knowledge a company has developed by operating in its home 
country and other countries may not be suited to the new market.  Therefore, new 
knowledge and capabilities need to be acquired.  In the latter, a new subsidiary faces 
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the additional burdens that any new company would face, i.e. establishing new 
business relationships, legitimacy, and recruiting staff (Barringer and Greening, 1998), 
while negotiating political and other risks (Delios and Henisz, 2000). 
Hamel and Prahalad (1989) discuss the importance of the concept of interest 
alignment.  They claim that financial performance depends on the incentives that 
stakeholders have within the organization to provide background information, 
including tacit knowledge, which is key to an organization’s performance.  They 
address that a “sense of reciprocal responsibility is crucial because competitiveness 
ultimately depends on the pace at which a company embeds new advantages deep 
within its organization, not on its stock of advantages…” (p. 69) They further argue 
that direct costs are not an indicator of how well costs are perceived to be distributed 
so that stakeholders feel motivated to give their maximum contribution. In a sense, 
their argument addresses the problem of bounded rationality.  If extended to a 
subsidiary level, one can argue that performance depends on the extent to which 
knowledge is given the chance to be dispersed and subsequently internalized.  
Accordingly, I use ownership as a tool to adjust the extent to which knowledge is 
given the chance to be dispersed. 
Calof (1993) provides a performance-based entry mode model based on sales 
performance for 38 Canadian companies in developed countries.  He discusses 
sequential entry modes and mode adjustments from lower hierarchy to the next higher 
hierarchy (control) entry mode as a type of entry mode adjustment.  His example 
includes switches from low-control modes such as exporting to establishing sales 
subsidiaries and joint ventures to wholly-owned subsidiaries.  Although his study 
addresses ownership structures based on a performance measure, it has shortcomings 
with regard to the performance measure (sales do not equal profits) and sample size.  
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As an earlier work, however, it does take into account the importance of learning 
effects of the parent company, which is the justification for the subsequent next 
higher-control entry mode.  However, his work is constrained by its small sample 
size and limitation to entry modes in developed countries, where the required sets of 
know-how and tacit knowledge and other complementary assets are likely to differ 
from those in developing countries (Makino and Delios, 1996). 
Makino and Delios (1996) measure the financial performance in 558 
Japanese IJVs in East and Southeast Asia.  They find that the relevance of the local 
partner declines as the Japanese partner gains experience in the host country, to the 
point where the local partner becomes a liability to the Japanese company.  Although 
their study addresses the learning effects of the parent company, and is therefore 
non-static with regard to knowledge, it still fails to consider the learning effects of the 
local partner.  Although IJVs’ financial performance declined in their study, it could 
also mean that ownership structures did not reflect the change in knowledge 
accumulation by both partners meaning that declining performance could be due to 
inappropriate ownership structures. 
 
2.3.3.2  Performance and productivity-based measures 
A study by Buckley and Casson (1981) is one of the first to use 
productivity-based (efficiency-seeking) measures as proxies for subsidiary 
performance.  They use the financial measures of net present value of an investment 
to determine whether to choose low-control entry modes (exporting or licensing) or 
higher-control entry modes (IJVs) and whether to switch entry modes subsequently.  
Due to the objective of maximizing an investment’s net present value (NPV), their 
model implies (optimal) timing strategies for entry modes and subsequent adjustments.  
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In extending Buckley and Casson’s (1981) study, Kogut (1988) later defined NPV as 
the quotient of the sum of cash flows, learning, and joint production and the interest 
rate plus one.  It is in a sense a measure of productivity-based performance.  Their 
study suggests that foreign investments with high technological intensity will take 
longer to reach their full net present value; however, their net present value will also 
take longer to decline, which could affect entry mode choice. 
Buckley and Casson (1996) provide a model for joint venture selection 
versus lower-control types of entry modes. Their model addresses the conditions 
under which the most efficient transfer of knowledge and its internalization can be 
achieved.  They divide knowledge sought by both partners as either technology or 
marketing knowledge.  Each partner is valuable to the other for these sets of assets, 
either separate or in combination.  Interaction among explanatory factors is then 
explained.  These factors include market size, technological change, cultural distance, 
economies of scale, and technological uncertainty, all of which affect entry mode 
choice.  Moreover, these factors can have different effects on the sets of knowledge 
combinations being exchanged. We will review these in a later section.  Nonetheless, 
in terms of performance-based measures, their model is one of the first (and only) 
models to use the concept of productivity, which they view as the efficient transfer of 
tacit knowledge and its related sets of tangible and intangible assets (technology, 
technological knowledge, marketing knowledge).  However, they link knowledge 
absorption with profitability only conceptually without using quantitative data. 
There is a significant amount of literature on domestic spillovers of tacit 
knowledge that has resulted in new R&D (Kremic, 1993; 2003).  This has been 
extended to examining international spillovers between manufacturing in pairs of 
countries (e.g. Bernstein, 1996).  Kokko (1992) and Dunning (1993) conducted 
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related studies with regard to the effects of multinational enterprises on host country 
firms. They examined whether sectoral productivity was positively related with the 
share of foreign ownership, given other variables. (Caves, 1974; Blomstrom, 1989; 
Kokko, 1992). These studies are generally cross-sectional and relate to labor 
productivity in manufacturing.  Beyond labor productivity, a study by Haddad and 
Harrison (1993) did not produce conclusive results for the effects of non-arm’s length 
transactions (FDI) on total factor productivity, a version of which will be used in this 
dissertation. 
Jefferson et al. (2000) conducted a study on state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
in the manufacturing industry in China.  Their study established that productivity 
offers a more reliable gauge of long-term industrial performance than profitability, 
particularly in transition economies.  It further established that a rise in SOE 
productivity raises SOE profitability, which in itself is an important result because it 
means that productivity growth measures entail higher profitability, which makes my 
productivity growth measure directly relevant to companies.  Their finding supports 
my model indirectly when the assumption that firms try to minimize costs and 
maximize profitability is made.  Jefferson et al. (2000) also found that SOEs may 
enhance the profitability of established producers by assuming complementary roles 
as suppliers or subcontractors if their productivity increases.  In the context of China, 
however, Jefferson et al.’s (2000) findings indicate weak labor and capital 
productivity growth in SOEs.  As for ownership, their findings remain inconclusive 
due to frequent entry mode conversions (ownership conversions) and high exit rates 
of SOEs in the early 1990s, to which their data is limited.  Importantly, they suggest 
that “until it becomes possible to track the performance of fixed samples of firms in 
different ownership categories, we cannot eliminate the possibility that enterprise 
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conversions may have influenced our comparison of productivity differences over 
time and across ownership groups.” (Jefferson et al., 2000)  This is a gap that I 
partially try to fill with time-series data on Japanese manufacturing subsidiaries in 
China, a majority among which are Sino-Japanese equity IJVs. 
Important to my model of efficiency transaction processes is also the fact that 
the authors’ model directly links labor and capital productivity to subsidiary 
performance and productivity increases by the local partner.  The basic assumption 
of their model is similar to my model. 
Perkins (1996) conducted a study on SOEs as potential IJV partners in China.  
They found foreign ownership – either as JV or WFOE - to be highly significant in 
explaining the growth of labor productivity versus domestic enterprises.  In terms of 
methods, Perkins’ (1996) study is closest to the methods chosen in this dissertation; 
they measure a (residual) type of productivity growth that is due to technological 
progress.  My dissertation further seeks to refine the results of the ownership levels 
at which highest knowledge spillovers and technological progress will occur. 
Wei et al. (2002) examine the influence of ownership and control on the 
profitability of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in China.  They found moderating 
effects of SOEs as IJV partners on profitability, which is closely linked to the partial 
measure of capital productivity in our model.  Moreover, they found that profitability 
took on average six to seven years to occur.  They argue that state allocation and 
involvement negatively affects resource allocation and human resource management. 
Hejazi and Safarian (1999) measured performance in terms of knowledge and 
R&D spillovers in arm’s length and non-arm’s length transactions.  In terms of total 
factor productivity, they find that technological/knowledge spillovers will be larger 
through subsidiary-based production and equity-based entry modes rather than 
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through trade.  While they discuss total factor productivity, their study only 
distinguishes between hierarchical and non-hierarchical entry modes and does not 
address ownership choices within hierarchical entry modes. 
Similar to Makino and Delios (1996), Petersen et al. (2000) build on 
profitability as an indication of subsidiary performance and discuss subsequent 
strategies to dissolve or integrate with the foreign partner.  Their discussion includes 
both low-control and high-control entry modes.  Profitability is used as a measure to 
decide on and revise entry modes, including adjustments to lower and higher-control 
modes.  Their study is one of the first to consider entry mode flexibility by 
accounting for changing circumstances through learning and relationship building 
between alliance partners. 
 
2.3.3.3 Effects of structural market failure (government interference) 
on ownership and productivity growth 
Evidence of a general labor and capital productivity slowdown may to some 
extent imply constraints on foreign ownership due to legal, financial, and regulatory 
systems.  In other words, a subsidiary may not be free to choose ownership 
structures based on which ownership structure will yield highest performance.  The 
foreign company could thus end up with ownership that is too low or too high.  This 
is in line with Delios and Henisz’ (2000) findings which claim that a foreign company 
will limit its ownership if the potential for structural failure is perceived to be high (i.e. 
high government interference, public expropriation hazards). 
Blomstrom and Sjoholm (1999) argue that a significant factor influencing 
productivity due to technology diffusion between foreign and local companies is 
ownership structure.  Their study also mentions public expropriation hazards, 
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whereby governments recognize the causality of technology spillovers and ownership 
and therefore restrict foreign ownership with the expectation that there will be more 
technology learning/diffusion if the local partner has more control.  Delios and 
Henisz (2000), however, find opposite influences of public expropriation hazards on 
ownership compared to private expropriation hazards.  Therefore, if foreign 
companies perceive a risk of losing proprietary knowledge to a local partner, they may 
refuse to set up a subsidiary or, with regard to our study, transfer less advanced or 
older technologies. 
The rate of technology-based productivity growth can also give an indication 
of the appropriateness of the technologies introduced, which may also include older 
technologies initially.  Where technology or knowledge gaps are large, transferring 
older technologies may even produce higher learning rates in the beginning, and 
therefore initially contribute to high technology/knowledge-based productivity growth 
(Rai, 2004) because the local partner can process knowledge at the lower level faster.  
However, continued non-upgrading of older technologies would eventually lead to a 
decline in technology/knowledge-based productivity growth due to diminishing 
marginal returns.  Technology/knowledge-based productivity growth can therefore 
also implicate subsidiaries that lack renewal of technology or production processes 
(innovation).  However, since other factors can also lead to low 
technology/knowledge-based productivity growth, reasons can only be confirmed 
qualitatively. 
The authors also note a positive link between ownership and control over 
profits, which provides a greater incentive to transfer technology and management 
skills to subsidiaries.  However, their view of control is slanted towards the owner of 
technology, while they do not address how ownership affects all participants in the IJV, 
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including the minority owner, and that motivation for the local partner to contribute 
complementary assets may therefore depend on its ownership share as well 
(Blomstrom and Sjoholm, 1999), lending further weight to my argument that an 
appropriate ownership structure for optimum levels of knowledge exchange may be 
below full ownership.  Therefore, without an optimum ownership structure the 
foreign firm may not be able to obtain the partner’s local knowledge, as a result of 
which transaction costs could rise since technology would be transferred without 
getting intangible assets in return.  Moreover, limited cooperation by the partner may 
compromise the ability of the foreign firm to make judgments regarding the suitability 
of technologies, processes, and knowledge transferred (Perkins, 1996).  Their study 
finds that diminishing returns to scale cause labor productivity to decline over time, 
further implying that only where new skills were introduced could labor productivity 
remain constant or increase. 
 
2.3.3.4  Performance and subsidiary survival 
Instability/survival (performance): The lifespan of IJVs has also been 
considered a performance measure by several scholars.  Woodcock et al. (1994),  
Hymer (1976) and Lu and Beamish (2001) attribute initial low performance during 
the early stages of an IJV to the liability of foreignness.  Therefore, this finding, 
when combined with the findings by Delios and Beamish (2001), who argued for a 
decline in performance after seven years, and likely IJV termination after 10 years, 
effectively leaves an IJV with a financially productive lifespan of four years in the 
worst case and seven years in the best case out of ten years. 
Additionally, Buckley and Casson (1996) find that in the interest of JV 
performance (productivity), the effective lifespan of JVs is not expected to be very 
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long.  In fact, their study shows that a long JV lifetime indicates strategic errors on 
the part of management, and that ownership adjustment to that of a wholly owned 
enterprise would have been preferable instead.  Their study also notes that firms that 
engage in a series of short-lived JVs may experience productivity gains due to 
flexibility under conditions of rapid technological change (Buckley and Casson, 1996).  
Therefore, these findings are similar to those by Makino and Delios (1996) and Delios 
and Beamish (2001) in that they confirm the findings regarding the limited productive 
lifespan of IJVs. 
 
2.3.3.5  Other factors affecting entry mode and performance 
Subsidiary performance and thus entry mode choice can be affected by 
endogenous and exogenous (internal/external) factors.  Exogenous factors can 
include market imperfections such as structural market failure (e.g. Dunning, 1997), 
which affects entry mode choice but is moderated by internal factors such as a firm’s 
experience in foreign market entries, for instance.  I will first discuss internal and 
external factors separately and follow with a discussion on their interaction. 
 
2.3.3.5.1 Company-internal factors in relation to 
technology/knowledge-based productivity growth 
  
Tacit knowledge and technology/knowledge-based productivity growth 
Tacit knowledge forms the largest part of a technology intensive firm’s 
intangible assets and thus internal factors (Gupta and Govindarajam, 1991; Kremic, 
2003).  A joint venture partner with less sophisticated technologies can still 
contribute tacit knowledge even in the early stages after setup in the form of 
knowledge about the local culture, work ethic/suitable company culture, and valuable 
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connections that can help an IJV operate smoothly, raise productivity, and reduce 
transaction costs. Equity-based entry modes allow for contact with tacit knowledge 
and thus allow it to be exchanged effectively which arm’s length transactions would 
not accomplish (e.g. Daellenbach and Davenport, 2004). 
 Oliver (1992) and Chan et al. (2006) note that firms “make normatively 
rational choices” in entry mode decisions based on intangible factors and social 
justification. Therefore, tacit knowledge plays a critical part in a firm’s entry mode 
and ownership choice abroad. 
Tacit knowledge also affects productivity in the subsidiary (Buckley and 
Casson, 1996).  Joint ventures are formed on the understanding that both partners 
contribute what is needed to achieve a common objective.  While neither partner is 
likely to supply all its knowledge, neither partner will actively attempt to restrict the 
contribution of knowledge necessary to achieve an immediate objective, such as 
solving a technical or other problems (Kremic, 2003).  Buckley and Casson (1996) 
argue that shared-equity arrangements provide mutual insurance to the partners where 
they are not only unsure about their partner’s competence, but about their own 
competence as well, particularly in new markets.  The need for such mutual 
insurance - a local partner - would be moderated proportionately to the foreign 
partner’s experience in the host country or other foreign markets.  Interestingly, 
Buckley and Casson (1996) also note that if each partner knew exactly what it was 
capable of and had a full understanding of the requirements of the project, it would be 
able to “specify exactly what it required from its partner” and thus would be fully 
clear what it should supply itself (Buckley and Casson, 1996).  A possible inference 
one can draw from this finding is that arm’s length and non-arm’s length transactions 
would both result in the acquisition of the needed skills in a scenario of full 
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knowledge.  Therefore, the more uncertain the two partners are about the relevance 
of their expertise relative to the contributed process, product, or technology, the 
greater the uncertainty of specifying exactly what is required of the partner to 
complement one’s own skills, which complicates the process of assessing the value of 
the complementary knowledge for both partner.  In the former, the foreign partner 
does not know exactly what knowledge is being bought from the local partner, since 
the information sought may already be known, obsolete, or inappropriate.  In the 
latter (as the seller of knowledge), the foreign partner may find it difficult to assess 
the cost of the transfer due to technical or human problems that may arise. 
In this regard, hierarchical entry modes are particularly useful in controlling 
buyer’s and seller’s uncertainty, which particularly the foreign partner faces and risks 
as the owner of proprietary knowledge and technologies.  Therefore, the risk of 
agreeing to supply a specific skill through arm’s-length transactions will be greater 
(Buckley and Casson, 1996).  The mutual insurance to each partner through the entry 
mode of JVs, however, will only work if the other partner can be trusted to make an 
appropriate response (Casson, 1991), and the appropriate response can be influenced 
through the appropriate equity share (e.g. Buckley and Casson, 1996).  Therefore, 
knowledge transfer within equity-calibrated limits of information uncertainty is key to 
reducing transaction costs and enhancing productivity.  Daellenbach and Davenport’s 
(2004) study reinforces the link between equity, trust, and performance within 
subsidiaries.  Without mutual trust, the productivity of a JV is likely to be limited as 
transaction costs rise due to inefficiencies caused by distrust and the higher cost of 
protection of proprietary knowledge and technology. 
 
 Experience and technology/knowledge-based productivity growth 
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Delios and Henisz (2000) suggest that the degree of ownership is positively 
influenced by factors such as firm experience and the presence of other firms in the 
location and moderated by partner capabilities and local institutional constraints, such 
as structural market failure (e.g. political hazards).  In terms of performance, Delios 
and Beamish (2001) further show that the foreign firm’s likelihood of survival and 
degree of profitability will depend on its possession of experience and knowledge of 
the host country.  Experience is usually acquired over time and frequency of foreign 
market entries (e.g. Johanson and Vahlne, 1977; Delios and Beamish, 2001).  The 
level of experience can also be indirectly and immediately raised by acquiring it 
through a local partner firm at the time of market entry through equity involvement 
(e.g. Inkpen and Beamish, 1997; Delios and Beamish, 2001).  In addition, Chang 
(1995) notes that a higher degree of experience (an intangible asset) upon market 
entry compensates for a foreign company’s lack of the cultural, political, and 
economic understanding of the host country, and should therefore lead to higher 
productivity in a shorter time as well as a higher ownership share for the foreign 
partner. 
Another consideration in IJV performance has been the effect of a firm’s 
accumulated experience in equity-based entry modes, including WOS, on its new 
shared-equity subsidiaries.  For example, Hannan and Freeman (1984) and Baum 
and Ingram (1998) found that firms with extensive networks of hierarchical 
subsidiaries will be likely to replicate organizational procedures, routines, and 
structures in newly-formed JVs.  Again, firms that frequently chose WOS in the past 
will sometimes choose JVs due to lower transaction costs or to compensate for factors 
such as political or economic uncertainties (UNCTAD, 1996).  Greve (1999) and Lu 
and Beamish (2006) also note that strategies that have been successfully implemented 
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in WOS are transferable and will similarly enhance IJV performance.  Thus, prior 
WOS experience will positively affect IJV performance. 
Tallman and Li (1996) also found support that financial performance is 
positively related to and linearly related to the degree of experience in foreign 
hierarchical market entries.  Studies by Grant (1988) and Geringer and Hebert (1989) 
support these findings by establishing strong links between firm performance and its 
experience in foreign markets, although Ramaswami (1993) finds only limited links.  
The idea behind the prior discussion of experience accumulation is to show the likely 
existence of a link between the accumulation of the stock of tacit knowledge (i.e. 
intangible assets) gained in prior equity-based entry modes and their positive 
influence on the utility gained from future equity-based entry modes. 
 
2.3.3.5.2 Company-external factors in relation to 
technology/knowledge-based productivity growth 
More recent research (e.g. Guillen, 2002; Chan et al., 2006) has emphasized 
the perspective of (tacit knowledge and intangible assets) as sociological factors and 
their facilitating (legitimizing) effects on entry mode decisions.  However, firms tend 
to replicate their previous investment decisions subject to external factors such as 
government restrictions (i.e. structural market failure).  Firms with less experience 
are also likely to imitate the entry mode choices of those firms that operate in the 
same market as DiMaggio and Powell (1983), Scott (2001), and Delios and Henisz 
(2000) have shown.  Furthermore, Delios and Henisz (2001) find that such entry 
mode replication occurs more frequently when Japanese companies establish foreign 
subsidiaries.  The likelihood of a Japanese company’s entry mode into a foreign 
market is strongly influenced by the entry modes of other Japanese companies in the 
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vicinity, particularly where a main company is being followed as an entry mode 
example. 
 
2.3.3.5.3  Interaction between internal and external factors 
Fagre and Wells (1982) talk about the interaction between a firm’s internal 
factors and outside forces.  The choice of entry mode that would be made in the 
absence of external factors such as government pressure would depend entirely on 
firm-internal factors.  Firm-internal factors are made up of both tangible factors (e.g. 
technology, capital) and intangible factors (e.g. product diversity/differentiation, 
market access, know-how).  Fagre and Wells (1982) used government interference 
(institutional environment) and the degree of competition in an industry as external 
factors that would limit a foreign firm’s bargaining power in choosing a desired 
ownership level.  Government influence was used as a moderating factor on 
ownership choice in later studies (e.g. Luo, 2000, 2002).  A foreign firm’s ability to 
secure a desired ownership level would thus depend on its bargaining power which is 
influenced by the presence of the internal and external factors mentioned. 
Buckley and Casson (1998) further argue that joint ventures are useful when 
costs of learning by experience, building trust, acquiring an intermediate output 
market and technologies through arm’s length transactions are higher than 
internalizing them. 
 
2.4  Sequential entry modes and their relevance to the discussion of 
ownership adjustment 
Prior research has evaluated sequential entry modes in terms of resource 
commitment and the level of entry mode hierarchy in JVs and WOS (i.e. low 
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hierarchy entry modes to the next higher hierarchy level of entry mode).  The earliest 
sequential entry mode studies, most notably the Uppsala School (i.e. Johanson and 
Wiedersheim-Paul, 1975; Johanson and Vahlne, 1977), focused on resource 
commitment, which grows incrementally as knowledge is gained.  As early studies 
on sequential entry modes, the Uppsala school segments increased resource 
commitment into activities that a foreign firm undertakes.  Accordingly, a foreign 
firm will first engage in export activities which are then upgraded to sales subsidiaries 
followed by manufacturing subsidiaries as new knowledge is gained.  In a wider 
sense, this could be extended to higher value-added activities in the present context.  
Several studies have followed the Uppsala School; for instance, studies that have 
discussed sequences in which a firm exports and then upgrades its activities by setting 
up a sales subsidiary or adding a production subsidiary in the host country include 
those by Kogut (1983) and Kogut and Chang (1991).  Chang (1995) extended prior 
research by focusing on firms that add lines of business to their local subsidiaries that 
have built strong local organizations/subsidiaries, adding that Japanese firms 
sequentially enter markets where they have a stronger competitive advantage to 
reduce the risk of failure.   
Further research on sequential entry modes has largely followed the concept 
that higher-control entry modes are chosen as subsequent entry modes where an IJV 
remains successful (i.e. it is not terminated for reasons of business failure).  Whereas 
the Uppsala School argued from the point of view of resource commitment, later 
studies have argued from the point of view of entry mode hierarchies. 
Buckley and Casson (1996) follow where early studies focused on switching 
from low-control to higher-control entry modes (e.g. JV to WOS).  For hierarchical 
entry modes, Benito and Welch (1994) argue that a firm’s commitment to a foreign 
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market tends to increase over time and that a firm will choose higher-level hierarchy 
entry modes with time.  Later research by Vanhonacker and Pan (1997) and Pan and 
Tse (2000) specifies the prior findings by arguing that subsequent types of entry 
modes, such as JV followed by WOS, depend more on firm-internal factors such as 
higher R&D intensity -  as a result of the successful transfer of tacit knowledge.  
The above review necessitates a further discussion of entry mode adjustment. 
 
2.5  Entry mode adjustments and performance 
Anderson and Gatignon (1986) explain that entry mode is a tradeoff between 
control and cost of resource commitment with effects on a subsidiary’s long-term 
productivity.  Their research thus concerns the question of the circumstances under 
which a particular entry mode is the most efficient choice in the long term with regard 
to the tradeoff between risk and return.  High-control, equity-based entry modes 
offer higher returns along with higher risk, whereas low-control entry modes 
minimize risk (Anderson and Gatignon, 1986).  With regard to a partner’s 
complementary assets, their study makes an early attempt in explaining the degree of 
ownership by arguing that products involving a high degree of tacit knowledge 
require a higher degree of control, However, where products mature, less control, 
hence ownership, should be sought.  As for the learning process by the local partner, 
which requires time, transferring a greater degree of control to the local partner could 
thus be productivity-enhancing. 
Studies extending the impact of the tradeoff between control/ownership and 
resources on performance were further developed by Hoang and Rothaermel (2005) 
and Knudsen and Stieglitz (2007).   Pan and Tse (2000) create a hierarchical model 
of entry modes, explaining that the first decision firms face is the choice between 
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hierarchical and non-hierarchical entry modes.  Within hierarchical entry modes, 
they then face the choice between JVs and WOS.  Their study then segments joint 
ventures into three categories, namely those that are minority-owned, 50%-owned by 
both sides, and majority-owned.  They find that the choice within equity-based entry 
modes depends largely on firm-internal factors, while only the choice between 
non-equity and equity-based entry modes is more dependent on outside factors such 
as government influence or cultural factors.  As for the choice within equity-based 
entry modes, however, Pan and Tse (2000) found less support for industry and host 
country factors as influences.  Prior studies such as Benito and Gripsrud (1992) 
found a correlation between firm-external factors, subsequent ownership choice, and 
performance.  Firm-internal factors, and their influence on subsequent entry mode 
choice and ownership adjustment resulting from firm-internal performance, however, 
have remained largely under-discussed. 
Within hierarchical (equity-based view) sequential entry modes, Lu and 
Beamish (2006) found that prior collaboration through equity-based partnerships 
would increase experience levels and thus future IJV performance through absorption 
of tacit knowledge.  However, Hoang and Rothaermel (2005) argue that the 
experience and knowledge gained from partners will eventually become subject to 
diminishing returns, following which IJV performance will decline.  To compensate 
for diminishing returns on existing quantities of knowledge, higher value-added 
knowledge must be sought  (Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004; Hoang and Rothaermel, 
2005).  Knudsen and Stieglitz (2007) suggest transacting new and higher 
value-added knowledge through incremental adjustment of equity control in their 
framework of knowledge exploitation. They use equity ownership as a proxy for 
refining resource choice configurations between joint venture partners and that more 
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control over input factors given to the joint venture partner could facilitate obtaining 
them.  For the majority owner, relinquishing some equity ownership enables it to 
simplify the search for new knowledge, both of which will lead to higher 
organizational performance as long as some randomness in performance outcomes is 
accepted (Knudsen and Stieglitz, 2007). 
With regard to the productive lifespan of JVs, Buckley and Casson (1996) 
note that JVs may experience productivity gains due to higher flexibility under 
conditions of technological change that require new knowledge and skills at faster 
rates.  With respect to my argument about ownership as a medium for the exchange 
of complementary assets, more ownership should thus be offered to the joint venture 
partner if higher value-added knowledge or contributions are sought. 
From the perspective of firm-internal factors, Chang and Rosenzweig (2001) 
further advance the research on entry mode modeling by developing a sequential 
model of a firm’s entry mode.  Their model is a first construct in modeling sequential 
entry modes and finds that despite higher transaction costs due to factors such as 
cultural differences, their impact on transaction costs tends to decline as a firm 
accumulates experience in foreign market entries – which is possible through either 
frequent market entries across different countries or the length of time spent in one 
country.  Based on their findings that firms learn and accumulate experience from 
earlier entry modes or an extended presence in one country, their choice of entry mode 
will also vary.  For the case that a subsidiary spends a long time in one country, this 
means ownership adjustment would take place (Chang and Rosenzweig, 2001).  The 
shortcoming of their model/theory is that they do not include data on performance or 
data that could be linked to lower transaction costs due to the increased experience in 
the host country. 
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The common finding among sequential entry mode studies, however, has 
been that successive entry modes will follow a pattern of greater commitment to the 
host country owing to higher levels of knowledge and experience gained over time.  
Although prior studies have been able to explain sequential entry modes within a 
resource commitment framework and thus the increasing sophistication of activities in 
the host country market, and other studies between non-equity and equity-based entry 
modes, little research exists on sequential entry modes within equity-based entry 
modes themselves. 
This dissertation addresses the gap by arguing that ownership adjustment is 
needed over time in order to ensure the most efficient transfer of assets.  I chose 
high-tech industries because they have a high component of tacit knowledge (Kremic, 
1993). 
In the first instance, my dissertation argues from a similar perspective in that 
learning in its larger sense (i.e. experience gain, building connections) is a non-static 
process that both partners are subject to and that can change the nature of assets 
required from either joint venture partner.  In the second instance, I argue that the 
learning process calls for a continuous re-assessment of ownership structures, which 
may require adjusting ownership structures in either direction. 
 
2.6  Knowledge as a dynamic concept 
 This section will introduce the concept of knowledge transfer and resulting 
changes in levels of knowledge.  In other words, the section explains the importance 
of viewing knowledge as a dynamic concept (knowledge dynamism) rather than a 
static concept.  Knowledge dynamism is then discussed with respect to ownership 
levels, which, as a result, necessitate a dynamic view as well. 
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2.6.1  Dynamic view of knowledge and ownership 
Spender (1996) mentioned that “knowledge is not an immutable reality… it 
is a diagnostic and explanatory probe, a method for unpacking the complexity of the 
evolved quasi-objects… Its purpose is to help us see how individual creativity 
interacts with the background collective knowledge that gives each system its 
meaning and identity.” (Spender, 1996: 58)  Therefore, my argument closely follows 
Spender’s (1996) and previous research by Polanyi (1959) in that new capabilities 
require new sets of knowledge, which are applied from individual learning to 
absorption within the organization.  The simple diagram below shows the 
relationship between knowledge in the individual and organizational contexts: 
 


















Source: Spender (1996) 
 
The above table highlights that organizational knowledge is an amalgamation 
of various individual sources of knowledge, which, after adjustment of ownership, can 
be internalized by the subsidiary more productively.  Importantly, the beneficiary of 
knowledge transfer is the entire subsidiary - not only the technology-seeking (local) 
partner. 
According to Bresman et al. (1999), technology and knowledge transfer in 
the beginning stages tends to be from the technology owner to the local IJV partner, 
while in later stages reciprocal (two-way) knowledge transfer occurs, during which 
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more tacit knowledge is transferred. 
 
2.6.2  Shared ownership and knowledge transfer 
The dynamic view of knowledge acquisition posits that the mutual 
acquisition of tacit and explicit knowledge is important.  For example, the local 
partner may, through capabilities acquired from the Japanese partner, become a 
potential supplier to the IJV, or the local IJV partner may have the knowledge to 
source other local suppliers, an option that Japanese companies in China are 
increasingly utilizing.  A concept for acquiring such tacit knowledge most efficiently 
(at minimal transaction cost) is developed and applied through data in the quantitative 
chapter. 
Knowledge has come to be regarded as a key asset of employees, their ability 
to readily acquire and use it a core competence (e.g. Kremic, 2003).  From the 
organizational point of view, creating and sharing new knowledge is crucial for 
innovation processes (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995; Ayas, 1996; Poell et al., 2000). 
The prior literature review has discussed the importance of ownership 
structures in transferring knowledge effectively. 
There are several issues that warrant a discussion of knowledge transfer with 
regard to its absorption by the partner and its internalization within the subsidiary.  
Tacit knowledge in particular, eventually needs to be absorbed by the subsidiary in 
order to result in higher productivity; otherwise only its transaction costs are incurred 
without benefit. 
 
2.6.3  Absorptive capacities 
On the recipient’s side, the transfer of knowledge depends on the recipient’s 
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ability to absorb such.  In many cases the learning capacities of the Chinese partner 
will be lower than what can be absorbed from the transferring/foreign partner (Kremic, 
2003).  This ultimately lowers productivity that is dependent upon the foreign 
partner’s new technologies and knowledge.  In the short term, the asymmetry in 
learning capacities does not affect the foreign partner or IJV negatively.  A gap in 
learning capacities between foreign and local partner benefits the foreign partner 
initially with respect to knowledge acquisition from the local partner.  Kremic (2003) 
suggests that the Chinese partner will still offer its complementary assets in return for 
the knowledge, technologies, and capital received from the foreign (Japanese) partner 
even without fully understanding the foreign (Japanese) partner’s new technologies 
and knowledge.  Kremic (2003) also posits that the partner with the more advanced 
technology will internalize new knowledge from its local IJV partner at a faster rate 
than the local partner to whom technology is being transferred.  In the initial stages 
of an IJV, the utility from the knowledge of the local (Chinese) partner will be greater 
to the foreign (Japanese) partner than vice versa, until the local (Chinese) partner 
catches up with the foreign (Japanese) partner’s new technology.  Regardless of the 
aforementioned relationship, however, the marginal benefit to the foreign partner of 
the knowledge contributed by the local partner will eventually decrease, while the 
marginal benefit to the local partner from the foreign partner will increase as the local 
partner absorbs the foreign partner’s knowledge at a greater rate with improvement in 
the local partner’s learning capacities.  However, the local partner’s learning 
capacities will reach a peak after which the marginal benefit of having a foreign 
partner will also decline.  To reverse this process, innovation from the newly 
internalized knowledge must take place within the subsidiary (Kremic, 1993; 2003). 
For the transfer of tacit knowledge, Kremic (2003) suggests a three-phase model, 
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beginning with specificity and technical precision (know-how), to a higher level of 
skill (know-why), to the third phase of knowledge creation (innovation), a result of 
which would/could be R&D.  The third stage is signifies high productivity levels as a 
result of the transfer of and internalization of explicit and tacit knowledge.  A table is 
provided below. 
 
Table 2.2: Phases of technology transfer and learning process 
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2. Higher rates of 
knowledge 
processing 
1. Conducting R&D for 
new product and/or 
production processes 
 
2. Innovation resulting  
in new products and/or 
production processes 
Source: Kremic (2003) and own compilation of various sources 
 
With regard to the amount of knowledge transfer, Gupta and Govindarajam 
(1991) previously noted that the desire for knowledge has served as a behavioral tool 
for locally hired managers to share their expertise with the subsidiary.  Gupta and 
Govindarajam’s (1991) argument implies that the type of knowledge is a motivator for 
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obtaining and sharing knowledge.  This dissertation additionally argues that 
ownership structure is a tool to control the transfer of knowledge.  However, they 
also recognize that hierarchical entry modes serve to internalize knowledge transfer - 
in line with prior research by Caves (1982), Hymer (1976), and Teece (1976). 
Gupta and Govindarajam’s (1991) research thus focuses on the volume and 
relevance of knowledge flows and transactions within organizations and find that 
knowledge flows will be greater between partners where knowledge and technology 
gaps are large; in other words, where the subsidiary is located in a developing country. 
Gupta and Govindarajam (1991) further define subsidiary-internal knowledge 
flows as either expertise (e.g. skills and capabilities) or external market data of 
strategic value (e.g. information or knowledge about customers, competitors, and 
suppliers).  They further segment expertise into input processes (e.g. purchasing 
skills), throughput processes (e.g. product designs and/or process designs) or output 
processes (e.g. marketing know-how, distribution expertise).  For this dissertation, 
the terms ‘knowledge’ or ‘intangible assets’ broadly refer to what Gupta and 
Govindarajam (1991) defined as throughput or output processes. 
Extending the above framework of the phases of technology transfer and 
learning process (see Table 2.2), Gupta and Govindarajam (1991) further propose a 
framework of subsidiaries with regard to their roles as processors and creators of 
knowledge relative to the knowledge supplied by the parent company.  As such, 
subsidiaries have the capability to create high and low outflows of knowledge, but are 
constrained in their autonomy by the parent company.  The table below summarizes 
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Ultimately, subsidiaries can take on the role of innovator by becoming 
creators of new knowledge, products, or processes, having processed transferred 
knowledge from the parent company, subject to the autonomy of the subsidiary from 
the parent company.  Gupta and Govindarajam (1991) argue that the need for 
autonomy will be higher the higher the subsidiary’s knowledge creation (innovation) 
is. With regard to Japanese subsidiaries in China, however, knowledge creation is 
constrained due to high involvement and control by the parent company and Japanese 
subsidiaries’ arguably lower degree of autonomy and higher involvement by the 
Japanese headquarters in decision-making.  According to Gupta & and 
Govindarajam’s model, such subsidiaries would thus be unlikely to go beyond the role 
of ‘integrated player’ or ‘local innovator’.  With regard to Kremic’s (1993; 2003) 
framework, Phase II is unlikely to be exceeded since a high degree of tacit knowledge 
is required for innovation to take place.  Low subsidiary 
technology/knowledge-based productivity growth may ultimately signal that tacit 
knowledge has not been fully internalized. 
Poell et al. (2000) state that learning has become more important to the 
survival of organizations in recent years and resulted in changes in the structural 
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shape of subsidiaries.  Their learning-network theory explains what happens between 
people as they interact socially, but not what takes place inside a person’s mind (i.e. 
bounded rationality, opportunism) (Poell et al., 2000).  Negative effects of 
opportunism and bounded rationality can be controlled through the adjustment of 
ownership structures. 
Poell et al. (2000) divide learning networks into several types, which link 
back to the prior discussion on the knowledge processing and creation.  Similarly, 
the amount and content of knowledge acquired depends on the degree of involvement 
by the parent company resulting roughly in liberal, vertical, horizontal, and external 
learning networks that result in liberal, regulative, integrative, and inspiring learning 
styles, respectively (Van Der Krogt, 1995, 1998; Poell et al., 2000).  Poell et al. 
(2000) further argue that the transfer of tacit knowledge is best achieved under 
conditions where the content structure of learning is organization or problem oriented 
and learning climate integrative, which are usually found within horizontal 
organizational structures.  The table below summarizes the most important points. 
 
Table 2.4: Learning networks 
Learning networks 
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The categories that apply to equity-based entry modes, however, will fall 
mostly within the centralized, horizontal, or externally directed organizational type of 
structure.  Among Sino-Japanese IJVs, organizational structure will mostly be 
centralized and to a smaller extent horizontal (Poell et al., 2000, own fieldwork).  
With respect to the transfer of tacit knowledge, formalized organizational structures – 
or those under significantly constrained autonomy – may thus not the most conducive 
structures for the transfer of tacit knowledge. 
To connect Gupta and Govindarajam’s (1991) and Poell et al.’s (2000) 
frameworks, the former’s assessment that for knowledge transfer to have been 
productive, knowledge creation should result in high outflows of knowledge from the 
subsidiary.  Poell et al. (2000) attribute formalized and egalitarian (vertical and 
horizontal) learning networks, respectively, to result in the largest amounts of 
knowledge processing, albeit with explicit and tacit knowledge largely separated.  
Thus, while in their framework vertical networks are best suited to the transfer of 
explicit knowledge, horizontal structures are better suited for the transfer of tacit 
knowledge. As an extension to Poell et al.’s (2000) argument, 
organizations/subsidiaries should adopt horizontal structures in order to become what 
Gupta and Govindarajam (1991) have termed ‘global innovators’ or where more 
knowledge is created relative to knowledge inflows. Unlike Gupta and 
Govindarajam’s (1991) framework, Poell et al.’s (2000) framework discusses 
adjustments in the learning structures of organizations and subsidiaries. 
When linked to my argument of knowledge transfer as dependent on control 
or ownership, horizontal (egalitarian) structures would be better reflected through 
ownership structures that reflect or attest to the contribution of knowledge outflow by 
each partner.  A partner with little equity will have little incentive to share or produce 
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visible knowledge, while a partner with unjustifiably high ownership relative to its 
contribution could be seen as an obstacle by the other partner, inhibiting the 
absorption and processing of new knowledge and/or technology.  A dynamic view of 
knowledge and learning should thus also coincide with a dynamic view of subsidiary 
ownership. 
This dissertation extends findings on technology and knowledge transfer and 
shared ownership by arguing that within the context of China, it is precisely the IJV 
form of entry mode that enables the foreign company to obtain necessary intangible 
assets, namely tacit knowledge from the local partner most efficiently, enabling the 
IJV to engage in higher-value added activities in its later life stages with the help of 
ownership adjustment.  The main question the quantitative chapter further addresses 
is the ownership structure at the time of entry and subsequently during later stages of 
Japanese-Chinese IJVs in China as new knowledge and technologies are acquired and 
internalized.  In the setup of the quantitative chapter, both ownership and knowledge 
have been viewed as dynamic. 
An important issue I will address in the next chapter concerns specific 
ownership structures that should be chosen at the time of entry and subsequently 
during the lifetime of Japanese high-tech subsidiaries in China with respect to 
optimizing productivity growth achieving through mutual knowledge and technology 
transfer.  Due to the difficulty of predicting the knowledge that will be required, I 
follow Grossman and Hart’s (1986) argument that ownership is a purchase of the 
control of these “residual rights”.  Ownership therefore controls their exchange. 
2.7 Status of existing research 
The literature review has shown a significant divide between business research 
methods and econometric methodologies when it comes to performance 
 97 
measurement.  While the former concentrates on measures such as financial 
indicators, longevity of subsidiaries, and productivity growth to the extent that 
tangible measures are reflected (i.e. financial performance), the latter offers methods 
to measure the tacit element of productivity growth.  An important consideration in 
the transfer of high technologies is their high degree of tacit knowledge and asset 
specificity.  In other words, asset specificity - a term frequently used in business 
research - refers to the degree to which an asset cannot be separated from its owner, 
otherwise it is of little use; therefore, the term asset specificity refers to the presence 
of high degrees of tacit knowledge, but quantitative tools to measure such tacit 
knowledge and the latter’s role in productivity growth have not found adequate 
application in business research.  The quantitative part therefore utilizes econometric 
tools.  The issue with the literature in economics has been its lack in going beyond 
the highly theoretical and conceptual and has therefore been lacking in specific 
applications using data in its models.  The quantitative chapter seeks to remedy these 
issues as its fundamental contribution. 
Specifically, the quantitative chapter will focus on these key points: 
a) Performance and productivity-based measures, namely their residual 
values.  Therefore, measures will be provided regarding productivity growth due to 
new technology and knowledge implemented.  These incorporate the effects of 
structural market failure as discussed in section 2.3.3.3.  The resulting effect on 
ownership structures is considered.  In other words, regression analyses will discuss 
the relationship between technology/knowledge-based productivity growth and 
ownership structures using panel data of approximately 1,800 hierarchical Japanese 
subsidiaries in China.  Where relationships are found, further ownership structures 
are calculated with respect to technology/knowledge-based productivity growth and 
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time.    
b) Further data analysis is conducted on relevant factors such as employee structures, 
ratio of Japanese staff to Chinese staff, etc. 
c) Subsidiary survival rates are put into direct perspective with 
technology/knowledge-based productivity growth.  As a result, the data analysis will 
establish a methodological connection between technology/knowledge-based 
productivity growth and potential adjustments in ownership structures and/or relevant 
factors such as employee structures. 
d) The use of panel data in the next chapter is also useful in accounting for the 
dynamic nature of knowledge as discussed in this literature review.  
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3. Important concepts for consideration in quantitative analysis 
This chapter is the first of two main parts in this dissertation to show 
quantitatively that variations within shared ownership with Chinese partner firms 
should be the entry mode of choice in subsidiary formation for Japanese high-tech 
companies in China.  The qualitative part is the fourth chapter and will relate the 
applicability of the quantitative findings of this chapter to actual examples of Japanese 
subsidiaries in China through case studies. 
I will discuss the concept of productivity growth due to technology and 
knowledge transfer in greater detail before developing the quantitative model.  
Productivity growth and ownership structures are also linked before variables are 
developed and applied in the quantitative model.  One of the results of this chapter is 
specific amounts of ownership with regard to optimizing productivity growth within 
Japanese subsidiaries in the high-tech industry in China. 
 
3.1 Review of concepts 
The following sections will review the role of ownership with respect to 
productivity within other studies by introducing the variable of ownership in more 
specifically in different roles.  The usage of ownership as dependent and independent 
variable is reviewed.  Moreover, ownership is discussed from uni-dimensional and 
multidimensional perspectives, i.e. from the perspectives of the owner of technology, 
and all stakeholders, respectively.  Other controlling factors are also reviewed in 
greater detail before they are used in the quantitative analysis.  These are 




3.1.1 Productivity and ownership 
Several studies have been conducted on ownership and productivity.  
Studies on a micro-economic level have tended to remain conceptual due to the 
difficulty of access to large-scale company or subsidiary-level data, particularly panel 
(time-series) data.  Other studies have tended to remain industry-based or 
sector-based, such as private and state ownership.  Therefore, most studies which 
have employed a productivity growth concept (e.g. Total Factor Productivity - TFP) 
have tended to analyze industry-level or country-level data. 
A highly relevant study with regard to firm-level data, however, is by Fukao 
et al. (2005).  They have included micro-level firm panel data of both foreign and 
domestically-owned companies in Japan’s manufacturing sector over a seven-year 
period and conducted a TFP analysis.  Their sample size was 236, and their findings 
have indicated that foreign-owned companies’ technology-based productivity was 
about 8% higher, while the growth rate of technology-based productivity also 
exceeded that of domestic enterprises.  Their data showed that foreign-owned 
companies showed higher R&D intensity as indicated by the expenditure on R&D per 
worker and had a higher capital per worker ratio.  Interestingly, Fukao et al. (2005) 
found that foreign-owned companies had significantly lower growth rates of tangible 
assets, which shows that foreign-owned companies rely much more on the exchange 
of knowledge-based assets.   
Their study also showed that local companies that were later acquired by 
foreign companies had higher technology-based productivity growth rates. While 
Fukao et al.’s (2005) study is thematically and methodologically closely linked to my 
thesis, their study leaves several significant issues unaddressed, and ignores the issue 
of knowledge as being non-static.  Shortcomings comprise the non-addressing of the 
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origin of foreign firms; ownership levels at both the time of entry, acquisition, and 
later lifespan; presence of foreign employees in the subsidiaries as well as experience 
in the present market or foreign market entries.  My dataset includes these variables 
or their proxy variables. 
Several studies have already considered ownership and its effects on 
technology-based productivity in more detail.  For instance, Blomstrom and Sjoholm 
(1999) have found that majority ownership allows the subsidiary to receive more 
sophisticated technologies from the parent firm.  Jefferson et al. (2000) on the other 
hand have suggested that minority ownership allows the local partner greater contact 
with technologies and therefore helps technology diffusion, barring large 
technological or knowledge gaps.  Similarly, Dougherty and Guckin (2001) point out 
that value-added activities in Chinese SOEs tend to rise when partnering with a 
foreign firm due to technology and knowledge spillovers, which therefore raises the 
overall technology-induced productivity for the IJV.  Their study, however, is 
conceptual and not nationality-specific.  I will first review those studies that treated 
the issue of ownership and technology-based productivity. 
Blomstrom and Sjoholm (1999) approach the problem of productivity growth 
from the perspective of technological spillover effects by MNCs entering a foreign 
market where their market entrance distorts the existing local market equilibrium.  
Local companies are then forced to react in order to protect their market share.  
Nonetheless, the authors argue that these effects have had a positive influence on local 
firms with respect to absorption of new technologies.  Where technological gaps 
were too large, however, the authors found a moderating effect on productivity 
because of the “limited scope for learning” by the local partner. 
Their study, however, leaves several issues unanswered.  First, they merely 
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present a statistical proof that productivity is compromised due to the local partner’s 
limited absorption capacities.  Second, they do not discuss or provide a framework 
for such absorption capacities. 
On the other hand, the importance of their contribution is that productivity 
growth is linked to technological capabilities.  Importantly, they discuss attempts to 
separate these technological capabilities from labor and capital-induced productivity. 
Implicitly, the result of the discussion had they taken their research further could be 
considered a type of technological progress.  This is exactly where my research 
continues and in that their paper lays a conceptual foundation for my quantitative 
analysis.  I further unlink technological progress from progress due to manual labor 
and capital accumulation.  In this sense, my thesis utilizes the technology-linked 
productivity method, which is where their paper left off. 
Importantly, Blomstrom and Sjoholm (1999) make a case for equity-based 
(hierarchical) IJVs by arguing that hierarchical IJVs facilitate knowledge spillovers by 
pooling their proprietary assets.  However, other research has strongly criticized this 
fact as a liability of joint ventures (e.g. Mowery et al., 1996, Inkpen and Dinur, 1998). 
Perkins (1996) found that ownership was highly significant in explaining 
growth in total factor productivity (TFP).  His study uses firm-level data of 3,000 
foreign and domestic companies in China including Sino-foreign IJVs, WOSs, SOEs, 
collectives and township enterprises over a period from 1980 to 1994.  He found that 
productivity growth was much higher in firms with a non-state partner, and that the 
ability to retain control, or keep majority ownership had a positive effect on labor 
productivity.  Among the subsidiaries surveyed, IJVs and WOSs in China recorded 
the highest productivity growth.  However, there was no clear distinction between 
IJVs and WOSs in terms of technology-based productivity growth, which challenges 
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their previous hypothesis that higher ownership levels equal more control and 
therefore higher technology and knowledge transfer rates. 
Wei et al. (2002) tested the relationship between ownership and productivity 
growth in state-owned enterprises, domestic non-state-owned enterprises, and 
foreign-owned enterprises.  Wei et al.’s (2002) findings indicate, expectedly, that 
SOEs experience lower productivity growth than domestic non-SOEs and 
foreign-owned enterprises. 
For foreign-owned enterprises, however, the findings were more unexpected.  
Wei et al. (2002) found their productivity growth to be lower than some domestic 
non-SOEs, but attributed it to the initial lack of knowledge of foreign-owned 
companies, which impacts productivity growth negatively.  IJVs tended to 
outperform WOSs on productivity growth, which the authors attributed to the local 
partners’ sharing of intangible assets, including tacit knowledge, connections, and 
access to the local market, thereby enhancing IJV productivity.  Wei et al.’s (2002) 
study was groundbreaking in that it linked the long-term contribution of the local 
partner’s intangible assets to the productivity growth of the subsidiary, therefore 
solidifying the argument that a local partner is indeed necessary.  As such, Wei et 
al.’s (2002) research extends Perkins’ (1996) and Blomstrom and Sjoholm’s (1999) 
studies: with regard to the former, that productivity indeed depends on ownership and 
with regard to the latter – that state ownership and foreign ownership should be split 
so as to achieve higher productivity rates. 
Moreover, Wei et al.’s (2002) study supports Perkins’ (1996) findings by 
emphasizing that in the short-term productivity levels in foreign-owned subsidiaries 
tend to be low but in the long-term, they tend to be higher than in any other form of 
domestically-owned enterprise.  In Wei et al.’s (2002) study, subsidiaries in high 
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value-added industries such as electronics, precision machinery, and chemical 
industries tended to achieve the highest productivity growth levels. 
However, the previous studies do not address conditions under which 
productivity rates can be raised or address any specific ownership structures between 
foreign and Chinese IJV partners. 
 
3.1.2 Other factors in relation to productivity 
Griffith (1999) addresses the problem of parent nationality, ownership, and 
productivity in high-tech manufacturing IJVs on the example of the UK as the host 
country.  His findings indicate that foreign-owned subsidiaries are more productive 
and have greater unit output per worker than domestic firms.  In fact, one can find 
support for simple productivity-related performance measures since the works of 
Gerschenkron (1962) and Nelson and Phelps (1966), who argued that differences in 
technological knowledge and ability across countries have been seen as possible 
sources of differences in productivity levels.  Thus, Dunning’s (1988) eclectic theory, 
and its concept of ownership advantages, could also apply to productivity-related 
measures (e.g. Dunning, 1988; Brouthers et al., 1996; Madhok, 1996).  Griffith 
(1999) specified his findings into output per worker and value-added per worker and 
found differences in nationalities regarding value-added per worker.  Certain 
nationalities, such as US and German-owned IJVs in the UK had higher value-added 
per worker than did French-owned IJVs.  His study, however, did not include any 
Japanese IJV partners. 
With respect to emerging economies, scholars have found that 
non-transparency, high discretionary powers of officials, opaque legislation, and weak 
enforcement of intellectual property rights (IPR) can alter the relationship between 
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productivity rates and ownership.  Several studies have argued that foreign 
ownership has a positive effect on productivity in high value-added manufacturing 
industries (e.g. Delios and Beamish, 1999; Li et al., 2002; Asiedu and Esfahani, 
2001). 
Studies have thus far not identified to which extent foreign ownership in high 
value-added industries has resulted in higher levels of technology-based productivity 
growth and therefore lower transaction costs. 
Prior work on productivity has identified the relationship between ownership 
and productivity growth to the extent that foreign ownership raises productivity in the 
long term within both the subsidiary and the foreign partner company. Productivity 
rates may be low in the short term due to the liability of being foreign (e.g. Delios and 
Beamish, 1996).  Further work (e.g. Oulton, 1998; Moon and Lado, 2000) has shown 
that productivity is higher in industries that have a high value-added component.  
These subsidiaries are often found in the electronics, precision-mechanical, and 
chemical industries.  Studies have also shown that in these industries IJVs 
occasionally exhibit higher technology-induced productivity than WOSs, although 
causes and reasons have not been discussed.  Several studies have addressed the 
utility of a local partner and inferred a link between tacit knowledge spillovers from 
the local to the foreign partner which may impact productivity in the long term 
(Perkins, 1996; Griffith, 1999; Wei et al., 2002). 
In support of the previous studies, Okamoto and Sjoholm’s (2000) study of 
the automotive industry in Indonesia indicates that majority foreign-owned 
subsidiaries tend to display higher technology-induced productivity than 
locally-owned firms.  Therefore, I expect majority foreign ownership to be essential 
for technology transfer. Further quantitative analysis will seek to find ownership 
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combinations within Japanese majority ownership for the specific case of 
Sino-Japanese high-tech joint ventures by linking their 
technology/knowledge-induced productivity growth to ownership levels. 
In so doing, I take Okamoto and Sjoholm’s (2000) study and methodology 
further by using panel data for a much longer period (17 years) and conducting 
regression analyses.  Importantly, the above studies have only shown links between 
minority and majority ownership.  They have not addressed variations within 
majority ownership. 
 
3.1.3  Technological aspects: knowledge and skills 
It has been noted in IJV literature that complementary needs create 
interpartner fit which is expected to generate a synergistic effect on IJV performance 
(Buckley and Casson, 1988).  However, complementariness is not likely to 
materialize unless a certain level of skills is already in place (Luo, 2000).  Chinese 
partners in IJVs generally seek technological, innovational, and managerial skills 
from foreign partners (e.g. Luo, 2000).  The success of an IJV’s local operations and 
expansion in this market will largely depend upon its local partner’s learning 
capability, or its ability to acquire, assimilate, integrate, and exploit knowledge and 
skills.  The firm’s ability to process, integrate, and deploy an inflow of new 
knowledge and skills closely depends on how these relate to the skills already 
established.  This skill base is expected to influence strategic and organizational fit 
between IJV partners, which in turn influence the IJV’s accomplishment in financial 
goals in both short and long term, as well as higher knowledge transfer and 
internalization of new skills and technology in the long term (Luo, 2000).  In this 
way, Luo (2000) argues will the Chinese partner’s learning ability contribute to the 
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IJV’s profitability, sales growth, and productivity.  For example, one of Fujitsu’s IJV 
partners in northern China, the Zhonghuan Group, has high R&D intensity and 
employs one of the largest numbers of engineers in China’s semiconductor industry.  
These skills have fundamentally contributed to its superior learning capabilities (Luo, 
2000). 
In further research, Yan and Luo (2001) argue that the initial use of a large 
local workforce and the reliance on Chinese managers in the IJV’s management 
functions can be critical in the beginning phases of an IJV.  If the local partner is an 
active participant in management and not a silent partner, the local partner will likely 
be responsible for recruiting the workforce and will largely be involved in managing it 
since the local partner is likely to have more knowledge on how to manage local 
workers.  Several general managers have reported key contributions such as 
recruiting, appraisal, and reprimanding of Chinese workers to be key contributions of 
their local partners because differences between Japan and China were perceived to be 
too significant. 
Where Japanese managers managed Chinese workers directly, higher staff 
turnover was reported, which weighed on the respective subsidiary’s technology and 
knowledge-induced productivity growth values.  Japanese managers also 
acknowledged that they did not fully understand how to recruit effectively or design 
effective job advertisements to recruit local workers, and admitted that the local 
partner was useful for this task.  Moreover, the use of a local partner in recruitment, 
human resource management (HRM), and direct supervision activities gave credibility 
to a subsidiary’s management among Chinese workers as some job seekers preferred 
not to work for a Japanese company (e.g. Kwan, 2003; Yu and Meyer-Ohle, 2008). 
An additional aspect that makes a local partner invaluable is that foreign 
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subsidiaries in China are also subject to labor unions.  “A foreign company needs a 
local partner that can deal with unions under these circumstances.” (General Manager 
A, 2007) 
At the set-up stage, local partners’ contributions allowed IJVs to channel 
resources into training, while general managers credited local partner presence with 
keeping employee turnover rates low, which prevented any significant knowledge 
outflow.  In terms of productivity growth rates, this contribution must therefore have 
a positive effect on technology-induced productivity growth rates.  Although the data 
in my study does not allow for an itemization of productivity growth rates by specific 
partner contributions, it does allow for an analysis of the impact of the presence of a 
local partner on technology/knowledge-based productivity growth rates. 
As for the skills of the local workforce, research has shown that a high skills 
gap can lead to lower knowledge absorption rates (e.g. Kremic, 2003) and therefore 
less or even negative productivity growth. 
Noronha (2002) further emphasizes the absence of quality orientation in 
Chinese workers (p. 64).  Similarly, an IMF (2003) study found productivity of 
Chinese engineers to be lower than in developed countries due to larger gaps in 
education, training, and work experience, including limited exposure to advanced 
technologies. 
One difficulty electronics firms of all nationalities in China face is the 
availability of skilled labor, which can vary greatly by region.  Qualified labor is 
easier to recruit in the coastal areas along the eastern seaboard than in other areas 
where education levels seldom exceed primary school (IMF, 2003).  According to 
one Japanese manager, the perceived skills gap between a well-trained Chinese 
engineer and an engineer of similar rank in Japan was about “20 years” (General 
 109 
Manager B, 2007). 
For my method of calculation, a high technology-induced productivity 
growth index would therefore indicate particularly effective methods of technology 
implementation and high learning rates (Felipe, 1997).  As a residual value, however, 
a technology/knowledge-induced index is only useful in connection with a qualitative 
analysis. 
Many Chinese companies are state-owned conglomerates which are normally 
not competitive in the international marketplace (Yeung, 1997).  Japanese companies, 
however, generally make fewer commitments to product modifications or 
development to the local market because they are more export-oriented (Yan and Luo, 
2001).  This is gradually changing, and Japanese companies with high 
technology-induced productivity growth are increasingly diversifying their orientation 
away from export-orientation to include local market access, for which more product 
modifications are being considered and performed locally.  Therefore, there has been 
a gradual shift from mere labor-intensive assembly of products to more technology 
and capital-intensive production (Yan and Luo, 2001).  As a result, subsidiaries in 
China have seen higher product and process innovation (Luo, 2000; Yan and Luo, 
2001). 
 
3.1.4 Political factors 
Political factors in China have significantly shaped the landscape for 
potential IJV partners (Luo, 2000).  The Chinese economy is characterized by strong 
governmental interference, poorly specified guidelines for ownership (entry mode) 
approval as well as poorly specified property rights.  State-owned enterprises, 
however, have the location-based advantages of access to scarce resources, materials, 
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capital, networks (guanxi) and information.  SOEs also have an advantage over local 
privately owned firms in terms of their government connections, access to capital, 
market presence, industry experience, production and innovation (R&D) facilities, 
and economies of scale.  For these reasons, an SOE or SOE-affiliated enterprise may 
contribute more to an IJV than a non-state owned enterprise. 
 
3.1.5 Organizational rank of local partner 
SOEs are generally ranked into the following levels in descending order of 
importance: national, provincial, city, and county.  Different levels imply different 
degrees of autonomy.  The higher the organizational level, the greater the power 
delegated to the SOE and the greater the support it receives from the government.  
Besides regional levels, all firms, including SOEs, are also ranked into classes of 
development.  Higher-class firms generally have superior product quality, internal 
management, customer responsiveness, and organizational performance.  Depending 
on the goals of the foreign company, these rankings should be taken into account 
when selecting a local IJV partner (Yan and Luo, 2001). 
To Chinese SOEs, organizational skills have been important and the 
government has pursued the acquisition of these skills from foreign companies 
through assigning SOEs as IJV partners.  Compared to Japanese companies, the 
managerial expertise of western companies has generally been more attractive to the 
Chinese side (Yan and Luo, 2001).  As a trade-off, however, companies from the US 
and Europe have also been allowed to hold greater shares in IJVs or establish WOSs.  
They have been more likely to transfer their critical organizational skills to local 
subsidiaries because they have focused more on long-term market growth in China, 
while Japanese companies have mainly viewed China as a production base from 
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which to export back to Japan and abroad.  The orientation of Japanese companies, 
however, has also changed, and cases for this and the changing requirements for the 
local JV partner are discussed in the following chapter.  In Sino-Japanese IJVs, 
receiving a new set of complementary assets has partially worked, and as my on-site 
research has shown, it has worked particularly well where divergent interests between 
the partners could be aligned effectively through changes in the ownership structure. 
 
3.1.6 Applicability to Japanese companies in China 
Having fewer cultural barriers with China than with western companies means 
that Japanese MNCs face lower costs and time as they learn about the local 
environment, which would result in more communication, fewer misunderstandings 
and therefore fewer barriers to communicating technological and managerial 
knowledge within IJVs.  They will also share similar values, such as high regard for 
guanxi and network building and will therefore likewise recognize the value of this 
intangible asset as a contribution from the Chinese partner (e.g. Makino and Beamish, 
1998; Yan and Luo, 2001).  The result should be a positive impact on residual-value 
(technology/knowledge)-induced productivity growth. 
Another moderating factor in China could be the government.  The 
government has a large influence on the choice of IJV partner (Yan and Luo, 2001).  
It is difficult to predict the effect of government involvement on productivity values in 
IJVs because government involvement can speed up the process for finding a local 
IJV partner for inexperienced Japanese companies on one hand, but could also take 
advantage of the Japanese partner’s inexperience on the other, which would be 
another principal-agent problem.  However, for experienced foreign companies in 




3.2 Methodological development 
This part is concerned with developing the concept for measuring the 
performance of Japanese subsidiaries in China, and based on 
technology/knowledge-induced productivity growth as a performance measure, the 
entry mode or ownership strategy that should be chosen. 
According to Prasad and Wei (2007), a natural measure of performance is a 
productivity ratio – the ratio of outputs to inputs, in which a larger value of the ratio is 
associated with better performance.  However, performance is a relative concept and 
several methods/studies regarding performance measurement and its dependent entry 
mode or ownership strategies exist.  All studies are based on the underlying concept 
of an efficient and least costly method to define ownership structures. 
 
3.2.1 Review of previous methods 
Studies can be defined into two broad categories: a) studies in which 
ownership structures/entry mode were the outcome of a composition of a subsidiary’s 
combined assets (ownership advantages) and/or environmental factors and b) studies 
in which the performance of a subsidiary was the (outcome) of ownership decisions.  
Generally, in category a) ownership was the dependent variable while in category b) 
ownership was the independent variable.  My study attempts to combine both 
approaches.  In the first part, my method would fall into category b) in which a 
statistical relationship is established linking ownership and ownership change to a 
performance variable which I refer to as technology/knowledge-based productivity.  
In other words, out of a sample of 1,800 subsidiaries (IJVs), a relationship is initially 
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shown in which subsidiary performance depends on ownership-related variables.  In 
a further sub-part of the quantitative chapter, ownership is then adjusted to show its 
influence IJV performance. 
In prior literature, studies can still be further divided into two more groups - 
namely those studies that have addressed performance and ownership 
uni-dimensionally - thus from the point of view of the benefit for the technology 
owner or parent company; while the other broad group of studies has been concerned 
with assessing performance multi-dimensionally, i.e. from the point of view of all 
stakeholders.  For the case of IJVs – multi-dimensional studies take into account the 
foreign and local IJV partners’ tangible and intangible assets.  Multi-dimensional 
studies have been better at linking the ownership with (performance measures) 
firm-linked or endogenous attributes such as financial measures, capital productivity, 
labor productivity, asset specificity, or bargaining power, and exogenous factors such 
as a host country’s environment, including infrastructure, presence of other MNEs.  
In addition, those studies that used ownership as an independent variable, tended to 
link ownership to financial indicators most frequently. 
Most research has tended to treat ownership as a dependent variable and to 
focus on parent firm capabilities in determining an ownership structure.  
Uni-dimensional studies, which look only at the parent company, tend to be concerned 
with the choice between (non-equity, contractual) and hierarchical (equity) entry 
modes, while multidimensional studies tend to focus more specifically on the levels of 
ownership and consider both equity partner’s capabilities.  Multi-dimensional studies 
are also less concerned with financial performance indicators and tend to focus on 
factor inputs in subsidiaries and therefore are more inclined to use productivity factors 
and the choice of ownership (e.g. Burgel and Murray, 2000; Moon and Lado, 2000).  
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Moreover, uni-dimensional studies tend to focus on financial performance such as 
sales, profits, return on assets (ROA) and return on investment (ROI) while 
multi-dimensional studies shifted their focus to factor inputs and often resulted in 
productivity measures for capital or labor (eg. Oulton, 1998). 
The table below summarizes the most important literature that has linked 
ownership to firm-level performance indicators.  Studies have been categorized as 
either uni-dimensional or multi-dimensional.  I further categorized existing research 
into whether ownership was treated as a dependent or independent variable.  Table 
3.1 (next page) summarizes these findings.
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Studies that are uni-dimensional and where ownership is the dependent 
variable emphasize financial performance and use the transaction cost approach (e.g. 
Burgel and Murray, 2000; Moon and Lado, 2000).  In cases where ownership is an 
independent variable, however, uni-dimensional studies tend to extend beyond 
transaction cost theory, by extending financial performance indicators into 
productivity and efficiency measures. Studies that use measures such as capital and 
labor productivity and technical efficiency as a result of a parent company’s 
ownership choice include those by Oulton (1998) and Li et al. (2002). 
Multi-dimensional studies, on the other hand, expand the focus to include the 
resource-based view where partner capabilities and complementary assets become a 
central issue.  The exchange of these assets at the lowest transaction cost becomes a 
central focus of multi-dimensional studies.  These studies make the claim that shared 
ownership is preferred to sole ownership or non-hierarchical (non-equity) entry modes 
where it is necessary to overcome the disadvantage of being foreign, mainly in the 
institutional and experiential sense. Scholars that have published multi-dimensional 
studies including Delios and Beamish (1997), Asiedu and Esfahani (2002), and 
Gomes-Casseres (1989, 1992) argue from the point of view that shared equity 
ownership lowers the transaction costs for acquiring these intangible assets. 
The transaction cost approach is the direction taken by most scholars 
including those in uni-dimensional studies.  The difference between ownership as a 
dependent and independent variable is that with the former the impact of non-firm 
specific factors in addition to firm-specific factors can be measured, such as the host 
country environment, host country risk, or other externalities such as improvements in 
infrastructure.  The importance for ownership is that any change in these variables 
can cause a change in ownership – the dependent variable.  The most important 
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concept to the effects of changes in ownership that has emerged from studies that use 
ownership as a dependent variable is the concept that intangible assets are not static 
and that they have an impact on ownership over time, which therefore calls for the 
case that ownership be revised periodically.  However, when ownership is revised 
and adjusted, the role of the ownership variable changes.  Ownership then becomes 
an independent variable that will influence an IJV’s performance in the future.  Thus, 
if knowledge is non-static and dependent on ownership adjustment, then how can the 
effects of a change in ownership on knowledge/capabilities be measured 
quantitatively?  This is where many studies have shown limitations. 
As a non-static concept, it is not sufficient to capture changes in knowledge 
by measures such as R&D intensity, or percentage of engineers employed in a 
subsidiary.  These measures do not capture the internalization and absorption effects 
of new technologies and knowledge by the subsidiary – (therefore they are 
insufficient to address the view of knowledge transfer and absorption, which by 
definition is a non-static process).   
Subsidiary-level data availability, however, has often been a significant 
problem.  I begin with the papers in which ownership was used as an independent 
variable.  Studies in this stream tend to precede those in which ownership was used 
as a dependent variable. 
 
3.2.1.1 Ownership as independent variable: uni-dimensional studies 
Oulton (1998) found that foreign ownership raised productivity by about 
one-third in a study of foreign-owned companies in the UK.  His notion of 
productivity was based on labor and capital productivity, measures which do not lead 
to an implicit understanding to how well or how efficiently knowledge is absorbed.  
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Thus, when foreign ownership raised productivity, it did so through deployment of 
more capital and greater employee numbers or outlays in employee expenses.  He 
found that higher foreign ownership – even in the UK, an industrialized country – led 
to higher productivity among these factor inputs.  His study was based on 
approximately 140,000 majority foreign-owned subsidiaries in the UK in one year – 
1996 - and included both JVs and WOS. Foreign ownership in this study was limited 
to US and Canadian companies, although as companies from industrialized countries, 
we see the results as relevant to our study which analyzes Japanese subsidiaries.  
Although the study confirms the benefits of foreign ownership, it does not specify 
which ownership levels cause which technology-based productivity levels.  The 
insufficiency with productivity values in this study, as in the previous study, is that he 
does not base it on the concept of technology and knowledge absorption, and as such 
do not explain productivity or efficiency in technology transfer.  The study found 
that in manufacturing industries foreign ownership raised input intensity.  In 
manufacturing foreign ownership raised capital intensity, while in the 
non-manufacturing sector, labor intensity was found to be significantly higher.  The 
results confirm, however, that foreign ownership in the manufacturing sector has a 
direct impact on the technology transfer in its basic form – as shifts in capital and 
technology occur - even between industrialized economies. 
Li et al. (2002) used ownership to test its influence on firm performance 
including what they refer to as subsidiary effectiveness, efficiency, and technology 
intensity of Sino-foreign JVs in China.  They used subsidiaries in the electronics 
industry which they defined as electronics companies those companies that 
manufacture electronics components and/or assemble or manufacture products 
containing electronic components.  They used hierarchical blocked regressions to 
 119 
test the effects of strategic choices (independent variables) on firm performance.  
These strategic choices were location, ownership, and capital and technology intensity.  
The dependent variables were efficiency, and technology intensity.  As for the 
dependent variable of firm performance, the authors did not further elaborate on 
effectiveness, except that the companies they tested were in the “top 10 of sales 
revenues in their respective sectors” (Li et al., 2002).  Unlike their vaguely used 
concept of effectiveness, the authors define efficiency as return on assets (ROA).  
Technology intensity, the third dependent variable, was defined as average assets per 
employee.  Clearly, technology intensity in their study is not based on the view that 
that technology is something that is absorbed based on improvements in and 
absorption of knowledge.  Nonetheless, their study yielded significant findings with 
respect to the effects between technology intensity and ownership, in that 
wholly-owned subsidiaries were more likely to have higher capital and technology 
intensity than IJVs.  Their findings, however, are not surprising, as they reinforce 
other studies in the first stream that treated ownership as an independent variable.  
Again, what their study does not show are the effects of technology-intensity on 
ownership. 
 
3.2.1.2 Ownership as independent variable: multidimensional studies 
Grossman and Hart (1986) make a case between contractual and equity IJVs, 
using transaction cost theory and linking it to the profitability of both the investing 
company and the potential partner company.  They conclude that equity ownership is 
a lower cost alternative to contractual ownership in industries where it is difficult to 
anticipate or predict exactly what is required of the partner.  Ownership is thus 
viewed as a purchase allocating residual rights to these unspecified assets between the 
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two parties. 
In their framework, however, the residual rights allocated to one party are lost 
by the other party, from which another cost arises as incentives for opportunistic 
behavior also shift.  Importantly, Grossman and Hart’s (1986) study has established 
that the degree of control – or ownership - in a foreign subsidiary confers a 
proportional degree of control over the uses to which these firm-specific assets can be 
put (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Delios and Beamish, 1997). Therefore, their research 
has been groundbreaking and opened other avenues for enquiry into the study of 
equity joint ventures, including bounded rationality and opportunistic behavior. 
As another representative of the multi-dimensional stream with ownership as 
the independent variable, Rasiah (2004) extends previous research by focusing on 
human resource capability, process technology capability, R&D capability, and 
network strength in the electronics industry in several developing Asian countries, 
excluding China.  Rasiah’s (2004) results indicate that subsidiaries with high local 
ownership exhibit higher reliance on network strength with regard to technology 
intensity and R&D, compared to subsidiaries with high foreign ownership.  Similar 
to Li et al. (2002), Rasiah (2004) defines technology intensity as assets per employee.  
This is an important finding in support of my argument because lower foreign 
ownership thus leads to greater access to the local partner’s country-internal networks.  
Together with the non-static view of knowledge, the local partner’s importance to the 
foreign partner is expected to rise in terms of potential component-localization, which 
may lead to more component and supplier sourcing within the country as the local 
partner’s technological capabilities improve. 
Based on the uncertainty of what is being transacted and the view of 
knowledge as non-static, the above literature has essentially argued for equity 
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ownership as a tool to reduce such uncertainty and acquire a set of assets from the 
local partner, both tangible and intangible. Ownership controls the interaction between 
the foreign company and local partner, which then allows the foreign partner to tap 
the local partner’s capabilities and networks. 
 
3.2.1.3 Ownership as dependent variable: uni-dimensional studies 
Burgel and Murray (2000) take the approach of organizational capabilities of 
high-tech companies rather than transaction cost factors in the determination of entry 
mode choice.  Their study comprised both non-hierarchical/non-equity and 
hierarchical/equity-based entry mode choices. The former included direct selling and 
using distributors in the host country while the latter included JVs and WOS.  
Although their study was biased in favor of the former, it nonetheless offers valuable 
insights for equity-based entry modes.  As a uni-dimensional study, however, they 
focus on capabilities of the parent firm, while capabilities present in host-country 
firms are not considered.  Though their approach works in the context of a 
survey-based study comprising 246 high-tech companies in the UK that ascertains the 
goals of parent companies in the choice of market entry modes, the magnitude of such 
a survey and resource constraints likely prevent the same authors from extending it to 
subsidiaries.  Their findings indicate that subsidiaries’ ownership structures changed 
over time, as subsidiary managers gained experience.  Importantly, Burgel and 
Murray’s (2000) findings show that entry modes by companies with innovative 
technologies that embody a higher degree of tacit knowledge are more likely to 
involve a collaborative arrangement involving a local partner.  These findings mirror 
similar findings by Robertson and Gatignon (1998), who found that firms 
experiencing higher technology uncertainty (ie. Firms with new technologies rather 
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than mature technologies) are also more likely to engage in alliances.  Though both 
studies lack the consideration of local partner capabilities, their findings support my 
argument in the sense that rising partner capabilities lead to higher innovation 
potential – a point I stress in the case studies - and therefore less likelihood for 
technologies to mature due to higher innovation potential, thereby increasing the 
importance of the local partner. 
Moon and Lado (2000) take a resource-based view of the (parent) firm by 
arguing that firm-specific resources including managerial and technological resources 
provide a sustained basis for bargaining power vis-à-vis the host government.  
According to other scholars such as Fagre and Wells (1982) and LeCraw (1984), 
ownership is the outcome of negotiations between a foreign firm and a host country 
government.  The disadvantage of their view, however, is that higher bargaining 
power equates to higher ownership, and that highest possible ownership should be the 
default strategy of the foreign entrant.  Other scholars, however, have addressed this 
problem and defined the preference of ownership around factors such as the nature of 
transactions (Gatignon and Anderson, 1988; Gomes-Casseres, 1989; Hennart, 1991), 
strategic benefits expected such as acquisition of marketing capabilities, access to 
local markets, or localization of supply (Gomes-Casseres, 1989; Moon and Lado, 
2000). Others have raised cultural distance as a factor (e.g. Kogut and Singh, 1988).  
Moon and Lado (2000) also depart from the view of knowledge as static, and address 
the measure of subsequent ownership adjustment caused by technological progress, 
emphasizing that initial ownership levels do not reflect potential and actual changes in 
future bargaining positions and that this issue needs to be addressed by “longitudinal 
research designs” (Moon and Lado, 2000; p. 89).  My research addresses this issue.  
However, I depart from their research by the fact that I use ownership as an 
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independent variable with which to adjust technology and knowledge-based 
productivity taking into account changes in both partners’ (technological) capabilities. 
 
3.2.1.4 Ownership as dependent variable: multidimensional studies 
Hagedoorn and Narula (1996) found a higher incidence of IJVs in mature 
industries compared to high-tech industries, though their study is limited to developed 
countries.  They argue from a transaction cost perspective.  Their study finds that 
due to a higher rate of changing technologies in the high-tech sector, organizational 
flexibility becomes more important and therefore contractual alliances will be 
preferred to equity arrangements.  Unlike Asiedu and Esfahani (2001), their study 
discounts the role of external factors, such as host country environment and the local 
partner’s contribution in managing local market imperfections.  Moreover, their 
study discounts any consideration of the local partner’s knowledge as a process in 
development.  They argue that knowledge and technological advancement between 
partners will be similar, which means that the rate of learning will also be similar 
(Kremic, 2003), following which no JV partner would have a significant knowledge 
advantage.  From this point of view, alliances can be sustained, but less so where the 
technological and knowledge gap is significantly greater, such as in alliances with 
partners from technologically advanced and less advanced countries, e.g. Japan and 
China.  However, Hagedoorn and Narula’s (1996) study carries significance for my 
research in that additional layers of administration created in joint ventures can 
compromise responsiveness and adaptability of the subsidiary - an important 
consideration where product cycles are short.  It also creates another issue for our 
research – that of the composition of management-level employees within joint 
ventures.  Hagedoorn and Narula (1996) offer no solution in this regard; however, 
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my data yields enough evidence to conclude which levels of management and/or 
expatriate employees increase efficiency/productivity, therefore lowering transaction 
costs and making a case for IJVs in the high-tech sector. 
In their multidimensional study on 1043 Japanese equity-based subsidiaries in 
East and Southeast Asia, including China, Delios and Beamish (1999) show that high 
asset specificity causes the foreign investor to assume a higher ownership position 
while requirements for complementary assets moderate higher ownership shares.  
Similar to studies previously discussed, Delios and Beamish (1999) also found that 
experience in foreign market entries had a positive effect on the ownership share 
assumed by the foreign company and that market imperfections and country risk 
generally caused the foreign company/partner to assume a lower ownership share, 
excluding the case of intellectual property protection, where the foreign partner would 
tend to assume a higher ownership share. 
Delios and Beamish (1999) provide a list of complementary asset 
requirements required by foreign firms in these markets, consisting mainly of 
intangible assets, which included market knowledge, tacit technology, distribution 
systems and other intermediate inputs.  In the context of Japanese high-tech 
companies, my research has shown that tacit knowledge applies mostly to quality 
improvements, adherence to kanban systems as well as higher innovation capabilities.  
These enable the local partner firms to increasingly replace or source components that 
were originally procured from Japan. 
Asiedu and Esfahani (2001) argue from a transaction cost perspective in their 
explanation of ownership choice and levels in equity-based foreign entry modes.  
They found that there is a negative link between the foreign ownership share and the 
importance of the local partner’s contributed assets and is moderated by a 
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host-country government’s policy towards foreign direct investment including 
government motivation for the outcome of the ownership structure.  They include 
locally-owned intangible assets in their model as a determinant factor in ownership 
outcomes, including intangible assets not directly related to the product such as 
knowledge on how to overcome structural market failures in the local market (ie: how 
to navigate the black market), which emphasizes the importance of the local partner’s 
intangible assets such as guanxi.  Although their findings complement research by 
Moon and Lado (2000), the importance of the local partner in this paper does not 
decline with the foreign manager accumulating experience and his own connections 
over time.  Due to their non-static view of knowledge, the local partner’s capabilities 
and intangible assets become an increasingly relevant factor in the local partner’s 
future setting of ownership share in addition to navigating structural market failures in 
China.  Past research has offered only inconsistent findings on the issue of 
ownership choice. It remains unclear how decisions related to entry mode and 
ownership strategies after market entry have influenced firm performance. 
 
3.2.2 Data source 
The following section will form the quantitative concept which is used in 
order to analyze technology-based productivity growth based on data from the Toyo 
Keizai Kaigai Shinshutsu Kigyo Soran which had been compiled in electronic form 
ranging from 1986 to 2003.  There were over 16000 subsidiaries in the entire dataset, 
of which 1881 subsidiaries yielded relevant data.  I have chosen companies from 
electronics-related industries that manufacture end products and assemble components.  
More details of the dataset including SIC codes are mentioned in the section on 
descriptive data later. 
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4. Methodology applied 
4.1 Intended contribution 
Applying an economics-related concept, I seek to make an important 
cross-discipline contribution to current business research. Quantitative business 
research has relied heavily on statistical methods, but application of micro-economic 
frameworks has been rare.  Furthermore, I also seek to make a contribution to the 
field of economics since most economics-related papers eschew application of the 
theoretical concepts they develop, due in part to a lack of firm-level data.  In doing 
so, I combine approaches from both the fields of business research and economics. 
The advantage of my study is that I have complete micro-level time-series subsidiary 
data for 1881 Japanese subsidiaries (WOSs and IJVs) in China covering a 17-year 
period from 1986 to 2003, obtained from each annual issue of the Toyo Keizai Kaigai 
Shinshutsu Kigyo Soran from 1986 to 2003. 
I use residual values in order to estimate productivity growth within 
subsidiaries.  In other words, a low residual value would indicate low productivity 
growth.  From this one could infer that some factors within the subsidiary are 
obstructing the transfer and absorption of knowledge and/or technology.  This could 
be due to an inappropriate ownership structure or other factors that have an impact on 
ownership choice, such as experience in foreign market entries or subsidiary age.   
Employee ratio between Japanese and local employees can also be a factor and a 
direct result of the control structure (Felipe, 1997).  The method used or its 
variations have until now mostly been applied in macroeconomic studies (e.g. Felipe, 
1997; Li et al., 2002) and several microeconomic studies on industry scale (e.g. 
Perkins, 1996; Blomstrom and Sjoholm, 1999).  Economists (e.g. Solow, 1956; 
Felipe, 1997; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1997; Barro, 1998) mathematically proved the 
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measurement approach’s feasibility to private sector companies, including factories, 
units within a firm, service industries, and non-profit organizations - as long as 
micro-level data was available. 
In this section, a background and overview of the quantitative methods further 
employed is provided.  I begin with a general economic explanation and specify it in 
subsequent sections. 
 
4.2 Overview of methods 
There are essentially four major methods available for productivity 
measurements (Coelli et al., 2005): 
 
1. least-squares econometric production models; 
2. total factor productivity (TFP); 
3. data envelopment analysis (DEA); and 
4. stochastic frontiers 
 
The first two methods are most often applied to aggregate time-series data and 
provide measures of technical change expressed by a total factor productivity (TFP) 
index.  The TFP method is also referred to as growth accounting (e.g. Solow, 1956; 
Barro, 1998).  Methods 3 and 4, however, are most often applied to data on a sample 
of firms with linear data and provide measures of relative efficiency among those 
firms (Coelli et al., 2005).  The two methodologies used in most papers on 
productivity growth have been growth accounting (TFP, method 2) and econometric 
estimation of production functions (stochastic frontiers, method 4).  I use a 
modification of method 2 due to availability of time-series (panel) data that covers an 
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extensive time period (17 years; 1986 to 2003) with a large sample of Japanese 
subsidiaries in China that had complete data availability for a time-series analysis on 
micro-level (subsidiary-level) data (n=1881 subsidiaries).  However, the original 
sample exceeded 16,000 subsidiaries.   
Several scholars, including founding scholar Solow (1956) as well as later 
scholars such as Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997), Barro (1998) and Felipe (1997) have 
developed and applied the TFP method to account for knowledge-based and 
value-added progress, which is commonly referred to as technological progress.  In 
the case of firms producing multiple outputs using multiple inputs, productivity 
growth or decrease is represented by growth in the TFP index (i.e. productivity 
growth) (Coelli et al., 2005). 
This method breaks down economic growth into components associated with 
factor inputs and the Solow residual, which reflect technological progress and 
processes that facilitate residual productivity growth; in other words, capable 
management that enables knowledge and intangible assets to be transacted efficiently.  
As a residual value, the Solow residual is the TFP growth rate between two discrete 
time points where the influence of changes in capital and labor have been removed.  
TFP therefore signifies that part of productivity growth which cannot be attributed to 
the firm’s current tangible assets such as labor and capital, hence the term ‘residual’.  
It implies some kind of progress within technological systems or processes within a 
company which requires implementation of new skills (e.g. Solow, 1956; Barro, 1998).  
Economists therefore attribute this residual value to technological improvements 
and/or improved management of firm-internal resources.  It is therefore a measure 
for technological change, and in this sense it is an implied measure for technology and 
knowledge transfer (Barro, 1998: 3).  The TFP method provides a breakdown of 
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observed output growth into components associated with changes in factor inputs and 
a residual that reflects technological progress. 
 
4.3 Technology/knowledge-based productivity growth 
In its simplest form, productivity can be defined as the ratio of outputs that a 
firm produces to the inputs that it uses.  Therefore, 
Productivity=
Inputs
Outputs       (1) 
 
This calculation is the most basic example of productivity, where the 
production process involves a single input and a single output.  However, in practical 
terms, this is seldom the case.  Thus, when there is more than one input, a method for 
aggregating these inputs into a single index or inputs must be used to obtain a ratio 
measure of productivity.  Therefore, when one refers to productivity, the reference is 
to total factor productivity (TFP), which is a productivity measure that involves all 
factors of production.  Other measures of productivity, such as labor productivity, 
capital productivity, and land productivity are often referred to as partial measures of 
productivity.  These partial productivity measures, however, are not an indication of 
overall productivity when considered in isolation.  Therefore, I do not follow partial 
productivity measures in this dissertation. 
When one considers productivity comparisons through time, however, an 
additional source of productivity change is possible.  It is commonly referred to as 
technical change (e.g. Coelli et al., 1998, 2005).  This measure involves advances in 
technology and/or improved management.  An introduction of new technology, for 
instance, can extend the productivity potential of the firm/subsidiary beyond previous 
limits, thus resulting in productivity growth/positive productivity change. 
Up to this point, I have not discussed issues such as costs or profits, as all 
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discussion has involved physical quantities and technical relationships (Felipe, 1997).  
In addition, I have made behavioral assumptions including cost minimization and 
profit maximization.  Performance measures can be devised that incorporate this 
information.  The additional measures would be referred to as allocative efficiency.  
Allocative efficiency involves selecting a mix of inputs (e.g. labor and capital) that 
produces a given quantity of output at minimum cost.  Thus, when minimum cost is 
subtracted, then the result obtained would be maximum profit.  Allocative efficiency 
and technical efficiency combine to provide an overall economic efficiency measure.  
In this study I work with the overall economic efficiency measure without 
decomposing the measure further. 
 
4.3.1 Weights 
One of the important assumptions scholars make about productivity is that it is 
a technical concept which refers to a ratio of outputs to inputs (Barro, 1998; Felipe, 
1997; Coelli et al., 2005).  When more than one factor is taken into account, 
however, the problem of how to weight each factor becomes critical to the equation.  
Therefore, weights of labor and capital become important.  They are often indicated 
by the coefficients α (alpha) and β (beta), respectively.  In an ideal scenario, these 
weights could be measured.  Due to difficulties, however, some scholars have 
addressed these as aggregate values, derived from a large pool of economic data.  
Another problem is that data has been biased in favor of companies based in 
developed industrial countries.  Nonetheless, values were assigned to the factors of 
labor and capital.  Under the Hicks-neutral technique and the hicks- technique, fixed 
values of α =0.4 and β =0.6 or α =0.35 and β =0.65 have commonly been 
assigned, respectively. 
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The disadvantage of fixed weights is that they are generic by assuming 
constant returns to scale.  I circumvent this problem, however.  With enough 
micro-level subsidiary data, individual weights can be assigned to each subsidiary 
within a given time period.  The dataset enables me to do so.  Therefore, I can 
avoid assuming constant returns to scale and using generic values, thereby making 
calculations more accurate. 
In the simplest form, the problem of weighing can be solved by relating the 
productivity ratio to the basic aggregate production function, where output is a 
function of capital, labor, and technology.  I have already discussed the difficulty of 
quantifying the last part – technology - and therefore treat it as a residual value.  In 
its simplest form, the aggregate production function can be written as: 
),,( tLKFQ ttt =    (Felipe, 1997)    (2) 
The next section will discuss in closer detail the concept of growth accounting 
as a method for computing the TFP.  Behind the TFP is the (neoclassical) production 
function: 
),,( LKAFY =   (Barro, 1998)     (3) 
A is the level of technology, K is the capital stock, and L is the quantity of 
labor.  In Barro’s (1998) version, the growth rate of output can be partitioned into 
components associated with factor accumulation and technological progress. 
If technological progress appears in a Hicks-Neutral way, output becomes a 
function of technology-induced productivity and a function of capital and labor.   
( )LKAF ,,  will become:  
),( tttt LKFAQ =        (4) 







=        (5) 
In equation (2), output was shown to be the dependent variable of a function 
of capital, labor, and time, where time as a shift factor is a proxy for the effects of 
productivity and technical progress/change.  Barro (1998) and Felipe (1997) both 
assume that “t” is separable from K and L, a finding from which they create a new 
variable: A, or technical progress at a discrete point in time. 
In its simplest form, productivity is a function of output, capital, and labor, 




=  ,       (6) 
whereby A denotes a technology-based productivity measure at a discrete point in 
time. 
Per this equation, tA  is referred to as exogenous and Hicks-Neutral technical 
progress, and is a measure of how output changes at different time intervals.  
Therefore, the measure of productivity can be interpreted as an index of factors other 
than labor and capital, which contribute to the generation of output but which cannot 
be accounted for in discrete terms.  So what are these factors?  Solow (1959), Barro 
(1998), and Felipe (1997) point out that these factors are managerial capabilities, 
organizational competence, diffusion of technology, intersectoral transfer of resources, 
and research and development.  Therefore, it is a combined and implied measure of 
technology and knowledge transfer. 
Equation (2) by itself is impractical since it requires knowledge of the 
marginal products ( )tKF  and ( )tLF .  According to Barro (1998: 5), however, 
( )tKF  and ( )tLF  can be measured by observed factor prices.  Thus, if K and L 
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have “paid their social marginal products”, so that RFK =  (R is the rental price of 
capital, thus the interest rate or depreciation rate) and wFL =  (wage rate), then 
Barro (1998) suggests that the standard of the rate of technological progress can 






















      (7) 
Variables ks and ls are factor payments of capital and labor, respectively. 










=  ,      (8)  
since I use the variable tb  to denote technical change.  This formula illustrates the 
residual of technology growth, which one can also call the growth rate, or change in 
TFP, where technological progress is the result of subtracting changes in the shares of 
capital and the shares of labor.  I closely follow this method. 
 
4.3.2  Estimation 
A significant advantage of the aforementioned method (growth accounting - 
TFP) method is that it enables us to calculate the growth rates for technology-induced 
productivity between specific time intervals, which therefore makes it suitable for 
panel data.    By using panel data, one can get more accurate results for both the 
weights of labor with respect to time and technology-induced growth (TFP growth) as 
a result.  For empirical purposes, however, equation (2) also raises a conceptual 
problem.  Although the equation represents output per unit of joint inputs, it is much 
more difficult to assign a meaningful interpretation to it as well as to the meaning of 
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the level of technology, which in itself can be subject to speculation (Felipe, 1997). 
Studies have tended to use such measures as technology intensity (assets per 
employee) (e.g. Li et al., 2002) or R&D intensity (R&D expenditure relative to sales) 
(e.g. Makino and Delios, 1996), but these are static figures and are not based on 
absorption rates of new technology or knowledge and therefore say little about a 
firm’s technology/knowledge-based productivity growth, thus the efficacy of 
technology or knowledge transfer.  The partial productivity in the growth accounting 
method index, however, addresses the problem more suitably by accounting for the 
weighted productivities of labor and capital, leaving a residual value for growth in 
productivity (Felipe, 1997). 
Coelli et al. (1998; 2005) have developed a framework for measuring 
productivity and productivity change as part of a performance measurement.  
“Productivity is essentially a level concept and measures of productivity can be used 
in comparing performance of firms at a given time.  In contrast, productivity change 
refers to movements in productivity performance of a firm or an industry over time.” 
(Coelli et al., 2005) 
The Thornqvist index has become a commonly used measure of 
technology-induced productivity change (Coelli et al., 2005).  In the Thornqvist 
index, observed productivity improvements could be the result of improvements in 
technical efficiency and/or in the underlying production technology (Coelli et al., 
2005).  I have specifically chosen the Thornqvist index and subsequently refer to it 
as such or as technology/knowledge-based productivity growth interchangeably. 
 
4.3.3 Applicability 
For the Thornqvist index to be utilized, the following assumptions and 
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limitations apply: 
• The firm engages in either cost minimization or revenue maximization. 
• The residual value is a combined value of technical change and technical 
efficiency change, without separating the two due to the difficulty of quantifying 
the value of technical change. 
• Price information is incorporated/part of the PQ index (output), which is suitable 
for a large number of companies in an industry because it assumes an aggregate 
function similar to that of the GDP value for any given economy. 
• An important advantage of the Thornqvist index, however, is that it can be 
calculated with a minimum of two time-related data points and information on 
output, labor, and capital data, while other frontier approaches require several 
time periods, and specific data on any given technology.  In this sense, the 
Thornqvist index significantly enhances the number of usable observations from 
my dataset and thus provides a higher likelihood of yielding significant results. 
Scholars have suggested several measures of productivity change in firms with regard 
to technological influence. 
In most empirical applications, where TFP indices are calculated, the 
Thornqvist index formula is used for purposes of output and in input calculations.  









=   (9) 
The first part of the right-hand side of equation is the logarithmic form of the 
Thornqvist index applied to output data, and the second part is the input index, which 
is calculated using input quantities and the corresponding cost shares. 
To measure technology-related productivity changes, the Thornqvist index 
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can measure changes in the levels of outputs generated and inputs contributed to the 
production process over two time periods for a given firm.  Where more time periods 
were available for a given subsidiary, I calculated the value of the Thornqvist index 
between each consecutive time period.  The Thornqvist index provides a reasonable 
approximation to the true output and input quantity index numbers (Coelli et al., 
2005: 88), and in most practical applications involving panel data, the formula yields 
realistic numerical values for the TFP index (Diewert, 1992; Coelli et al., 2005). 
        In calculating the specific data, I followed Chambers’ (1988), and Felipe’s 














































   (11) 
LΘ and KΘ denote shares of each aggregate factor in total factor payments. 
 
4.3.4 Estimation of shares of aggregate factors in factor payments ( lθ , kθ ) 
Both LΘ and KΘ  are estimated as the share of either labor or capital out of 
the total non-residual factor payment share of capital and labor in time periods t and 
t-1.  The change in labor-based factor payment shares and capital-based factor 
payment shares is then a middle-point in that time-period, as Felipe (1997) suggests.  
Therefore, I neither used the highest nor the lowest values.  Factor payment of labor 
was determined according to the wage rate times the number of local employees.  
Capital was depreciated at an average rate of 0.95 per annum (Jefferson et al., 2000). 
  Another issue is the estimation of labor.  Since the value of 
technology-based productivity growth is an index value, thus without any assigned 
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unit, all units in the original equations (10) and (11) needed to have a common 
denominator and therefore needed to be capital-based, i.e. have a monetary unit.  
Therefore, following other studies (e.g. Perkins, 1996; Jefferson et al., 2000), I 
introduced a wage rate to the labor variable.  The wage rate is already incorporated 
into the variable L.  Therefore, L is the number of local employees in the subsidiary 
times their wage rate.  I used the common wage rate of 12,000 yuan per worker per 
year.  Ultimately, all denominators became common and thus cancellable, leading to 
an index of the growth rate of technology-based productivity. 
 
4.4 Variables 
In order to proceed with calculations of ownership structures that yielded the 
highest technology/knowledge-based productivity growth results, a regression to test 
the relationship of several independent and control variables with the dependent 
variable – technology/knowledge-based productivity growth – was set up first.  Of 
particular interest are the relationships between ownership and its related variables 
such as ownership changes in relation to technology/knowledge-based productivity 
growth.  I was further interested in aspects of labor-related and capital-related factor 
inputs on technology/knowledge-based productivity growth.  In addition, since 
extensive time-series (panel) data was being used, I was also interested in determining 
the effects of subsidiary age on technology-induced productivity growth and 
instability among the subsidiaries in the sample. 
To accomplish the aforementioned, I chose STATA as the statistical program 
to handle panel data in which random-effects regressions were set up in order to 
determine relationships among the aforementioned variables. 
In the first instance, a regression established the relationship between 
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ownership-related variables and technology/knowledge-based productivity growth.  
In further regressions, ownership-related variables were modified in order to specify 
linear and non-linear relationships between ownership-related variables and 
technology/knowledge-based productivity growth.  In addition, limits with respect to 
subsidiary age were applied in order to further test the relationships between 
dependent and independent variables at different stages of subsidiary existence. 
Other STATA commands were also used in order to filter data and apply some 
of the relationships established in the regressions to specific numeric data values.      
The relevant correlation analysis, regression tables, and related quantitative analyses 
are discussed in detail in subsequent sections of this chapter. 
With regard to regressions, the advantage of using random effects is the 
ability to account for the individual characteristics of each subsidiary and the 
uncertainty that cannot be explained by individual factors (e.g. Sohn and Kim, 2007).  
In the following section, variables used in the regression are discussed in more detail. 
 
4.4.1 Independent variables 
Japanese ownership (jatotal, logjatotal) and ownership change (changeown) 
were defined as independent variables.  Ownership change here is meant to be the 
percentage difference in ownership between two consecutive time intervals, i.e. at 
time t and t-1.  Before proceeding with calculations on specific numeric values 
regarding ownership-related variables, the relationship between dependent and 
independent variables was tested first, with control variables applied. 
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Japanese ownership and logarithm of Japanese ownership (jatotal and 
logjatotal) 
In addition to absolute Japanese ownership (jatotal) at each discrete time 
point, I further generated the variable of the natural logarithm of Japanese ownership 
(logjatotal) as an independent variable in the expectation that 
technology/knowledge-based productivity growth would diminish with rising 
Japanese ownership. 
 
 Change in ownership (changeown) 
The change in ownership between two discrete time intervals is the third 
independent variable. 
 
4.4.2 Dependent variable 
 Technology/knowledge-based productivity growth (Thornqvist index) 
As previously discussed, technology/knowledge-based productivity growth 
(Thornqvist index) was set as the dependent variable.  It will depend on the discrete 
ownership values (jatotal and/or logjatotal) at each time interval as well as the change 
in ownership between time intervals.   According to the literature review, I do not 
expect technology/knowledge-based productivity growth to peak at the highest 
ownership levels.  In order to obtain more conclusive results, I tested this assumption 
by creating a change in ownership value (changeown). 
 
4.4.3 Control variables 
In addition, variables related to labor, capital, technical change and subsidiary 
age were set as control variables since they have been discussed as factors in 
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productivity growth and company performance in the literature review (e.g. Felipe, 
1997; Hitt et al., 1997; Tallman and Li, 1997; Barkema and Vermeulen, 1998; 
Geringer et al., 2000).  The following points summarize the specific control 
variables: 
- Labor-related variables: number of local (Chinese) employees (lemp), 
number of Japanese employees (jemp), ratio of Japanese to Chinese employees 
(empratio), factor payments LΘ  and an inflation-adjusted time-related labor variable 
( tl ) 
- Capital-related variables: Capital in USD (uscpt), an output variable (pqt), 
and factor payments KΘ  and tk   
- Age-related variables: Subsidiary age (subsidiary_age) 
A correlation table will confirm that these variables did not show high collinearity and 
could therefore be used as control variables. 
 
4.4.4 Explanation of control variables 
 Labor-related variables ( tl ) 
The combined number of Chinese employees and Japanese employees was 
used as a proxy for labor input.  An inflation-adjusted and year-specific wage rate to 
the labor control variable tl  was assigned.  Average wage rates were obtained from 
the China Statistical Yearbook for the relevant years and SIC codes. 
In contrast, it is more difficult to assign a wage rate to Japanese expat 
employees.  In addressing this difficulty, I decided to apply the same wage rate to the 
Japanese employees for two reasons:  Any labor input measured is 
subsidiary-specific.  First, Japanese expat employees’ wages are usually not a 
(substantial) part of a subsidiary’s expenses, since Japanese employees tend to receive 
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their salary from the headquarters rather than the subsidiary directly (e.g. Agrawal, 
2006).  Second, the number of Japanese employees in the subsidiaries is very small. 
It did not exceed 6 employees in more than 90% of the observations, some of which 
include large keiretsu with more than one thousand Chinese employees.  Therefore, 
expatriate wage rates were not included in the productivity calculations.  
Furthermore, the mean ratio of Japanese employees to Chinese staff in 1881 
observations was only around 4.9%.  The impact of a Japanese employee variable 
would therefore not be large, regardless of the wage-coefficient used (Bauer, 1990). 
LΘ  denotes the share of the aggregate factor of labor in the total factor 
payments of the subsidiary.  The other control variable used is tl , which denotes the 
growth rate of local labor between two consecutive time intervals.  Following Delios 
and Henisz (2002) tl  can be interpreted as a measure of inexperience, due to its 
measurement of the difference in local employees.  It was also assumed that each 
additionally locally hired employee needed to be trained and immersed into the 
company culture first before becoming fully productive.  This measure applies to 
manual labor, rather than new engineers, whose level of knowledge would be higher.  
Due to the large ratio of manual labor in subsidiaries, tl  therefore mainly refers to 
manual labor. 
 
 Japanese employees (jemp) and local employees (lemp) 
In accordance with other studies that have involved the transfer of tangible 
and intangible assets (e.g. Kremic, 1993; Delios and Henisz, 2002; Dhanaraj and 
Beamish, 2003). Employee numbers of Japanese and local employees were also 
utilized as control variables since employees are the active sources and recipients of 




 Capital-related control variables (uscpt) 
Furthermore, I controlled for the effects of capital using the amount of 
invested capital in US Dollars ( uscpt ) for each observation.  The effects of output 
were also controlled for. 
 
 Output 
It is necessary to define and discuss the usage of the output variable ( tPQ ).  
In the sense of micro-level data, the variable tPQ  (STATA notation: pqt) is similar to 
what a GDP would represent for a macro-economy (Barro, 1998) – on a micro-level, 
it is an output variable for a subsidiary.  It is not revenue or sales in the strictest sense 
because an essential implied component in aggregate output values is the price of 
goods, which is not a component of the dataset.  Thus, rather than using revenue or 
sales as an output variable, I decided to base output on a function of profit, capital, a 
capital depreciation rate, and wage rates.  Except for the price of goods, all other 
variables were available from the dataset.  As in GDP figures, the price of goods is 
an implied component of the output, and therefore it is not necessary to designate a 
specific value to it (Hsieh, 1999).  Designating a specific price would be impractical 
because companies make different products.  Likewise, a macro-economic GDP 
figure also does not tell whether its value came from good A or good B.  The tPQ  
(output) value therefore is an aggregate output value for which it is not necessary to 
incorporate specific prices.  In determining tPQ , I followed the notation that output 
is a function of capital and labor over time: 
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[ ]tLKFPQ tttt ,,=       (12) 
A profit function as suggested by Barro (1998), in which profit equals a price-output 
less cost of capital less labor costs was also used according to the following formula: 
ttt wLrKPQ ++Π=        (13) 
( =Π Profit, =r depreciation rate of capital, =w wage rate) 
According to Hsieh (1998), who suggested that the Solow residual 
(technology/knowledge-based productivity growth index) is a result of the growth 
rates of factor prices, rather than factor quantities.  A similar assumption can be 
made for the purpose of this dissertation.  I followed both Barro’s (1998) and Hsieh’s 
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where ks and ls  are factor payments of capital and labor, respectively. 
Another notation for productivity growth was developed by Felipe (1997), 
and is obtained from the sum of the share-weighted growth of factor prices, in which 














































,  as in equation (11) 
The last expression thus represents the share of factor inputs of labor and 
capital between two discrete and consecutive time points.  This method was applied 
to my dataset in order to generate the new variable 1, −ttϕ .  It is also referred to as 
 144 
Thornqvist index in this dissertation. 
This section has shown how Felipe’s (1997) model in equation (10) was 
adjusted to fit the situation of my dataset as shown in equation (15).  Namely my 
usage addresses price-output ( tPQ ) rather than output in general as in equation (10). 
With only the condition that factor output equals factor incomes the result is 
that both productivity growth indexes will be the same.  Therefore, no further 
information was needed on input prices, as they are implied in the expression tPQ , 
which is price-including. KΘ  and LΘ  in Felipe’s (1997) expression refer to what 
Barro (1998) termed ks and ls  in his formula, respectively.  A closer discussion 
was provided in the beginning of this chapter. 
The advantage of Felipe’s (1997) notation is that it introduces 1, −ttϕ  as a 





QP   thus essentially becomes productivity growth, in which the 
difference in the share of factor inputs of labor and capital between two time points 
has been accounted for and weighted by LΘ  and KΘ . 
 
 Capital-related factor payments ( KΘ and kθ ) 
KΘ  and kθ were then used as capital-related control variables.  KΘ  
denotes the share of the aggregate factor payment of capital in the total factor 
payments of a subsidiary.  It interacts with the next control variable: kθ .  kθ  
denotes the growth rate of capital between two consecutive time intervals.  The 
relationship between the two variables ( KΘ and kθ ) is a result of the change of the 
share of capital within the factor payments of labor and capital between two time 
 145 




 (Felipe, 1997), whereby   (16) 
( )1, −ttkθ  represent the weights of capital in the total factor payments of labor (L) and 


















θ     (17) 
 
 Labor-related factor payments ( LΘ  and lθ ) 
Similar to KΘ , the share of the aggregate factor payment of labor was 
included in the regression as a control variable.  In order to determine the factor 
payment of LΘ , the change in the factor share of labor between two time intervals had 
to be determined, which is similar to that of capital (K) above.  The equation for LΘ  
as well as tl ,θ  and 1, −tlθ  (factor shares of labor at time points t and t-1) are 
expressed by the following notations, respectively: 























θ     (19) 
 
 Subsidiary age 
Subsidiary age was used as another control variable, mainly as a proxy to 
account for subsidiary experience.  In accordance with my argument about the 
non-static view of knowledge, I controlled for the effects of subsidiary age and the 
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related accumulated knowledge within the subsidiary on the outcome of the 
Thornqvist index.  Subsidiary age is included in the analysis because previous 
studies suggest that it influences the innovations and international operations of a firm 
(Ietto-Gillies, 1998; Qian, 2008).  Subsidiary age is measured as the actual duration 
of existence of a firm since its year of formation in years. 
 
4.5 Quantitative analysis 
As outlined above, I followed equation (10) in calculating the Thornqvist 
index.  The Thornqvist index is a residual measure and implies a change in 
technology, technical, or managerial efficiency, which is not accounted for by changes 
in labor and capital productivities.  The model is applied and productivity growth 
discussed following a discussion of the dataset. 
 
4.5.1 Descriptive data 
The dataset was compiled from the Toyo Keizai Kaigai Shinshutsu Kigyo 
Soran and contains time-series data on 1881 Japanese subsidiaries in China covering 
the years from 1986 to 2003, in 3-year time intervals.20
From a methodological point of view, there was little need to use data from 
every year due to the time needed in technology and knowledge transfer.  Therefore, 
three-year time intervals are more practical.  The 1881 companies are those 
  The data had been compiled 
manually from the printed versions of Toyo Keizai Kaigai Shinshutsu Kigyo Soran 
(1986-2003) into electronic form.  Some limited data was available with regard to 
descriptive information about subsidiary setups as far back as 1981 and was included 
in Table 4.2 only. 
                                                   
20 The initial sample included equity-based high-tech manufacturing subsidiaries of Japanese companies in China; therefore, the 
initial sample contained both WOS and IJVs with one Chinese partner. 
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observations that contain complete data over at least two discrete time points so that at 
least one technology/knowledge-related productivity growth measure could be 
obtained.  Complete data implied that all data necessary for the calculation of the 
indexes, dependent variables, and independent variables was available, including 
relevant two-digit SIC codes, which eventually narrowed the sample from 
approximately 3,000 observations to 1,881 observations that contained full data. 
The sample includes data from the high-tech sector, which I have limited to 
the electronics, telecommunications, and high-precision industries, in the broad 
single-digit SIC 3 group.  More specifically, data was from the two-digit SIC-code 
groups of 35 to 39, which includes all electronic component makers, be they 
computers, integrated circuits, transmitters, mobile phones, and other electronic 
devices. 
Out of 1881 subsidiaries, there were 717 WOS, with Japanese ownership 
ratios greater than or equal to 90 percent and 1,164 IJVs, of which 593 were Japanese 
majority-owned (i.e. ownership exceeded 50%).  Many scholars, including Delios 
and Beamish, 1997; 1999 and Makino and Delios, 1996 consider a subsidiary to be a 
WOS if one IJV partner owns at least 90% of equity.  Out of 1164 IJVs, the mean 
Japanese ownership ratio was 56%, and the median ownership ratio was 52%.  Even 
if the foundation year of the subsidiaries is taken into account, which would be subject 
to different IJV laws, the Japanese ownership ratios can be considered low, given that 
most of the subsidiaries in the sample were established between 1994 and 1996.  The 
figures therefore point to the possibility that the rate of technology transferred in 
Japanese subsidiaries may not be high.  The following two tables show the year of 
set up of the high-tech subsidiaries (1881 subsidiaries) and the mean subsidiary age of 
the subsidiaries in the sample, respectively: 
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1981 1 0.05 
1983 1 0.05 
1984 9 0.48 
1985 28 1.49 
1986 25 1.33 
1987 23 1.22 
1988 37 1.97 
1989 40 2.13 
1990 40 2.13 
1991 64 3.40 
1992 101 5.37 
1993 145 7.71 
1994 268 14.25 
1995 340 18.08 
1996 302 16.06 
1997 204 10.85 
1998 87 4.63 
1999 64 3.40 
2000 46 2.45 
2001 44 2.34 
2002 12 0.64 
   
Total 1,881 100.00 
 
 
Table 4.2: Mean subsidiary age 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Subsidiary 
age 
1881 7.69013     3.183967        .25 18.75 
 
 
The data shows the mean subsidiary age to be 7.7 years, with 18.75 years as 
the maximum and 0.25 years as the minimum subsidiary ages.  The data further 
shows that most subsidiaries were founded between 1992 and 1997, with set-up 
activity reaching a peak between 1994 and 1996. 
Only 538 of 910 subsidiaries formed in those years were joint ventures at a 
level of Japanese ownership below 90%.  The surge in new subsidiaries and increase 
in wholly-owned subsidiaries (WOS) coincided with the previously enacted 
Provisions for Export-Oriented and Technologically-Advanced Foreign Investment 
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Law of 1992 and the devaluation of the yuan in 1993.  The former allowed greater 
freedom for export-oriented subsidiaries to set up WOS, bypassing previously 
mandatory IJVs with local SOEs.  Therefore, it would be reasonable to assume that 
WOS established in these years were more assembly oriented, which could impact 
their technology/knowledge-based productivity growth values adversely. 
 
4.5.1.1 Ownership adjustment 
The data of 1881 subsidiaries indicated that 814 subsidiaries had never 
changed ownership, while 205 subsidiaries had increased ownership at a mean rate of 
12% and 125 had decreased ownership at a mean rate of 9% (Table 4.4). For WOS, 
the rate of ownership decrease could result in WOS becoming IJVs if the ownership 
decrease resulted in Japanese ownership falling below 90%.  The results analysis 
which follows the descriptive data section will further show the impact ownership and 
ownership change had on technology-induced productivity growth.  Interestingly, of 
those subsidiaries that increased ownership, the dataset indicated that the majority of 
subsidiaries started to increase ownership when their subsidiary age was 
approximately 7 years, while for those subsidiaries that decreased ownership, the 
subsidiary age was approximately 8.5 years (Table 4.4).  It is also at this age that 
Delios and Beamish (1999) have argued that IJVs end their productive lifespan.  The 
change in ownership can therefore be interpreted as an adjustment or response to the 
productive lifespan.  More specific analysis with regard to subsidiary age, ownership, 
and technology/knowledge-based productivity growth is conducted from Section 6.5.2 
onwards. 
Furthermore, an analysis will show that a change in ownership could affect 
the technological/knowledge-based productive lifespan and generate numerical values 
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at which ownership should be adjusted to augment the productive lifespan. 
 









(in %)  
(Japanese 
perspective) 
Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
None 814 0 0 0 0 
Increase 205 12.13897 12.68582 .0499992 62.4 
Decrease 125 -9.133427 15.60896 -100 -.0149994 
 
 









Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Increase 942 7.111673 3.344776 .25 18.583 
Decrease 125 8.575664 3.216506 2.417 17.666 
 
 
4.5.1.2 Subsidiary age and instability 
In terms of subsidiary age and instability, the data showed that the majority 
of subsidiaries has remained in business.  A further data breakdown by WOS and 
IJVs shows that of the 1486 subsidiaries that did not dissolve, 544 were wholly owned 
and 937 were IJVs.  Of a total of 619 WOS in the sample, the non-termination rate 
for WOS at 88% was thus slightly higher than for IJVs, which recorded a slightly 
lower non-termination rate of 76%. 
The data is in line with other findings that WOS are less likely to disintegrate 
than IJVs due to higher control and fewer partner disagreements (e.g. Delios and 
Beamish, 1998).  However, the difference in this sample is not very large.  Unlike 
WOS, IJVs have two potential sources of instability – one type of instability can be 
local-partner induced (caused by the local partner), implying loss of control by the 
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majority shareholder/owner of technology (i.e. the Japanese partner).  For the 
Japanese partner, this scenario would amount to uncontrolled instability.  The other 
type is controlled instability in which the majority shareholder (i.e. Japanese partner) 
chooses the time at which to terminate the subsidiary.  The latter scenario also 
applies to WOS.  Both instability scenarios will be discussed as case studies in the 
qualitative chapter. 
 
Table 4.5: Subsidiaries by year of exit 




Non-exit 1,486 79.00 
1992 2 0.11 
1993 2 0.11 
1994 0 0.00 
1995 4 0.21 
1996 0 0.00 
1997 10 0.53 
1998 33 1.75 
1999 75 3.99 
2000 50 2.66 
2001 19 1.01 
2002 200 10.63 
   
Total 1,881 100.00 
 
 
Table 4.5 shows that 1486 subsidiaries did not terminate, yielding an overall 
stability rate for the sample of 79%.  The largest number of exits was recorded in 
2002 for both WOS and IJVs.  The large number of exits in the year 2002 could be 
the result of an amendment passed in 2001 to the Law of the People’s Republic of 
China on Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures, which simplified the process for 
establishing WOS.  Thus, the large number of exits could simply mean that many 
IJVs were terminated and converted to WOS.  However, the dataset may not reflect 
later subsidiary formations because the last year of observation is 2003.  In fact, a 
split of the dataset into WOS and IJVs in the next two tables shows that IJV exits 
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exceeded WOS exits significantly. 
The mean subsidiary age of those IJVs that exited was 9 years.  The age of 
all non-exited subsidiaries was 7.6 years on average, in which WOS recorded a mean 
age of 6.9 years and IJVs, 8.3 years.  Most of these subsidiaries were therefore 
formed between 1994 and 1996, immediately following the new IJV laws of 1993.  
Therefore, those subsidiaries that exited in 2002 at a mean age of nine 9 years were 
subsidiaries that had been established earlier than 1993, before the new law took 
effect and had thus been subject to greater structural market failure (Dunning, 1995). 
As such, they were exposed to greater government involvement and pressure, a higher 
degree of information asymmetry and thus non-alignment of goals between IJV 
partners.  Ownership structures were likely to be more a result of government 
involvement rather than mutual bargaining and therefore did not adequately reflect the 
tangible or intangible assets to be transacted. 




Table 4.6: WOS by year of exit 
Exit year Number of 
WOS exited 
Percent 
Non-exit 544 87.46 
1992 0 0.00 
1993 0 0.00 
1994 0 0.00 
1995 0 0.00 
1996 0 0.00 
1997 4 0.64 
1998 9 1.45 
1999 16 2.57 
2000 6 0.96 
2002 43 6.91 
   
Total 622 100.00 
 
 
Table 4.7: IJVs by year of exit 
Exit year Number of 
IJVs exited 
Percent 
Non-exit 937 74.42 
1992 2 0.16 
1993 2 0.16 
1994 5 0.40 
1995 4 0.32 
1996 0 0.00 
1997 6 0.48 
1998 24 1.91 
1999 59 4.69 
2000 44 3.49 
2001 19 1.51 
2002 157 12.47 
   
Total 1,259 100.00 
 
 
4.5.1.3  Size of subsidiaries 
 Invested capital 
The size of the companies measured by invested capital is also noteworthy.  
The average amount of invested capital for all subsidiaries in the year of their 
formation was 125 million USD, while for later time periods the amount of invested 




Table 4.8: Invested capital 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Capital in 
USD (uscpt) 
1881 1.25e+07 1.30e+08 8 4.36e+09 
 
 
 Employee numbers 
Unlike invested capital, however, subsidiaries have grown in terms of 
employee size.  While the average number of all employees (Chinese and Japanese) 
at the time of subsidiary setup was 256, this number grew to 284 employees in 
following years, which corresponds to an 11% increase in overall total employee 
numbers (Tables 3.10; 3.11; 3.12).  Such an increase was to be expected given the 
economic growth and expansion of production in China. 
Further analysis showed that the average number of locally hired (Chinese) 
employees grew by 35 employees (Table 4.10) from a starting value of 246 employees 
(Table 4.9).  This amounts to a locally hired workforce of 281, which corresponds to 
a 14% increase, according to the latest data.  The average number of Japanese 
employees also increased from 2.75 to 3.33, which corresponds to a 21% increase 
(Table 4.10). 
The decrease in invested capital and increase in employee numbers suggest 
that overall activities in subsidiaries had become more manual and less value-added 
with investments decreasing overall and employee numbers rising. This result is 
somewhat unexpected since it is an indication contrary to the behavior of 
capital-intensive high-tech companies.  With lower value-added, the amount of tacit 
knowledge transferred necessary for sustained technology and knowledge transfer 
could thus also result in a decrease.  The overall result of this analysis would suggest 
that most Japanese companies have increasingly used China as a base for production 
without emphasis on long-term value-added and knowledge-based capabilities. 
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1881 256.4588 694.4099 1 19244 




593 225.4755 489.8975 1 6741 
 
 
Table 4.10: Mean number of local and Japanese employees at time of IJV 







Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Local 1654 246.2533 689.388 0 19240 
Japanese 1654 2.751511 3.771039 0 43 
 
 








Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Local 1026 35.26358 307.452 -4947 5401 
Japanese 1026 .5789799 15.02249 -12.66667 428 
 
 
Table 4.12: Comparison of changes in numbers of local employees between WOS 









Std. Dev. Min. Max. 




368 20.30276 345.263 -4947 3510 
 
  
Breakdown of results 
When the aforementioned sample is broken down, however, the results 
become more differentiated.  While both WOS and IJVs increased employee 
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numbers, WOS did so at almost three times the rate of IJVs (Table 4.12).  The 
average increase in employee numbers amounted to 57 for WOS and 20 for majority 
Japanese-owned IJVs (Table 4.12). 
As for invested capital, however, the difference was even more pronounced 
(Table 4.13).  While WOS showed capital declines, IJVs increased capital at similar 
but inverse amounts that WOS had decreased capital.  Majority Japanese-owned 
IJVs, on average, increased capital at about USD 3.6 million, while WOS decreased 
capital by USD 4 million at the same time.  In summary, IJVs increased both 
employee numbers and capital, while WOS increased employee numbers at greater 
rates than majority Japanese-owned JVs while decreasing capital.  It can therefore be 
inferred that it has been WOS that have reduced value-added activities, not the 
majority Japanese-owned IJVs, as the initial analysis of the dataset might have 
suggested. 
Contrary to the usual behavior of high-technology companies, these WOS did 
not show capital-intensiveness in both absolute terms (i.e. they decreased capital) and 
relative terms (i.e. compared to IJVs), even though these WOS are from high-tech 
industries.  These findings thus support my case for IJVs as better vehicles for 
technology and knowledge transfer. 
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Std. Dev. Min. Max. 




414 3644268 6.93e+07 -3.10e+08 1.37e+09 
 
 
5. Results of quantitative analysis 
5.1 Panel data - reshaping 
The data was received in linear form.  In order to make a comparison among 
all subsidiaries over several intervals of time, the dataset had to be reshaped into panel 
data.  The program utilized was STATA. 
The data covers 17 years in intervals of three years.  Time intervals of less 
than three years would not yield significant marginal benefit due to the time involved 
in transferring technologies and absorbing knowledge (e.g. Kennedy, 2003; Oud and 
Singer, 2007; Zheng, 2009). 
 
5.2 Correlation analysis 
Before the regression, a correlation analysis was conducted with the variables 
discussed in the previous section on variables.  The correlation results show that 
most variables are not highly correlated, with most coefficients remaining well below 
0.1.  Other correlation values did not exceed the 0.5 mark at any point.  I therefore 
proceeded to use the variables in the regression analysis.  However, LΘ  and KΘ , 
tk , and tPQ  were dropped from the regression due to high collinearity with the 
dependent variable Thornqvist.21
                                                   
21 Technology/knowledge-based productivity growth is also referred to as Thornqvist index in this dissertation. 
  Correlation results are shown next.
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(USD) LΘ  KΘ  
PQt 






1               
Change in ownership -0.0491 1              
Japanese ownership 0.0591 -0.203 1             
Sales (USD) -0.1436 -0.01 0.054 1            
Local employees -0.061 -0.026 0.032 0.395 1           
Japanese employees 0.011 -0.057 0.093 0.112 0.1283 1          
Employee ratio 0.0627 -0.014 0.102 -0 -0.0879 0.0367 1         
Capital (USD) 0.1186 0.0005 0.022 0.031 0.0486 0.0794 -0.0107 1        
LΘ (aggregate 
factor payment – 
labor) 
0.0606 -0.004 -0.02 -0 0.0106 0.0098 -0.0184 -0 1       
KΘ  (aggregate 
factor payment - 
capital 
-0.0606 0.0041 0.018 0.003 -0.0106 -0.0098 0.0184 0.003 -1 1      
PQt (Output) 0.2028 0.001 0.022 -0.01 -0.0011 0.0412 -0.0015 0.003 0.3 -0 1     
kt (factor payment – 
capital) 0.0092 0.0021 -0.03 -0.01 -0.0026 -0.0021 -0.0025 -0 1 -1 0.3 1    
lt (factor payment – 
labor) 0.0619 0.1696 0.004 -0.02 -0.0416 -0.0225 0.031 -0.01 -0 0 -0 0.007 1   
bt (technical 
change) -0.0338 -0.065 0.011 -0.01 -0.0087 -0.0323 -0.0105 -0 -0 0 -0 -0 -0 1  
Subsidiary age -0.1586 0.01 -0.2 0.072 0.0792 -0.0157 -0.1159 -0.02 0 -0 -0 0.002 0.021 -0.017 1 
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5.3 Regression analyses 
For the regression analysis, four random-effects regressions were set up. The 
first two regressions included the entire dataset, while the last two regressions 
comprised those subsidiaries before and after their peak productivity age.  All 
regressions used technology/knowledge-based productivity growth (Thornqvist index) 
as the dependent variable, ownership-related variables as independent variables, in 
addition to other control variables.  The first regression used total Japanese 
ownership (jatotal) and ownership change (changeown) as independent variables, 
whereas the subsequent three regressions used the natural logarithm of total Japanese 
ownership (logjatotal) as the independent variable.  The latter was converted from 
the former by applying function ln(jatotal) to the dataset.  The variables used in the 
random-effects regressions are listed below. 
 
Dependent variable: 
• Technology/knowledge-based productivity growth (Thornqvist) 
 
Independent variables: 
• Total Japanese ownership (jatotal) (Regression 1),  




• Number of local employees (lemp), 
• Number of Japanese employees (jemp),  
• Invested capital in USD (uscpt),  
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• Factor payment of labor ( tl ), 
• Technical change ( tb ), 
• Subsidiary age (subsidiary_age) 
 
5.3.1 Regression setup 
In setting up the random-effects regressions, those control variables where 
high collinearity had occurred were removed.  According to the correlation table, the 
excluded variables were factor payments LΘ , KΘ , tk , and tPQ .  However, high 
collinearity was to be expected for variables LΘ  and KΘ , since in the econometric 
setup of the model, the sum of these two variables would be equal to or close to one, 
due to rounding errors. 
With regard to ownership and technology/knowledge-based productivity 
growth (Thornqvist index), the regression included the ownership-related variables 
ownership change (changeown) and total Japanese ownership (jatotal).  The 
regression also included other control variables which had shown no significant 
correlation in the previous correlation table.  These were namely variables related to 
labor (lemp, jemp, empratio), invested capital (uscpt), technical change ( tb ), and 
subsidiary age (subsidiary_age).
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Table 5.2: Regression 1 (random effects) 
 
Number of observations: 692 
Number of groups: 456 
 
Random-effects GLS 
regression        




Thornqvist Coefficient Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf.] Interval 
           
Independent variables:           
Change in ownership changeown -0.012898 0.0047881 -2.69 0.007 -0.0222824 -0.0035135 
Japanese ownership jatotal -0.0025229 0.0031196 -0.81 0.419 -0.0086373 0.0035915 
           
Control variables:           
Number of local 
employees lemp -0.0001285 0.0001031 -1.25 0.213 -0.0003305 0.0000735 
Number of Japanese 
employees jemp -0.0024285 0.0146163 -0.17 0.868 -0.0310758 0.0262189 
Employee ratio empratio 0.6453462 0.567851 1.14 0.256 -0.4676213 1.758314 
Capital (USD) uscpt 1.48E-09 3.26E-10 4.53 0 8.39E-10 2.12E-09 
Factor payment - labor lt 0.031349 0.0137526 2.28 0.023 0.0043943 0.0583036 
Technical change bt -3.95E-06 2.01E-06 -1.97 0.049 -7.88E-06 -1.53E-08 
Subsidiary age subsidiary_age -0.1125387 0.0224524 -5.01 0 -0.1565446 -0.0685328 
 
R-squared: within 0.0838 
  between 0.0877 




Wald chi2(12) 70.13 
Prob > chi2 0 
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5.3.2 Discussion (regression 1) 
In the first regression, a relationship between linear ownership-related 
variables and growth in technology/knowledge-based productivity growth (Thornqvist 
index) is established. 
Under these conditions, a regression of the dataset yielded a significant result 
within the 1% confidence interval with regard to change in ownership (changeown) 
and its relationship to technology/knowledge-based productivity growth, which was 
negative, with a coefficient of -0.012.  As such, this regression establishes the 
existence of a negative relationship between ownership change (changeown) and 
productivity growth (Thornqvist index).  Furthermore, it is important to note the 
negative coefficient for subsidiary age (subsidiary_age), which is also statistically 
significant.  
Although jatotal shows a negative relationship with Thornqvist, the validity 
of this relationship cannot be confirmed due to the high P>|z| value.  The regression 
did not yield significant results with regard to total Japanese ownership (jatotal) due 
to a P>|z| value of 0.42. 
Moreover, the regression shows only a marginal relationship between 
invested capital and growth in technology/knowledge-based productivity due to the 
low coefficient of uscpt, which continues unchanged throughout further regressions. 
The dataset for this regression yielded 692 observations that had complete data for the 
given variables. 
2R , sigma (σ ), and rho ( ρ ) values also remained within acceptable limits. 
With regard to the negative relationship between change in ownership and 
technology/knowledge-based productivity growth, the next regression (regression 2) 
will test the sample further by including the natural logarithm of total Japanese 
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ownership to determine the behavior of the rate of growth for changes in 
technology/knowledge-based productivity growth (Thornqvist index).  In other 
words, the next regression will determine whether productivity growth is non-linear 
and would slow after increases in Japanese ownership. 
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Table 5.3: Regression 2 (random effects) 
 
Number of observations 692 
Number of groups 456 
 
Random-effects GLS 
regression        




Thornqvist Coefficient Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf.] Interval 
        
Independent variables:        
Change in ownership changeown -0.0096959 0.0051567 -1.88 0.06 -0.0198028 0.000411 
Log Japanese ownership logjatotal 2.815523 1.696987 1.66 0.097 -0.5105099 6.141555 
        
Control variables:        
Number of local 
employees lemp -0.0001225 0.000103 -1.19 0.234 -0.0003244 0.0000793 
Number of Japanese 
employees jemp -0.0021689 0.0145983 -0.15 0.882 -0.030781 0.0264432 
Employee ratio empratio 0.662311 0.5671791 1.17 0.243 -0.4493396 1.773962 
Capital (USD) uscpt 1.48E-09 3.25E-10 4.56 0 8.47E-10 2.12E-09 
Factor payment - labor lt 0.0329098 0.0137671 2.39 0.017 0.0059268 0.0598927 
Technical change bt -3.77E-06 2.01E-06 -1.88 0.06 -7.70E-06 1.66E-07 
Subsidiary age subsidiary_age -0.1110885 0.0224405 -4.95 0 -0.1550711 -0.067106 
 
R-squared: within 0.0941 
 between 0.0854 




Wald chi2(13) 73.07 
Prob > chi2 0 
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5.3.3 Discussion (regression 2) 
In this regression, a new variable was included – logjatotal, which is the 
natural logarithm of total Japanese ownership (jatotal) and substituted jatotal.  The 
purpose was to find whether the relationship between total Japanese ownership and 
productivity could be non-linear. 
In this regression, significant results were obtained for both change in 
ownership (changeown) and the natural logarithm function of total Japanese 
ownership (logjatotal).  The latter exhibited a positive and significant relationship 
with technology/knowledge-based productivity growth (Thornqvist index), with a 
coefficient of 2.81 within a 10% confidence interval (P>|z| is 0.097).  The result 
means that the relationship between the share of Japanese ownership and 
technology/knowledge-based productivity growth in local subsidiaries and IJVs in 
China is not a linear one, but rather follows an inverse upward-sloping flattening 
curve, characteristic of ln functions.  Since logjatotal shows a positive and 
significant relationship with productivity growth, the relationship between Japanese 
ownership and technology/knowledge-based productivity growth is thus not negative 
and linear if the regression 1 had been statistically significant. 
In practical terms, higher ownership still yields higher 
technology/knowledge-based productivity growth, but it also means that full Japanese 
ownership will not yield highest technology/knowledge-based productivity growth 
and therefore lower transaction costs.  Full ownership at some point would lead to a 
decline in technology/knowledge-based productivity growth and thus increases in 
transaction costs due to the pattern the curve of logjatotal follows.  Maximum 
productivity and thus minimum transaction costs would therefore not be achievable 
with full (100%) Japanese ownership, but rather at some ownership level below.  
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Specific ownership levels are discussed in later sections of this chapter. 
The relationship between change in ownership (changeown) and 
technology/knowledge-based productivity growth remained unchanged and retained 
its significance with this particular regression setup.  The coefficient of the 
ownership change variable (changeown) remained negative at a value of -0.009 and 
significant at better than a 6% confidence interval.  As such, lowering ownership 
would positively impact technology/knowledge-based productivity growth, while 
raising ownership would likely lead to productivity losses. 
2R , Sigma (σ ), and Rho ( ρ ) values all remained within acceptable levels in 
this regression. 
Beyond ownership change and ownership as an absolute value, a wider result 
of the regression can also be interpreted as one in which the timing of ownership 
change matters.  When the control variable of subsidiary age (subsidiary_age) is 
considered, a highly significant and negative relationship with productivity at a 0% 
confidence level can be noticed, which means subsidiaries became less productive 
over time with regard to technology and knowledge transfer.  Downward ownership 
adjustment could then reverse declining technology/knowledge-based productivity 
growth.  Timing and other details of ownership adjustments are therefore also 
discussed in subsequent sections of this chapter. 
 
5.3.4 About regressions 3 and 4 
A further limitation of subsidiary age parameters yielded more specific 
results with respect to ownership change (changeown), subsidiary age 
(subsidiary_age), and technology/knowledge-based productivity growth (Thornqvist 
index).  In the next two sections, regressions were made on subsidiaries before their 
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peak productivity age and after their peak productivity age.  I chose to split the 
dataset at a subsidiary age of 7.3 years as the critical productivity age for the next two 
regressions, which is based on the average number for the peak productivity age 
among all majority Japanese-owned subsidiaries in the sample.  A more specific 
breakdown by ownership ranges, however, is presented in Sections 3.5.6.6 and 3.5.6.7 
of this chapter.  Peak productivity age for the dataset was determined by analyzing 
the age at which technology/knowledge-based productivity growth values were 
highest and limiting the dataset to those observations beyond the peak productivity 
age.  The following regression table shows results for subsidiaries below their peak 
productivity age.
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Table 5.4: Regression 3 (random effects): subsidiary age<7.3 years 
 
Number of observations 187 
Number of groups 150 
 
Random-effects GLS 
regression        




Thornqvist Coefficient Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf.] Interval 
        
Independent variables:        
Change in ownership changeown 0.0216987 0.0106257 2.04 0.041 0.0008726 0.0425247 
Log Japanese ownership logjatotal 3.607636 2.893735 1.25 0.213 -2.06398 9.279251 
        
Control variables:        
Number of local 
employees lemp 0.0002293 0.0002285 1 0.316 -0.0002186 0.0006772 
Number of Japanese 
employees jemp -0.0799398 0.0270861 -2.95 0.003 -0.1330277 -0.0268519 
Employee ratio empratio 0.0553789 0.5068924 0.11 0.913 -0.9381119 1.04887 
Capital (USD) uscpt 1.27E-08 6.71E-09 1.89 0.058 -4.42E-10 2.59E-08 
Factor payment - labor lt 0.0855665 0.0684008 1.25 0.211 -0.0484966 0.2196295 
Technical change bt 0.0000117 3.21E-06 3.66 0 5.45E-06 0.000018 
Subsidiary age subsidiary_age -0.3792696 0.1034523 -3.67 0 -0.5820323 -0.1765069 
 
R-squared: within 0.535 
 between 0.5562 
 overall 0.5397 
sigma_u  0.66508218 
sigma_e  0.8411153 
rho  0.38470234 
Wald chi2(14)  201.23 
Prob > chi2  0 
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5.3.5 Discussion (regression 3) 
The table shows significant results with regard to the relationship between 
ownership change (changeown) and growth in technology/knowledge-based 
productivity (Thornqvist).  Before the peak productivity year, the relationship 
between the dependent variable (Thornqvist) and independent variable of ownership 
change (changeown) was positive and significant within a 5% confidence level.  This 
means that upward ownership changes yielded higher technology/knowledge-based 
productivity growth in the early years, before subsidiaries reached their peak 
productivity age.  This finding is important because it is more specific with respect 
to the previous two regressions in which ownership change (changeown) was 
negatively related with growth in technology/knowledge-based productivity.  In a 
subsidiary’s younger years, an upward adjustment in Japanese ownership could 
therefore yield even higher productivity growth.  However, much cannot be 
concluded about the relationship between non-linear productivity growth and total 
Japanese ownership as seen in the statistical insignificance (P>|z| value) between 
logjatotal and Thornqvist. 
In contrast, other variables showed statistical significance.  Specifically, 
subsidiary age (subsidiary_age), and the number of Japanese employees (jemp) were 
all significantly and negatively related to growth in technology/knowledge-based 
productivity growth (Thornqvist index). 
Although the result for ownership change was significant, the regression is 
also based on fewer observations (187 observations) due to the limitation of 
subsidiary age parameters. The limitation could affect the interpretability of the results, 
as the values of 2R , sigma (σ ), and rho ( ρ ) suggest.  Another limitation of the 
finding could be that different subsidiary setup years are not considered.
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Table 5.5: Regression 4 (random effects): subsidiary age>=7.3 years 
 
Number of observations 505 
Number of groups 306 
 
Random-effects GLS 
regression        




Thornqvist Coefficient Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf.] Interval 
        
Independent variables:        
Change in ownership changeown -0.0108011 0.0050001 -2.16 0.031 -0.0206011 -0.0010011 
Log Japanese ownership logjatotal 4.179471 1.723028 2.43 0.015 0.8023987 7.556544 
        
Control variables:        
Number of local 
employees lemp -0.0001648 0.0000989 -1.67 0.096 -0.0003587 0.0000291 
Number of Japanese 
employees jemp 0.0066033 0.0147174 0.45 0.654 -0.0222422 0.0354488 
Employee ratio empratio 0.1382068 1.264663 0.11 0.913 -2.340487 2.616901 
Capital (USD) uscpt 1.50E-09 2.83E-10 5.29 0 9.45E-10 2.06E-09 
Factor payment - labor lt 0.032521 0.0122912 2.65 0.008 0.0084307 0.0566112 
Technical change bt 2.19E-06 2.50E-06 0.88 0.38 -2.70E-06 7.09E-06 
Subsidiary age subsidiary_age -0.0752259 0.02552 -2.95 0.003 -0.1252442 -0.0252075 
 
R-squared: within 0.1539 
 between 0.3101 
 overall 0.2784 
sigma_u  0 
sigma_e  1.2779916 
rho  0 
Wald chi2(15)  160.91 
Prob > chi2  0 
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5.3.6 Discussion (regression 4) 
After the peak productivity year, the relationship between the dependent 
variable (Thornqvist index) and ownership-related independent variables (changeown, 
jatotal) was similar to that in regression 2, and significant for all variables within 1% 
to 3% confidence levels (P>|z|).  In other words, changes in ownership remained 
significantly and negatively related with technology/knowledge-based productivity 
growth, while the influence of total ownership on productivity growth followed a 
pattern of the sum of negative total ownership and the natural logarithm of Japanese 
ownership (logjatotal).  The specific relationship has been shown in regression 2.  
Therefore, it can be inferred that after the peak productivity age, decreasing 
ownership is preferable to increasing ownership if high rates of knowledge and 
technology implementation are to be maintained.  The higher absolute coefficient 
values of the ownership-related variables (changeown, logjatotal) compared to 
regression 2 suggest that changes in ownership after the peak productivity subsidiary 
age affected technology/knowledge-based productivity growth relatively more 
strongly. 
Moreover, the significance of the negative relationship between the number 
of local employees (lemp) and productivity growth is also noteworthy.  It could 
suggest that higher technology/knowledge-based productivity growth could be 
achieved by employing fewer local workers.  The value added per worker would 
therefore increase with time.  The variable for subsidiary age (subsidiary_age) also 
shows a negative relationship with the Thornqvist index, meaning that the age of the 
subsidiary is still a liability to technology/knowledge-based productivity growth. 
The reliability of this sample is high since it includes 505 observations with favorable 
2R , sigma (σ ), and rho ( ρ ) values. 
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5.3.7 Concluding remarks about regression results 
The combined results of regressions 1, 2, 3, and 4 suggest that it could be 
prudent to choose higher Japanese ownership levels at the time an IJV is set up, or 
adjust ownership levels upwards if low Japanese ownership had been chosen when the 
IJV was formed.  However, the difference between jatotal and logjatotal, in which 
the former has a negative coefficient, also possibly means that sole Japanese 
ownership would not be effective and therefore any growth in 
technology/knowledge-dependent productivity based on efficient knowledge and/or 
technology transfer would depend on shared ownership.  Upward ownership 
adjustments would need to be completed before an IJV reached approximately 7.3 
years of age in order to attain higher levels of productivity growth.  After the peak 
productivity age, it would still make sense to cede some ownership to the Chinese IJV 
partner in order to maintain positive productivity growth. 
 
5.4 Additional issues, limitations, and concluding remarks 
The chapter has shown several important findings with respect to the dataset. 
In the first instance, the dataset was analyzed with respect to its descriptive qualities 
regarding information on the status of Japanese-Chinese IJVs in China.  Several 
important findings with respect to descriptive data have also been established: 
 Furthermore, the chapter has sought to provide a link between economic 
concepts and business research, thus addressing a gap in both economics and business 
literature.  Moreover, the findings made in this chapter could provide some utility in 
practical application and thus be useful for managers and policymakers.  Practical 
implications are addressed in the next chapter more closely. 
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5.4.1 Findings of descriptive data 
 The descriptive data has given background information on Japanese 
subsidiaries (WOS and IJVs with local partners) in China.  It has consisted of 
background information that is relevant to the set-up and management of subsidiaries 
in China.  Most samples of descriptive data were categorized by WOS and IJVs.  
As such, descriptive data has given information about the years of formation by type 
of subsidiary (WOS or IJV), the size of subsidiaries by invested capital and 
employees.  Accordingly, descriptive data gave evidence about instability rates, 
which included termination rates by subsidiary type and the time it took to reach 
instability.  An important finding in this regard has been the productive lifespan of 
subsidiaries.  Even though IJVs were more likely to experience instability than WOS, 
IJVs that eventually managed to survive experienced longer periods of productive 
lifespan and could achieve higher technology/knowledge-based productivity growth 
after ownership adjustment. WOS became an unproductive liability following their 
peak productivity growth year.  Additionally, descriptive data provided further 
information about ownership changes by subsidiary age as well as information about 
factor-input changes. 
 
5.4.2 Findings of regressions 
The primary purpose of the chapter, however, was to find the relationship 
between ownership-related variables and technology/knowledge-based productivity 
growth under constraints of several other variables that were previously identified as 
relevant in the literature review and included as control variables in the regressions.  
Thus, the relationship between ownership-related variables (i.e. Japanese ownership 
and ownership change) and changes in technology/knowledge-based productivity was 
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tested using random-effects regressions.  A total of four regressions (random-effects) 
were developed.  The first two regressions tested the entire sample of Japanese 
high-tech WOS and IJVs in China with respect to total Japanese ownership and 
change in ownership.  Control variables included subsidiary age and factor 
input-related variables (capital, labor, employee ratio, technical change). 
While the first regression established a negative relationship between 
ownership change and technology/knowledge-based productivity growth, the 
regression did not establish a conclusive relationship between the linear function of 
total Japanese ownership and technology/knowledge-based productivity growth. 
In accordance with the review of theories in chapters two and three, the 
argument of the dissertation was that highest productivity growth would occur within 
some majority-Japanese ownership level below full ownership.  In order to account 
for the argument in quantitative terms, a new ownership variable was generated as the 
natural logarithm of total Japanese ownership.  Its function is upward sloping but 
flattens near the maximum.  Consequently, the second random-effects regression 
established a positive relationship between the natural logarithm of total Japanese 
ownership and technology/knowledge-based productivity growth within an acceptable 
confidence interval of better than 10%.  The result means that while high Japanese 
ownership is indeed important for technology/knowledge-based productivity growth, 
Japanese ownership should not be too high or productivity growth may be 
jeopardized. 
 
5.4.3 Findings of related quantitative analyses (control variables) 
With respect to subsidiary age, both regressions have shown a highly 
significant negative relationship between subsidiary age and 
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technology/knowledge-based productivity growth.  As a result of its significance, a 
specific value for subsidiary age at which technology/knowledge-based productivity 
growth peaked was generated from the sample.  The value for the age for peak 
growth in technology/knowledge-based productivity was 7.3 years.  The sample was 
then divided into subsidiaries before the age for peak productivity growth and 
subsidiaries at least the age for peak productivity growth (including subsidiaries of 7.3 
years and older). 
As a result, two new regressions were formed: one random-effects regression 
was completed on the sample of subsidiaries less than 7.3 years of subsidiary age and 
another regression was formed on subsidiaries of subsidiary ages of 7.3 years or 
higher. 
After the split of the sample by subsidiary age, the regression results became 
more differentiated: 
For subsidiaries before the subsidiary age of 7.3 years, no significant 
relationship between the logarithmic function of total Japanese ownership and 
technology/knowledge-based productivity growth could be found.  However, a 
significant positive relationship between ownership change and 
technology/knowledge-based productivity growth could be found. 
For subsidiaries with subsidiary age of 7.3 years and after, two significant 
relationships with respect to ownership-related variables were established for this 
sample.  A significant and positive relationship could be determined for the 
logarithmic function of total Japanese ownership and technology/knowledge-based 
productivity growth at a high significance of 0.015.  Furthermore, there was also a 
positive relationship between change in ownership and technology/knowledge-based 
productivity growth at a confidence interval better than 0.05. 
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5.4.4 Summary of interpretation of quantitative findings 
The findings mean that the Japanese investor should seek higher ownership 
when negotiating for the joint venture set-up.  However, a higher ownership should 
be given to the Chinese partner over the life of the joint venture, particularly when 
peak productivity age is reached.  Therefore, ownership should be renegotiated after 
approximately 7 years of forming the IJV. 
Variations by specific ownership range, related ownership adjustments, and 
changes in technology/knowledge productivity that resulted were further discussed in 
the chapter.  Importantly, the results imply that learning, knowledge absorption, and 
higher skills result in higher potential value added that the Chinese partner can 
contribute to the IJV, and for this additional value added, the Chinese partner needs to 
be compensated accordingly – in the form of additional ownership.  The concept of 
ownership as a medium for the transaction of complementary assets (tangible and 
intangible) had been discussed in the literature review.  The according productivity 
growth values therefore give guidance on the value or worth received from changing 
ownership structures. 
In addition, analysis on employee structures, possible adjustments to 
employee ratios and their impact on technology/knowledge-based productivity growth 
were also discussed.  Employees are an essential component in the knowledge 
transfer and absorption process. 
 
5.4.5 Limitations 
In addition to determining relationships between 
technology/knowledge-based productivity growth, ownership, and factor-input related 
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variables, the chapter has extended these findings from numerous angles by 
determining numeric values for specific ownership ranges in order to provide a 
context for possible practical implementation of the findings.  As such, the chapter 
has provided additional information on new productive growth periods and subsidiary 
instability rates following ownership adjustment. 
  
A note about limits in the sample size 
 
Findings where specific parameters were applied may have been limited by 
their sample size.  This occasionally applied to cases in which values were calculated 
for specific ownership ranges.  Setting specific parameters could limit the sample of 
subsidiaries with useful data. 
 Further limitations could include some initial assumptions that were made in 
order to fit the model, such as constant returns to scale and the price-output ratio.  
Moreover, the data consists of three-year time intervals.  Although the time frame is 
appropriate for absorption and processing of new technological and managerial 
knowledge, results may have differed if data had been used on a yearly basis.  
However, the limited expected additional marginal benefit of manually compiling data 
on a yearly basis for an almost two-decade time span worth of observations did not 
justify the additional time for a single-person project such as this dissertation. 
The main purpose of this section was to show the potential that the 
methodology can be used for.  While some very specific parameters caused the data 
to be limited, the sections have nonetheless shown the potential for research under the 
relevant methodologies.  While sometimes inconclusive, the data may nevertheless 
have provided an insight into general trends and thus given rough estimates of the 
results that could be expected out of more collaborative and well-funded research on a 
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greater scale with a team of researchers in the future by employing such methodology. 
 
5.4.6 Qualitative interpretation 
The next chapter will provide a qualitative interpretation of the findings made 
in this chapter by discussing several aspects of their relevance with regard to actual 
joint ventures between Japanese and Chinese companies in China.  Four case studies 
were selected based on the extent of technology/knowledge-based productivity growth 
found in the dataset.  Technology/knowledge-based productivity growth was ranked 
from the data and divided into very high, high, medium, and low productivity growth 
over a similar time span.  Cases of subsidiaries of a similar age and employee size 
were selected as case studies. 
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6. Additional analysis 
6.1 Objectives 
Having established a significant relationship between ownership-related 
variables and technology/knowledge-based productivity growth, I then proceeded to 
find the optimal levels at which ownership resulted in highest technology-induced 
productivity growth levels based on the sample.  In addition to the Thornqvist index, 
I wanted to find further interactions between variables such as changes in ownership, 
subsidiary age, productive lifespan and Japanese-Chinese employee ratios with 
respect to technology/knowledge-based productivity growth (Thornqvist index) and 
their specific numeric values.  STATA was used throughout the analysis. 
 
6.2 Method 
In order to gain a general idea of the Thornqvist index and how it relates to 
specific ownership levels, values for the Thornqvist index with respect to ownership 
in steps of 10 percent were calculated.  The number of subsidiaries that had exited 
within a particular ownership range was then counted using STATA.  Although the 
data do not reveal reasons for termination, possible reasons are discussed in the 
qualitative chapter.  The Thornqvist index was calculated for wholly-owned 
subsidiaries first. 
Due to different numbers of observations for each subsidiary – and different 
years of formation and exit across subsidiaries – a comparable variable for ownership 
that would encompass all observations for a subsidiary and its observed time intervals 
needed to be generated.  As a result, a mean ownership variable was generated.  For 
example, if a subsidiary yielded three different ownership observations across three 
time intervals, STATA would calculate the mean ownership variable from these 
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observations.  Likewise, a mean Thornqvist index among the time intervals for each 
subsidiary was also generated.  The results follow and are listed by ownership 
ranges. 
 
6.3 Definition of ownership ranges 
I have defined ownership ranges with respect to Japanese majority ownership 




 jatotal>=90%, (Japanese ownership is greater than or equal 
to 90%) (WOS) 
Ownership range 2:
 
 90%>jatotal >=80% (Japanese ownership is between 80% 
and below 90%, greater than or equal to 80 and less than 90) 
Ownership range 3:
 
 80%>jatotal>=70% (Japanese ownership is between 70% 
and below 80%) 
Ownership range 4:
 
 70%>jatotal>=60% (Japanese ownership is between 60% 
and below 70%) 
Ownership range 5:
 
 60%>jatotal>50% (Japanese ownership is above 50% and 
below 60%) 
 
6.4 Discussion by ownership ranges 
Table 6.1: Technology/knowledge-based productivity growth and instability 














1 359 30 .3868092 1.331707 -6.944955 10.11124 
2 84 9 .4659516 .8474288 -2.078245 4.883531 
3 96 8 .26229 1.261103 -5.49228 4.120498 
4 105 16 .3067979 .8454231 -2.867648 2.991041 
5 81 16 .2401744 .973858 -4.097531 2.492207 
6 (minority 
Japanese-owned) 
202 68 .1395638 1.164072 -6.274729 4.02515 
 
 
                                                   
** Values are fractions of 1.  In other words, each value can be interpreted as a percentage by multiplying it by 100. 
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Ownership range 1: 
For subsidiaries in which the majority holder owned 90% or more, the 
following results were obtained for the mean Thornqvist index22
This ownership range yielded 45 observations with a mean Thornqvist index 
of 0.38 and a standard deviation of 1.02.  The mean Thornqvist value being a 
positive number suggests that there has been a gain in technology-induced 
productivity.  Since, however, I am more interested in how other ownership 
categories performed, the first absolute value obtained is not yet meaningful, other 
than the fact that in WOS, there was an overall increase in technology-based 
productivity growth of about 38%. 
: 
The preceding figure for technology/knowledge-based productivity growth 
was then paired with the instability rate.  As for instability in the subsidiaries within 
this ownership range, the analysis showed that 30 out of 359 WOS, or less than one in 
ten subsidiaries eventually exited, although this analysis does not indicate whether 
they divested or became another type of subsidiary (such as an IJV).  Regarding 
mean technology/knowledge-based productivity growth, however, WOS observed 
gains in productivity growth.  However, it is more meaningful to understand how 
technology-based productivity growth in this ownership range compared to that in 
other ownership ranges.  Therefore, the same analysis was conducted for all other 
ownership ranges below 90% Japanese ownership. 
 
Ownership range 2: 
This range showed an increase in the mean Thornqvist index to above 0.46, 
among 84 observed subsidiaries in this ownership range.  Moreover, instability 
                                                   
22  Mean technology/knowledge-based productivity growth expressed as a fraction of 1.  Values can be interpreted as 
percentages by multiplying them by 100. 
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decreased.  The data shows that only 9 out of 84 subsidiaries terminated, which 
brings the instability rate to approximately 10%. 
 
Ownership range 3: 
A rapid decline in the Thornqvist index to a value of 0.26 in the 70 to 80 
percent ownership range among 96 observed subsidiaries is observed.  The 
instability rate in this ownership range increased to 16%, with 9 out of 56 subsidiaries 
exiting. 
 
Ownership range 4: 
Among 105 observations in this ownership range, the mean Thornqvist index 
increased to a value of 0.30 (30%).  The instability rate continued to increase with 16 
subsidiaries exiting, bringing the instability rate to approximately 15%. 
 
Ownership range 5: 
For the last Japanese majority-owned category, in which there were 81 
observations, there is a decline in technology-induced productivity to a mean value of 
the Thornqvist index of 0.240, and instability among 16 IJVs, which amounts to a rate 
of approximately 20% - an increase compared to the previous range. 
 
Ownership range 6: (Minority Japanese-owned IJVs) 
For minority Japanese-owned IJVs, I included all subsidiaries in which the 
Japanese partner owned less than 50% into this category, without further breakdowns 
into more specific ownership ranges.  This minority-ownership range thus yielded 
290 observations, 68 of which eventually terminated.  The corresponding instability 
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rate is approximately 23%.  Mean technology/knowledge-induced productivity 
growth (mean Thornqvist index) declined noticeably compared to the preceding 
ownership range, to a value of 0.14. 
  
Summary of findings 
The above data has shown that optimal technology/knowledge-induced 
productivity growth among both IJV partners likely occurred within ownership range 
2 (80%-90% Japanese ownership).  Incidentally, this ownership range also yielded 
the lowest termination rate of IJVs (i.e. lowest instability rate).  Therefore, a further 
narrowing of parameters within this particular ownership range is conducted in order 




Ownership range 2 was further divided into two ranges: one in which 
ownership was greater than or equal to 85% and less than 90%, and another where 
ownership was greater than or equal to 80% and less than 85%.  Therefore, values 
for the Thornqvist index at the 85% to 90% ownership levels and at the 80% to 85% 
Japanese ownership levels were calculated (Table 6.2). 
The latter ownership range yielded higher results in mean 
technology-induced productivity growth (mean Thornqvist index) at an exit rate of 
only 3 subsidiaries among 29.  I left the results within this 5% ownership range 
instead of narrowing them to more specific ownership percentages due to the number 
of observations, which would become too small otherwise. 
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Table 6.2: Ownership range yielding maximum initial 
technology/knowledge-based productivity growth 
 






a* 24 .5045867 1.114344 -1.369352 4.883531 
b* 29 .536149 .6775801 -.5818416 2.576564 
*Notes: 
a) Japanese ownership is between 90% and 85%, not including 90%; 
 (90%>Japanese ownership>=85%) 
b) Japanese ownership is between 85% and 80%, not including 85%; 
 (85%>Japanese ownership>=80%) 
 
 
6.5 Subsidiary age and ownership 
A separate analysis for subsidiary age and ownership was conducted, in 
which the occurrence of IJVs in specific ownership ranges is discussed.  In addition 
to the same five ownership ranges that were defined previously, an aggregate majority 
Japanese-owned and an aggregate minority Japanese-owned range were created. 
The mean subsidiary age for each ownership range was calculated and the 
number of observations within for the applicable ownership range recorded.  The 
table below summarizes ownership ranges, mean subsidiary age, and number of 
observations in a particular ownership range.  The mean subsidiary age for all 
subsidiaries above the 50% Japanese ownership level, including WOS, was 7.35 years 
(n=1310).  The mean subsidiary age for all Japanese majority-owned IJVs 
(excluding WOS), was 7.75 years (Table 6.3, next page). 
 
                                                   
** Values are fractions of 1.  Each value can be interpreted as a percentage by multiplying it by 100. 
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Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
c* 1310 7.355881 2.870199 .25 18.583 
d* 593 7.758553 2.812721 .667 18.583 
1 77 7.201013 2.898394 .25 17.083 
2 134 7.201799 2.342728 1.5 15.666 
3 142 7.811296 2.70095 .75 16.5 
4 184 7.910027 2.881392 .667 17.083 
5 303 8.406208 3.560164 1.333 18.75 
*Notes: 
c) Japanese ownership is above 50%; 
 (Japanese ownership>50%) 
d) Majority Japanese-owned IJVs (excluding WOS), ownership is above 50% and less than 90%; 
(90%>Japanese ownership>50%) 
 
For wholly-owned subsidiaries (ownership range 1) and IJVs in ownership 
range 2, the mean subsidiary ages were both 7.2 years.  However, the highest mean 
subsidiary age occurred within ownership range 5, which also recorded the highest 
number of observations.  The mean subsidiary age for ownership range 5 was closely 
followed by ownership ranges 3 and 4, whose mean subsidiary age values were very 
similar.  When compared to the IJV instability findings established previously, these 
ownership ranges were also among the highest with regard to termination rates.  
Therefore, subsidiary age and ownership ranges in this context point to the possibility 
that the oldest subsidiaries were established within ownership ranges of 50% to 70% 
Japanese ownership. 
In the upper ownership ranges, particularly ownership ranges 1 and 2, 
subsidiaries tended to be younger. 
The large quantity of subsidiaries in ownership ranges 4 and 5 will be 
important in the discussion of ownership adjustment since they provide room for 
upward adjustment in Japanese ownership. 
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6.6 Subsidiary age and technology/knowledge-based productivity growth 
With respect to the Thornqvist index, the relationship between subsidiary age 
and technology/knowledge-based productivity growth changed depending on the 
average subsidiary age.  The average subsidiary age for the sample of Japanese 
majority-owned subsidiaries was 7.35 years.  The average subsidiary age for WOS 
was 7.2 years, while majority Japanese-owned IJVs, specifically, recorded an average 
age of 7.75 years.  An analysis of the Thornqvist index for those subsidiaries below 
the average subsidiary age of 7.2 years for WOS and 7.75 years for IJVs yielded a 
mean value of the Thornqvist index of 0.64 for WOS (ownership range 1) and 0.56 for 
all other majority Japanese-owned IJVs, respectively. 
At above their respective average subsidiary ages, the mean value of the 
Thornqvist index for WOS fell significantly to 0.17 (ownership range 1), but was 0.32 
for IJVs.  This suggests that even though IJVs have a longer productive lifespan, 
they also take longer to reach full knowledge and technology-based productivity 
growth.  Although the mean Thornqvist index for both WOS and IJVs was much 
lower after subsidiaries had been in operation for more than their respective average 
subsidiary ages, IJVs showed a twice higher performance in terms of 
technology/knowledge transfer than did WOS.  The majority of these IJVs fell into a 
Japanese ownership range of between 65% and 75%.  The finding suggests that after 
these periods, raising ownership levels would not necessarily be an effective option 
with respect to maintaining or raising technology and knowledge transfer and IJV 
stability.  Therefore, I will examine the rate of ownership adjustments with respect to 
critical subsidiary age values such as lifespan and peak years for 
technology/knowledge-based productivity growth by ownership ranges more closely 
starting with Table 6.4. 
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Table 6.4: Technology/knowledge-based productivity growth by subsidiary age 




















402 .1520334 1.015707 -6.944955 7.48645 
 
 
Table 6.5: Technology/knowledge-based productivity growth by subsidiary age 
















199 .1727397 1.140936 -6.944955 7.48645 
 
 
Table 6.6: Technology/knowledge-based productivity growth by subsidiary age 
















188 .3169062 .9979929 -5.49228 4.883531 
 
 
As an extension to the above paragraph, I further decided to find a subsidiary 
age which would yield an optimal rate in the growth of technology/knowledge-based 
productivity, within average subsidiary ages. 
                                                   
** Values are fractions of 1.  Each value can be interpreted as a percentage by multiplying it by 100. 
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An analysis of the dataset showed that within the relevant age ranges, WOS 
tended to reach their peak with regard to technology/knowledge-based productivity 
growth exceeding majority Japanese-owned IJVs by almost twice in this regard, 
within 6 years.  Similarly, majority Japanese-owned IJVs also tended to reach peak 
technology/knowledge-based productivity growth within six years of formation, 
although they did not reach the same levels as WOS.  Furthermore, majority 
Japanese-owned IJVs tended to be unproductive for the first 4 years and peaked with 
regard to technology/knowledge-based productivity growth after 9 to 10 years.  In 
contrast, WOS tended to reach highest levels of the Thornqvist index within 3 to 4 
years of setup and without experiencing significant unproductive periods immediately 
following subsidiary formation.  However, technology/knowledge-based 
productivity growth of WOS started to decline after 4 years when IJVs were gaining 
technology-based productivity, and eventually fell below that of IJVs after 7 years. 
Moreover, technology/knowledge-based productivity growth of WOS 
eventually became negative after 10 years.  In contrast, technology and knowledge 
transfer rates (Thornqvist index) among majority Japanese-owned IJVs reached a 
plateau after approximately 11 years after which they declined only somewhat and 
remained well within positive territory.  As such, majority Japanese-owned IJVs did 
not register negative growth in technology/knowledge-based productivity constantly 
maintaining positive rates after they had overcome the initial unproductive period 
following IJV setup. 
 
6.7 Overall effects of ownership adjustments 
6.7.1 Instability in IJVs that adjusted ownership 
Before analyzing ownership adjustment and its effects on 
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technology/knowledge-based productivity growth (Thornqvist index), I tested the 
effects of ownership adjustment on IJV instability first.  The reason is that if 
ownership adjustment were to cause high termination rates among subsidiaries, the 
meaning of ownership adjustment as a tool to adjust the Thornqvist index would 
diminish (Felipe, 1997). 
 
6.7.2 Method 
I counted those subsidiaries that had already terminated and grouped them 
into those that had not adjusted ownership and those that had either increased or 
decreased ownership throughout their lifetime.  Among a total of 309 subsidiaries 
that had terminated, the analysis showed that 262 subsidiaries had never adjusted 
ownership, while 28 subsidiaries had increased ownership and 19 subsidiaries had 
decreased ownership.  
Since panel data was used, the incidences of ownership decreases and 
increases were counted and subsidiaries designated as having decreased ownership if 
two conditions were met: the number of incidences of ownership decrease 
outnumbered that of ownership increase and the last observed ownership value was 
less than the first observed ownership value.  Otherwise, it would be counted as an 




The findings show that those IJVs that had never changed ownership were 
the most likely to exit.  By contrast, subsidiaries that had changed ownership in 
either direction were much less likely to terminate.  However, subsidiaries that had 
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changed ownership upwards were more likely to exit than those that had changed 
ownership downwards. 
More specifically, compared to subsidiaries that had increased ownership, 
subsidiaries with no ownership changes were about 10 times more likely to exit.  
Compared to subsidiaries that had decreased ownership, subsidiaries with constant 
ownership were more than 13 times more likely to terminate.  In other words, 
subsidiaries that had decreased ownership were the least likely to terminate in this 
sample. 
 
6.7.4 Instability in IJVs that adjusted ownership compared to IJVs that did 
not adjust ownership 
Using STATA, I counted those IJVs with no ownership adjustment but had 
terminated within IJV ownership ranges (i.e. ownership ranges 2, 3, 4, and 5).  A 
result of 82 IJVs that had terminated without ever having changed ownership was 
obtained. 
After applying the same procedure to account for those IJVs that had 
increased Japanese ownership, a result of 16 IJVs that had terminated was obtained.  
Similarly, STATA showed 11 IJVs to have exited after decreasing ownership. 
 
Table 6.7: IJV termination rates by type of ownership adjustment 
Type of ownership change (Japanese 
perspective) 






The previous findings have shown that changing ownership in either 
direction could extend the lifespan of IJVs, particularly after ownership was increased.  
Most IJVs in ownership range 4 chose to alter ownership structures.  In this 
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ownership range, the average increase in ownership amounted to 8.53% while the 
average decrease was almost negligible at -0.033%. 
With regard to IJV instability, most subsidiaries in ownership ranges 4 and 5 
were better off increasing ownership, while IJVs in ownership ranges 2 and 3 could 
choose the options of either decreasing or increasing ownership in order to extend 
lifespan to similar extent.  IJVs in ownership range 2 – those above 80 percent - 
however, would likely cross the 90-percent Japanese ownership mark after ownership 
increase and thus become WOS. 
 

































increase in % 
(Japanese 
perspective) 
1 99.1% 93.6% 97.6% 2.93% 2.81% 
2 82.1% 83.5% 84.2% -8.58% 24.5% 
3 71.4% 73.6% 75.6% -46.67% 25.62% 
4 61.4% 64.5% 63.8% -0.033% 8.53% 
5 53.5% 54.4% 53.0% -13.17% 15.14% 
 
 
6.7.5 Relation to ownership 
The mean initial ownership level for IJVs that had increased ownership was 
69%, while the mean initial ownership level for IJVs that had decreased ownership 
was 58%. For those IJVs that did not change ownership, the mean (initial) ownership 
level was 72% (Table 6.9).  Subsidiaries that had increased ownership did so at an 
average rate of 11% while subsidiaries that had decreased ownership did so at an 
average rate of 7%.  
With regard to instability of majority-owned IJVs, however, the results 
support the assumption made previously that in the case of existing ownership 
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structures - which may be non-optimal with regard to technology/knowledge-based 
productivity growth (Thornqvist index) – subsequent adjustments of ownership may 
not have coincided with optimal absolute ownership values with respect to the 
Thornqvist index established previously.  This could be due to increasing potential 
for IJV instability.  For example, subsidiaries with 72% Japanese ownership were the 
least likely to change ownership and thus most likely to result in termination.  
However, when one compares subsidiaries with no change in ownership with 
subsidiaries that recorded increases in ownership, it can be seen that an increase in 
ownership could reduce instability by as much as 10 times.  However, when the 
average rate of increase of 13% was added to the average Japanese ownership rate of 
72% for those IJVs that had increased ownership, the result was that IJV stability 
(non-termination) would be achieved approximately within the optimal ownership 
range that had been established with respect to the Thornqvist index previously 
(between 80% and 85% Japanese ownership).  The average ownership value after 
ownership increase would be 82% (69%+13%). 
For subsidiaries that had decreased ownership from an average ownership 
value of 58%, the rate of instability was even less; however, these IJVs managed to 
remain Japanese majority-owned on average only marginally at 51% (58%-7%).   
The findings in this section have shown that an ownership ratio of 69% to 
72% (two most unstable points) led to instability and that instability could be reduced 
significantly by increasing ownership at an average rate of 13%.  Interestingly, the 
case of ownership reduction yielded high stability, albeit almost at the expense of 
Japanese majority equity share. 
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Increase 69% 13% 82% 
Decrease 58% -7% 51% 
None 72% 0% 72% 
 
I further tested the sample with regard to the subsidiary age at which these 
IJVs exited by dividing the sample into those IJVs that increased, decreased, or kept 
their ownership constant.  The next table lists the results. 
 









Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
None 411 7.43 2.74 .667 18.08 
Increase 127 8.64 2.75 4.167 18.58 
Decrease 55 8.15 2.99 2.417 17.42 
 
 
The average subsidiary ages for IJV termination were 7.43 years for IJVs 
without change in ownership and 8.64 years and 8.15 years for IJVs which had 
increased and decreased ownership, respectively.  Ownership changes seem therefore 
to increase the lifespan of IJVs (Table 6.10). 
I further tested the sample of those subsidiaries that had terminated and 
changed ownership, with respect to the Thornqvist index.  I first wanted to obtain an 
overall idea over relative values of the Thornqvist index among the three types of 
subsidiaries which had terminated– namely those subsidiaries that had not changed 
ownership and those that had changed ownership. 
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Table 6.11: Mean change in technology/knowledge-based productivity growth by 
















None 85 0.016 1.21 -4.51 3.34 
Increase 25 0.19 1.25 -2.99 3.15 
Decrease 15 -0.23 2.06 -6.27 1.82 
 
 
The results indicate that IJVs which terminated and did not change ownership 
remained slightly productive with regard to technology and knowledge transfer in 
absolute terms, but not relative to IJVs that chose to increase ownership.  
Subsidiaries which chose to increase ownership had more than 10 times the gains in 
the mean Thornqvist index by comparison, and were therefore much more productive 
with regard to technology and knowledge transfer. 
However, IJVs which had chosen to decrease ownership experienced a 
contraction in the mean values of the Thornqvist index.  Even though decreasing 
ownership had helped extend their lifespan, it did not result in technology-based 
productivity growth.   
It is important to note that this section includes only those IJVs which 
terminated.  For those IJVs that did not terminate, ownership changes, including the 
reduction in ownership had different impacts on mean values of 
technology/knowledge-based productivity growth. 
The result is not unexpected since the owner of the technology is yielding 
greater control to the local partner and possibly giving it up altogether by becoming a 
minority owner.  In the previous section, an initial ownership value of 58% for IJVs 
that became unstable and chose to decrease ownership had been established.  As the 
                                                   
** Values are fractions of 1.  Each value can be interpreted as a percentage by multiplying it by 100. 
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low ownership value suggests, control over technologies was limited and further 
decrease may have led to withdrawal of technologies, processes, or vital knowledge 
resulting in the loss of technology/knowledge-based productivity growth (Table 6.11). 
I will further test the above findings with regard to the productive lifespan 
and the rate of change in ownership with respect to technology/knowledge-based 
productivity growth (Thornqvist index).  The above analysis has shown that a change 
in ownership can result in higher IJV stability.  However, the next section will 
address the question of whether changes in ownership also led to higher 
technology/knowledge-based productivity growth and the extent to which such 
growth occurred, if any. 
The following analysis will establish the effects of ownership changes on the 
productive lifespan of subsidiaries.  Additionally, another discussion will focus on 
optimal employee ratios since employees are an essential component through which 
new knowledge is communicated and implemented. 
 
6.7.6 Productive lifespan 
I wanted to find the productive lifespan of subsidiaries that changed 
ownership in comparison to those that did not with respect to the resulting amount of 
additional technology/knowledge-based productivity growth and lifespan that could 
be achieved.  Thus, I found the relevant new lifespan values for subsidiaries that had 
adjusted ownership either before or after a critical instability age for a given 
ownership range. 
The problem was approached with the purpose of obtaining values for the 
years at which subsidiaries became unstable, and whether ownership adjustment 
would have an influence on the productive lifespan of the subsidiaries.  In the next 
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instance, the amount of ownership to be changed that would result in the highest 
technology-based productivity growth was determined.  According to the literature 
review, this process would also result in a longer productive lifespan of a subsidiary. 
 
6.7.6.1 Method: Critical age for instability among subsidiaries 
In this section, the age at which instability would most likely occur within a 
given ownership bracket is analyzed.  Using STATA, I counted the occurrences of 
terminated IJVs within each ownership range, which then yielded an average 
instability age within a given ownership range.  The number of observations (N) 
ranged from a maximum of 88 subsidiary terminations among 690 subsidiaries for 
ownership range 1 to a minimum of 21 terminations among 142 subsidiaries, in 
ownership range 3, with the remaining results for JV instability in other ownership 
ranges.  The sample size was therefore large enough to rely on an average figure for 
subsidiary age at which instability would most likely occur. 
Among these ownership ranges, WOS were the least likely to encounter 
termination or instability, followed by the ownership range 3, while subsidiaries in 
ownership range 5 experienced the highest rates of instability.  Interestingly, 
subsidiaries in ownership range 2 would, on average, experience termination earliest, 
while subsidiaries in ownership range 4 would experience them latest. Occurrences of 
termination were much more frequent for the latter when those subsidiaries eventually 
did experience instability, which was later than in other ownership ranges.  The 
results are listed in the next table. 
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Table 6.12: Mean instability age by ownership range 
Ownership range Mean age (years) Mean instability age 
(years) 
Mean instability rate 
(n2/n1) 
1 6.93 (n1=690) 6.91 (n2=88) 0.127536232 
2 7.2 (n1=134) 6.35 (n2=22) 0.164179104 
3 7.81 (n1=142) 7.52 (n2=21) 0.147887324 
4 7.91 (n1=184) 7.84 (n2=35) 0.190217391 
5 8.05 (n1=133) 6.75 (n2=31) 0.233082707 
 
 
6.7.6.2 Calculation of Thornqvist index 
Using STATA, I summarized the Thornqvist index for all IJVs that had 
terminated within a given ownership range, which resulted in a mean value for the 
Thornqvist index within a given ownership range. 
With respect to the lifespan gained, I then proceeded to calculate the changes 
in lifespan that followed ownership change by generating an average new value for 
the lifespan using STATA for subsidiaries that had increased and decreased ownership 
within a given ownership range.  The results are listed in Table 6.13. 
 
6.7.6.3 Actual ownership adjustments and their impact on 
technology/knowledge-based productivity growth and productive lifespan 
While the previous discussion showed the impact of changes in ownership on 
the relative levels of technology/knowledge–induced productivity growth beyond the 
critical instability age, this section discusses the actual ownership changes that 
subsidiaries had made. 
 
 Expected result 
Ownership changes made by subsidiaries in their respective ownership 
ranges before and after their respective critical instability ages were calculated.  It is 
these ownership changes that had led to change technology/knowledge-based 
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productivity previously discussed.  The previous section also discussed whether 
subsidiaries were better off increasing or decreasing ownership with regard to 
technology/knowledge-based productivity growth.  Any increase in lifespan would 
therefore be an increase in productive lifespan accompanied by the corresponding 
increase in technology/knowledge-based productivity growth through ownership 
change. 
Table 6.13 summarizes the ownership changes required in each category in 
order to achieve higher Thornqvist values in relation to the critical instability age. 
The table also lists whether subsidiaries were better off increasing or 
decreasing ownership levels before and after the critical instability age with respect to 
technology/knowledge-based productivity growth and productive lifespan.  The 
results show average changes in technology/knowledge-based productivity growth 
and corresponding average changes in productive lifespan among subsidiaries that 




















































1 <6.91 -0.8666712 5.636666 0.6963496 0.6800398 10.64688 9.483857  
 >=6.91 -6.184666 7.397197 0.1928961 0.2015204   
2 <6.35 -27.885 15.72194 0.81285 0.9701316 8.68725 9.37475 
 >=6.35 -10.18167 15.33283 0.2738211 0.3196138   
3 <7.52 -28.46 19.64576 0.4605559 0.5304048 9.167 9.874667 
 >=7.52 -13.36905 19.34206 0.1861554 -0.0047231   
4 <7.84 -7.358889 8.318 0.5965078 0.5383678 10.3955 11.6163 
 >=7.84 -6.971667 12.79333 0.0412633 0.1270515   
5 <6.75 -17.324 15.19 0.6453844 0.7497624 9.57275 7.953444 
 >=6.75 -12.50774 6.946296 0.135517 0.1115597   
 
 
                                                   
** Values are fractions of 1.  Each value can be interpreted as a percentage by multiplying it by 100. 
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6.7.6.4 Discussion of results 
The STATA analysis has revealed that subsidiaries which had adjusted 
ownership achieved a longer lifespan across all ownership ranges.  However, 
increased productive lifespan was only slight in ownership range 1 (WOS), but tended 
to increase as Japanese ownership decreased.  Higher values in the Thornqvist index, 
however, did not necessarily translate to higher longevity among subsidiaries. 
Ownership adjustment benefited subsidiaries with lower Japanese ownership 
more.  These subsidiaries were able to increase their productive lifespan to a greater 
extent relative to their critical age for instability, compared to those subsidiaries in 
higher ownership ranges, where ownership adjustments had less effect on productive 
lifespan.  Generally, the higher the ownership range, the less effect ownership 
adjustment had on the productive IJV lifespan.  The critical instability age for each 
ownership range was used as a reference point for any additional amount of 
productive lifespan. 
In addition, Table 6.13 also lists changes in the Thornqvist index 
commensurate with added productive lifespan.   Except for ownership range 3, 
ownership adjustment in either direction positively affected the Thornqvist index, both 
before and after the relevant instability ages.  In ownership range 3, by contrast, an 
ownership increase after the critical instability age resulted in a decline in the 
Thornqvist index.  In all other ownership ranges, the extent of productivity growth 
depended on whether a subsidiary increased or decreased ownership. 
 
6.7.6.5 Effects of ownership adjustment on productive lifespan 
The magnitude of additional lifespan differed by ownership range and was 
subject to ownership adjustment.  In either case, the productive lifespan increased.  
 201 
Details for specific ownership ranges are discussed below. 
 
Ownership range 1: 
An ownership decrease yielded slightly higher productivity growth if it took 
place before the critical age for instability.  After the instability age, subsidiaries 
were better off increasing ownership compared to other ownership adjustment 
strategies (i.e. decreasing or not changing ownership).  The values for productivity 
growth, however, declined sharply once the instability age had passed.  The 
corresponding additional productive lifespan from ownership adjustments amounted 
to approximately 1.5 years if done before the instability age and 0.5 years if done after 
the instability age.  In sum, subsidiaries in ownership range 1 were much better off 
adjusting ownership before they reached the instability age. 
 
Ownership range 2: 
Ownership increases left subsidiaries better off both before and after 
instability age.  Productivity gains, however, differed significantly depending on the 
timing of ownership adjustments.  Ownership increases yielded higher 
technology/knowledge-based productivity growth if they were completed before the 
critical instability age.   
As for actual ownership changes, both groups of subsidiaries increased their 
ownership levels by approximately 15%, which, given this ownership range, would 
result in them becoming de facto WOS by crossing the 90% Japanese ownership mark.  
The additional productive lifespan gained from ownership adjustments was similar 
before and after the critical instability age, and amounted to approximately one to two 
years in both instances.   The fact that this ownership range exhibited similar gains 
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in technology/knowledge-based productivity and lifespan of subsidiary age could 
suggest that this ownership range should be a preferred choice for both IJV partners at 
when they set up an IJV. 
 
Ownership range 3: 
With regard to ownership change, subsidiaries before the critical instability 
age benefited from increasing ownership, while subsidiaries that had passed the 
instability age were better off decreasing ownership to attain increases in 
technology/knowledge-based productivity growth.  In fact, once the instability age 
had passed, increasing ownership was no longer an option since it would result in 
productivity decline.  Ownership changes before the instability age yielded much 
higher gains in technology/knowledge-based productivity growth, however – with 
0.53 as the best achievable value in the Thornqvist index versus 0.18 after the 
instability age had passed if Japanese ownership was decreased. The additional 
productive lifespan gained was almost identical, however. 
 
Ownership range 4: 
Subsidiaries in this ownership range experienced a reverse pattern compared 
to the previous two ownership ranges.  IJVs were better off decreasing their 
ownership between the time of subsidiary formation and instability age, despite their 
already low Japanese ownership considering the nature of the industry.  However, 
productivity gains following appropriate ownership adjustments were similar to 
previous ownership ranges.  Ownership had to be decreased by approximately 7% 
and increased by approximately 12% in order to obtain the respective gains in 
technology/knowledge-based productivity growth.   
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The additional productive lifespan gained amounted to about 2.5 years for 
subsidiaries before they reached instability age and that chose to decrease ownership, 
and about 4 years for subsidiaries that had passed the instability age and chose to 
increase ownership. 
 
Ownership range 5: 
Subsidiaries in ownership range 5 needed to increase ownership before 
reaching the critical instability age in order to experience gains in the Thornqvist 
index.  The amount of ownership increased was 15% and additional productive 
lifespan gained was approximately 1 year.  Subsidiaries that had passed the critical 
instability age needed to decrease ownership in order to secure gains in 
technology/knowledge-based productivity growth.  The interesting aspect in this 
ownership range is that subsidiaries that decreased ownership from here eventually 
became minority Japanese-owned, i.e. the Chinese partner took majority ownership. 
As for the influence on knowledge/technology-based productivity growth, it 
can be inferred that the Chinese partner’s eventually became more valuable to the 
Japanese partner, or that the Japanese partner reduced the amount of technology, 
training, and offering of specialized knowledge, to the point of letting the Chinese 
partner hold higher technologies.  This would most likely amount to a downgrading 
of technological processes and thus new knowledge within the subsidiary.  Even so, 
productivity gains indicate that the Chinese partners have learned and contribute 
relevant knowledge in order to maintain productivity gains, even though they were 
much lower than for subsidiaries below the instability age which chose to increase 
ownership.   
Subsidiary age seems to be the more relevant factor since within the same 
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age group neither ownership increase nor decrease resulted in noticeably large 
differences in gains in technology/knowledge-based productivity growth, which were 
similar regardless of the type of ownership adjustment chosen.  The amount of 
additional productive lifespan was higher for subsidiaries that had decreased 
ownership.  The difference in additional productive lifespan is most pronounced in 
this ownership range, yielding about three additional years for those subsidiaries that 
had decreased ownership compared to about one additional year for subsidiaries that 
had increased ownership. 
 
6.7.7 Effects of ownership adjustments on technology/knowledge-based 
productivity growth 
In this section I focus on finding the peak productive lifespan of the 
subsidiaries.  In contrast to the last section, this section does not seek to find 
ownership adjustments relative to the years when subsidiary instability occurred.  
Instead, ownership adjustments according to levels of technology/knowledge-based 
productivity growth at particular points in time are determined.  The points in time in 
this section are the years in which productivity started to decline, by ownership range.  
The method used in this section differs from the method in the previous section in that 
respective years of peak productivity are used as reference points rather than years of 
instability. 
This method builds on findings presented by Delios and Beamish (1998) with 
regard to the productive lifespan of IJVs.  Similarly, I assume that there is a peak to 
technology/knowledge-based productivity growth following which growth will 
decline.  Therefore, time points at which the Thornqvist index peaked were 
determined.  Then the ownership change that was needed in order to reverse the 
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decline in the Thornqvist index was determined.  Ownership adjustments, their 
impact on the technology/knowledge-based productivity growth (Thornqvist index), 
and time values were examined by ownership range.  The sample was divided into 
the same five ownership ranges containing WOS and majority Japanese-owned IJVs. 
 
6.7.7.1 Method 
In this section, the years during which subsidiaries could achieve peak 
productivity growth values were calculated - by ownership range.  Using STATA, I 
obtained productivity growth values from the time of IJV setup until the year 
productivity growth values would start to decline.  The rates of decrease in 
technology/knowledge-based productivity growth, however, varied by ownership 
range.  Lower Japanese ownership would generally result in higher decreases 
following the year peak productivity growth was reached.  Unlike IJVs, WOS did 
not experience a period of negative productivity growth following setup.  The 
unproductive period varied by ownership range, however. 
Findings in this section are based on observations that ranged from n=91 to 
n=41 depending on ownership range. 
 
6.7.7.2 Determining technology/knowledge-based productivity growth 
values with respect to time 
Using STATA, I summarized the maximum values for technology/knowledge 
base productivity growth for all IJVs within a given ownership range and the years 
within which these could be achieved.  Technology/knowledge-based productivity 
growth for a given ownership range over the entire lifespan of subsidiaries within that 
ownership range was used as a reference point.  I then continued to narrow the years 
 206 
until productivity values would grow, up until they reached their maximum and 
started to decline.  I then narrowed the time frame from the time of IJV setup at the 
minimum point and the maximum lifespan of subsidiaries at the maximum point 
within a given ownership range.  For example, if the Thornqvist index rose when I 
applied tighter time constraints to the sample from each subsequent year onwards, it 
would mean that initial years were less productive than the following years.  I would 
continue to constrain the initial years until a plateau was reached in the resulting 
technology/knowledge-based productivity growth. 
Next, constraints were applied at the upper years and narrowed down.  Thus, 
when the Thornqvist index rose, the higher years were more unproductive.  I 
continued to constrain the upper years until the Thornqvist index reached a plateau 
from which it would start to decline following a subsequent constraint in upper years.  
The result was a time span during which highest technology/knowledge-based 
productivity growth was reached. 
Table 6.14 (next page) summarizes the years of highest 
technology/knowledge-based productivity growth with the corresponding values in 
the Thornqvist index by ownership range. 
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4 5-8 years 0.515319 
 
Data not available 0.074678 
 








Before peak period for productivity growth: Generally, for majority-owned IJVs 
(ownership ranges 2 to 5), the upper ownership ranges (ranges 2 and 3) tended to 
yield higher values in the maximum achievable Thornqvist index compared to lower 
ownership ranges.  It can also be seen that WOS observed the highest Thornqvist 
index overall.  However, this could be due to higher initial productivity growth 
immediately following subsidiary setup when IJVs tended to experience negative 
technology/knowledge-based productivity growth. 
After peak period for productivity growth: On the other hand, IJVs in ownership 
range 2 did slightly better with regard to the Thornqvist indexes, which remained 
positive after the peak period had been reached, while WOS experienced a much 
sharper decline in the Thornqvist index, even into negative digits. 
The results explain that IJVs with this ownership structure were more 
conducive to technology and knowledge transfer in the long term. 
 
6.7.7.3 Relevance of findings 
The previous section provided answers about ownership and optimal 
                                                   
** Values are fractions of 1.  Each value can be interpreted as a percentage by multiplying it by 100.  The term ‘productivity 
growth’ refers to technology/knowledge-based productivity growth. 
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technology/knowledge-based productivity growth values. 
However, for the cases of subsidiaries that may not have been set up within 
optimal ownership ranges, or cases of subsidiaries that may seek to minimize initial 
subsidiary unproductiveness, the next section can be a decision tool for augmenting 
technology/knowledge-based productivity growth through ownership adjustments. 
Likewise, other subsidiaries may already be past their peak productive time 
and seek ways to improve technology/knowledge-based productivity growth.  The 
next section will address such scenarios and discuss options for ownership adjustment.  
Specifically, it will discuss whether it makes sense to increase or decrease ownership 
with respect to timing; in other words whether a subsidiary is before or past its peak 
productivity period.  I will discuss the specific extent of changes in productivity 
growth that could be achieved by either increasing or decreasing ownership.  In the 
second part, the extent of ownership adjustments made in order to effect changes in 
technology/knowledge-based productivity growth is discussed. 
 
6.7.8 Actual adjustment values of ownership with respect to improving 
technology/knowledge-based productivity growth 
6.7.8.1 Method 
Subsidiaries are listed in life stages relative to the peak productive lifespan 
within a particular ownership range (i.e. whether the subsidiary’s life is in the stage 
before or after the peak productive lifespan).  Within each ownership range, 
productivity gains or losses that coincided with either upward or downward 




6.7.8.2 Direction of ownership adjustments 
For each ownership range, I first specified STATA commands to isolate those 
subsidiaries which had increased or decreased ownership before and after the year(s) 
of peak productivity along with the respective values for Thornqvist indexes that 
resulted. 
In order to determine the specific ownership adjustments that resulted in 
subsidiaries within a particular ownership range experiencing gains or lossed in 
technology/knowledge-based productivity growth, I specified STATA to summarize 
mean changes in ownership within the constraints of ownership range and subsidiary 
age before and after the year of peak productivity. 
Mean values were used for each ownership range, both for 
technology/knowledge-based productivity growth (Thornqvist index) and ownership 
changes.  Results are summarized in Table 6.15 (next page).
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 After Peak Year -11.14983 
 
16.09521 
 0.2361612 0.2801527 
Decrease/ Increase 
3 Before Peak Year 
6-8 years -21.6625 18.70306 0.464607 0.532615 
Increase 
 After Peak Year -15.64583 19.8925 0.1396247 -0.0291388 Decrease 
4 Before Peak Year 
5-8 years -7.358889 8.318 0.5695792 0.5242915 
Decrease/Increase 
 After Peak Year -6.971667 12.79333 0.0008957 0.1140432 Increase 
5 Before Peak Year 
7-8 years -18.97167 9.597222 0.5916884 0.6473667 
Increase/Decrease 
 After Peak Year -8.001296 8.556667 0.0248591 -0.0469448 Decrease 
                                                   
** Values are fractions of 1.  Each value can be interpreted as a percentage by multiplying it by 100.  The term ‘productivity growth’ refers to technology/knowledge-based productivity growth. 
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6.7.8.3 Discussion 
For all ownership ranges, there was generally more effect from adjusting 
ownership before they reached the age for peak productivity growth.  Increases in 
the Thornqvist index could still be achieved after the peak years, but mostly at lower 
rates.  Results for each ownership range are discussed subsequently. 
 
Ownership range 1: 
Before peak year for productivity growth: For WOS, the significant effects 
with regard to increases in technology/knowledge-based productivity growth could be 
achieved by increasing ownership or decreasing ownership before the peak year for 
productivity growth.  The peak period for productivity growth in this ownership 
range was five to six years, which is less time than what subsidiaries with lower 
Japanese ownership had managed to attain.  WOS also managed to obtain the highest 
peak productivity growth values in the absence of ownership adjustments.  However, 
they also experienced the largest reduction in technology/knowledge-based 
productivity growth among all ownership ranges after the peak productivity period 
had passed (Table 6.15).  Technology/knowledge-based productivity growth 
(Thornqvist index) had dropped almost fourfold. 
The result for the initial years is not unexpected and could be due to the 
absence of a local partner and thus lower transaction costs incurred in the setup of the 
subsidiary.  However, the result for the later years is somewhat unexpected but 
shows that WOS tended to become inefficient with respect to technology and 
knowledge transfer sooner.  As for ownership adjustments before the peak 
productivity period, both increasing and decreasing ownership expectedly yielded 
similar results in productivity gains, although ownership increases yielded slightly 
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higher productivity increases, thus indicating that high Japanese ownership at time of 
subsidiary setup was more beneficial. 
The amount of corresponding ownership changes was 3.2% for those 
subsidiaries that chose to increase ownership while it was around 1% for those that 
chose to decrease ownership. 
After peak year for productivity growth: The situation, however, changed after 
the peak productivity year.  In this scenario, a decrease in ownership would yield 
higher productivity gains than an increase as a logical result of the sharp productivity 
decline following the peak productivity year.  Compared to the next ownership range, 
however, ownership changes effected after the peak productivity period resulted in 
lower gains in technology/knowledge-based productivity growth.  Average 
ownership decrease amounted to approximately 7% while average ownership increase 
amounted to approximately 5%.  With ownership reduction, a WOS would likely fall 
within the 80% to 90% Japanese ownership range and thus become an IJV.  Again, 
this supports my argument regarding 80% to 90% Japanese ownership as most 
beneficial.  For WOS, which chose to adjust ownership after their peak productivity 
period, becoming an IJV was the better option with respect to the 
technology/knowledge-based productivity and thus knowledge and technology 
transfer. 
 
Ownership range 2: 
Before peak year for productivity growth: IJVs in this ownership range 
attained peak technology/knowledge-based productivity growth after 4 to 7 years, 
taking slightly longer than subsidiaries in the previous ownership range. It is not 
unexpected since there are higher initial transaction costs associated with yielding an 
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equity share to the local partner, such as negotiations and trust building.  For 
majority-owned IJVs in this ownership range, IJVs that chose to increase ownership at 
this time tended to do slightly better with regard to the Thornqvist index than did 
those that chose to decrease ownership before the peak productivity period was 
reached, indicating that a weaker local partner lowered initial transaction costs and 
inefficiencies. 
After peak year for productivity growth: Ownership increases resulted in 
slightly better results in the Thornqvist index than did ownership decreases.  With 
regard to ownership adjustments, both types could be chosen since results in 
technology/knowledge-based productivity growth were similar.  Compared to the 
previous ownership range, overall ownership increases yielded higher 
technology/knowledge-based productivity growth than did ownership decreases, but 
lower results than ownership decreases in the previous ownership range.  The result 
suggests that optimal ownership still remains in a shared-equity subsidiary. 
In another interpretation, the result of the Thornqvist index at this time point 
could also indicate that it was slightly easier to increase ownership (i.e. less partner 
resistance) at these ownership levels and therefore achieve higher efficiency and 
hence lower transaction costs.  The Thornqvist index is a residual value and factors 
such as partner negotiations could affect its value.   
Ownership increases ranged from 13% before the peak productivity period to 
16% after the peak productivity period while ownership decreases ranged from 18% 
to 11%, respectively.  Since each ownership adjustment option yielded similar gains 
in technology/knowledge-based productivity growth, IJVs in this ownership range 
would have some leeway to decide which option might suit them best. 
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Ownership range 3: 
Peak technology/knowledge-based productivity growth was attained after 6 to 
8 years, possibly reflecting higher initial transaction costs that may have led to lower 
productivity growth in early years.  Additional ownership adjustments started to 
show less effect than in previous ownership ranges, although ownership adjustments 
still led to increases in technology/knowledge-based productivity growth.  As in the 
previous two ownership ranges, ownership adjustments in this range still yielded 
higher productivity growth if done in the early years before the peak productivity 
years of 6 to 8 years.  
Before peak year for productivity growth: There was little difference between 
raising and lowering ownership, although raising ownership produced somewhat 
higher productivity growth.  Thus, subsidiaries could choose to adopt either strategy 
in raising technology-based productivity growth.  As for specific ownership 
adjustments, IJVs which increased ownership did so at a rate of 18%, while those 
which chose to lower ownership did so at a rate of 21%.  The former would result in 
a significantly higher share for the Japanese IJV partner, likely in the higher range of 
80% or start of the WOS ownership range.  On the other hand, a decrease in 
ownership would affect the equity structure in the sense that the Japanese partner 
would likely retain only a slight majority share.  Both strategies, however, produced 
similar increases in technology/knowledge-based productivity growth. 
After peak year for productivity growth: Ownership adjustments after the 
peak productivity period yielded little benefit, and even contributed to slight negative 
productivity growth.  Upward ownership adjustment was therefore not an option 
with respect to technology/knowledge-based productivity growth, and Japanese IJV 
partners were better off conceding more equity to the local partner instead.  IJVs in 
 215 
which the Japanese partner lowered their share by 15 percent would experience 
increases in technology/knowledge-based productivity growth.  Possible reasons are 
reviewed in the qualitative chapter. 
 
Ownership range 4: 
IJVs in this ownership range took a similar amount of time to reach peak 
productivity growth as did IJVs in the previous ownership range.  Default peak 
productivity values were slightly below those of the previous ownership range, 
suggesting marginally higher inefficiencies, and therefore higher transaction costs, 
with an increase in the ownership of the local partner.  Contrary to the previous 
ownership range, however, IJVs experienced a much more pronounced decline in 
productivity values once the peak productivity period had passed.  Productivity 
growth could still be supported through ownership adjustments which then yielded 
similar results in productivity growth as in the previous ownership range. 
Before peak year for productivity growth: Before the peak productivity age, 
subsidiaries experienced little difference in productivity growth after either increasing 
or decreasing ownership. However, decreasing ownership led to slightly higher 
productivity growth.  Specifically, subsidiaries experienced ownership decreases of 
about 7% and ownership increases of about 8% in order to observe the respective 
increases in the Thornqvist index (Table 6.15). 
After peak year for productivity growth: After the peak period for productivity 
growth had been exceeded, increasing ownership yielded higher productivity growth 
compared to decreasing ownership.  Reducing ownership in this period did not seem 
to have an impact on the Thornqvist index, which tended towards zero.  Therefore, 
IJVs in later stages of their lifespan were better off increasing Japanese ownership.  
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As for changes in ownership values, subsidiaries could increase ownership by 
approximately 13% in order to observe productivity gains. 
 
Ownership range 5: 
IJVs in this ownership range reached similar productivity as in IJVs in the 
previous ownership range, taking only slightly longer to reach peak productivity 
levels (7 to 8 years).  Unlike all prior ownership ranges, declines in 
technology/knowledge-based productivity growth tended to be sharp and reached 
negative levels, i.e. there was a contraction in technology-based productivity rather 
than just slower growth.  Therefore, this ownership range is not advisable to consider 
when setting up an IJV in the absence of plans for future ownership adjustments.  
When ownership adjustments were conducted, IJVs in this still-majority-Japanese 
owned category experienced productivity increases in both directions of ownership 
adjustment, if conducted before the peak productivity years.  In this ownership range, 
however, any downward ownership adjustment would result in the subsidiary 
becoming minority Japanese-owned, and therefore any productivity gains would be at 
the expense of Japanese control in the subsidiary. 
Before peak year for productivity growth: Before the peak productivity age, 
subsidiaries were better off increasing ownership, and gains in 
technology/knowledge-based productivity growth were more pronounced than in the 
previous two ownership ranges (ranges 3 and 4).  The difference in productivity 
gains between ownership increase and reduction were not very large.  Corresponding 
ownership increases amounted to approximately 9% while ownership decreases were 
more pronounced at 18%.  The latter suggests that subsidiaries that chose this 
ownership range when they set up were better off either not being majority-owned at 
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all or having a more significant Japanese majority ownership stake – at least above 
60%, judging by the 9% average ownership increases. 
After peak year for productivity growth: After the peak productivity had been 
reached, however, ownership increases resulted in negative 
technology/knowledge-based productivity growth and are therefore not recommended.  
The only method by which subsidiaries could maintain knowledge and technology 
transfer in theory, was by reducing ownership at a rate of approximately 8% - a move 
which would leave the Japanese partner with a minority share.  The fact that 
productivity gains were still experienced could suggest high technological capabilities 
by the local IJV partner and high learning efficiency.  It could also suggest the 
importance of the local partner’s contributions to the IJV relative to the reduced 
contributions by the Japanese partner. The fact that only ownership reductions could 
help increase productivity growth in the later years of the IJV suggests that this could 
be likely. 
 
6.7.9 Employee ratios and technology/knowledge-based productivity growth 
After application of additional employee-related parameters to the analysis, 
findings concerning technology/knowledge-based productivity growth values changed 
somewhat from those in the previous section.  Employees are an integral part of 
knowledge transfer, reception, and processing; therefore, interaction with 
technology/knowledge-based productivity growth merits further consideration. 
The independent variable whose value I sought is the optimum employee 
ratio with respect to technology/knowledge-based productivity growth within the 
limits of peak productivity age and that subsidiaries were still operational (i.e. had not 
terminated).  The usual five ownership ranges were used to group the findings. 
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6.7.9.1 Method 
  Calculation of employee ratios by ownership range 
In the first instance, ratios of Japanese employees by ownership range were 
determined.  Using STATA, I then divided the number of Japanese employees by the 
number of total employees, which yielded a fractional value or percentage, which I 
have referred to as employee ratio, which is one of the control variables (empratio) 
used in the regressions.  The remainder (1-empratio) would be local employees.23
 
 
Table 6.16: Mean employee ratios by ownership range 
Ownership range Mean employee ratios of 
Japanese to Chinese 
employees**
Mean productivity growth 
values by ownership range** 
 (without 
adjustment) 
1 0.1002654 0.3868092 
2 0.0452394 0.4659516 
3 0.0606748 0.26229 
4 0.0262901 0.3067979 
5 0.031025 0.2401744 
 
                                                   
23 For Japanese subsidiaries in China and the Chinese labor market and availability of manual labor in general, it would be 
unlikely to encounter employees other than those from the host or home countries, i.e. it is unlikely that manual labor would be 
imported from overseas.  The table lists the average ratios of Japanese employees and average values in the Thornqvist index by 
ownership range. 
** Values are fractions of 1.  Each value can be interpreted as a percentage by multiplying it by 100. 
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6.7.9.2 Optimal employee ratios 
In the next step, I calculated optimal employee ratios and segmented this step 
into calculating optimal employee ratios before the peak productivity age and after the 
peak productivity age. 
Before peak year for productivity growth: Using the same peak productivity ages as 
in the previous section, I calculated average technology/knowledge-based productivity 
growth values (mean values for the Thornqvist index) by summarizing them relative 
to ownership range, subsidiary age (i.e. subsidiary age was less than the peak 
productivity year value), and employee ratios.  I determined a range of employee 
ratios for each ownership range by adjusting employee ratios around the mean 
employee values and determining whether they would cause mean values for the 
Thornqvist index to increase or decrease.  For example, I would broaden the 
employee ratio upward, downward, or both, in order to determine how mean values 
for the Thornqvist index would react and continued to adjust the ranges of the 
employee ratios as long as mean values for the Thornqvist index continued to rise. 
After peak year for productivity growth: I followed the same procedure as in the 
before peak year for productivity growth section, changing only the parameter for 




Table 6.17: Optimal employee ratios with respect to technology/knowledge-based productivity growth before and after peak 





































B (result): Adjusted mean 
productivity growth** (after peak 
year for productivity growth) 
1 6 years 0.1-0.3 1.12232 0.38 0.3-0.4 0.767901 
2 7 years 0.09-0.21 1.658661 0.46 0.16-0.24 0.541956 
3 8 years 0.02-0.03 0.57835 -0.1349353 0.06-0.1 0.271638 
4 8 years 0.03-0.07 0.8569165 0.3384754 0.06-0.08 0.758030 
5 8 years 0.04-0.05 0.6079646 0.2357116 0.03-0.05 0.563446 
 
                                                   
** Values are fractions of 1.  Each value can be interpreted as a percentage by multiplying it by 100.  The term ‘productivity growth’ refers to technology/knowledge-based productivity growth. 
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Among the five ownership ranges, the highest unadjusted mean value for the 
Thornqvist index was achieved in ownership range 2 with a mean Japanese employee 
ratio of 4.5%.  It was followed by ownership range 1 with a mean value for the 
Thornqvist index of 0.38 and a mean Japanese employee ratio of approximately 10%.   
Other ownership ranges had about twice fewer Japanese employees and 
achieved lower unadjusted mean value for the Thornqvist index than ownership 
ranges 1 and 2.  However, unadjusted mean values for the Thornqvist index for the 
remaining ownership ranges 1, 2, and 3 remained only marginally below those of 
ownership range 1. 
Ownership range 4, however, was higher than ownership ranges 3 and 5.  
Unadjusted employee ratios were similar for all ownership ranges except ownership 
range 1.  Generally, an adjustment in the employee ratio before the peak productivity 
year resulted in higher mean values for the Thornqvist index than adjustments after 
the peak productivity year.  Ownership ranges are reviewed in more detail in the 
following sections. 
 
Ownership range 1: 
In this ownership range, the average unadjusted employee ratio yielded a 
mean value for the Thornqvist index of 0.38 with a Japanese employee ratio of 
approximately 0.1 or 10%. 
Before peak year for productivity growth: After adjustment of the employee 
ratio, the maximum achievable mean value for the Thornqvist index was 1.12, which 
corresponded to a Japanese employee ratio that was between 10% and 30%.  I 
decided to leave the rather wide Japanese employee ratio due to the number of 
observations, which, otherwise would have been too small narrow further the 
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employee ratio were narrowed further. 
After peak year for productivity growth: After the year for peak productivity 
had passed, the maximum achievable mean value for the Thornqvist index after 
adjustment of the employee ratio was lower than if adjustment had been done before, 
although it was still higher than with the unadjusted employee ratio, at 0.76.  The 
result, however, is based on a small number of observations which should be kept in 
mind in its interpretation. 
 
Ownership range 2: 
In this ownership range, the average unadjusted employee ratio yielded a 
mean value for the Thornqvist index of 0.46 with a Japanese employee ratio of 
approximately 0.045 (4.5%). 
Before peak year for productivity growth:  After adjustment of employee 
ratios, the maximum achievable mean value for the Thornqvist index became 1.65, the 
highest among all ownership ranges. The corresponding adjusted Japanese employee 
ratio was between 0.09 and 0.21. 
Again, I decided to leave the rather wide employee ratio due to the number of 
observations, which, otherwise would have been too small under more severe 
employee ratio constraints. 
After peak year for productivity growth: After the year for peak productivity 
had passed, the maximum achievable mean value for the Thornqvist index following 
an adjustment of the employee ratio was lower than if adjustment in the employee 
ratio had been completed before the peak year for productivity growth and stood at 
0.54.  The corresponding adjusted employee ratio ranged between 0.16 and 0.24.  




Ownership range 3: 
In this ownership range, the average unadjusted employee ratio yielded a 
mean value for the Thornqvist index of 0.26 with a Japanese employee ratio of 
approximately 0.06 (6%).   The mean values for the Thornqvist index declined 
considerably compared to the previous ownership range while the employee ratio 
remained similar. 
Before peak year for productivity growth: After adjusting the employee ratio, 
the maximum achievable mean value for the Thornqvist index rose to 0.57, with a 
corresponding Japanese employee ratio of between 2% and 3%.  The employee ratio 
was thus lower than in the unadjusted state, suggesting that companies that dispatched 
fewer Japanese managers to an IJV observed higher gains in 
technology/knowledge-based productivity growth.   
The result could also suggest higher knowledge transfer from Chinese staff to 
Japanese staff, due to the lower ratio of Japanese employees.  Subsidiaries in this 
ownership range and time phase would strongly require the intangible assets of the 
local partner. 
   After peak year for productivity growth:  The scenario changed after the 
peak productivity year had passed.  The maximum achievable mean value for the 
Thornqvist index was lower by 0.3 than before the peak productivity year, at 
approximately 0.27.  The corresponding ratio of Japanese to Chinese employees rose 
to a value of between 6% and 10%.  The result suggests that more Japanese 
managers or engineers were needed in order to maintain technology/knowledge-based 
productivity growth.  However, the slower rate of productivity growth suggests that 
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knowledge from previous years had been absorbed, and that any productivity increase 
occurring at this time could be due to technology transfer from Japan and its gradual 
absorption.  The result, however, again is based on a relatively small number of 
observations. 
 
Ownership range 4: 
In this ownership range, the average unadjusted employee ratio yielded a 
mean value for the Thornqvist index of approximately 0.3 with a corresponding 
Japanese employee ratio of approximately 0.026 (2.6%).  The unadjusted mean value 
for the Thornqvist index rose compared to the previous ownership range, even though 
the ratio of Japanese employees became smaller, which again suggests that the 
productive contribution of the local partner became more important. 
Before peak year for productivity growth: An adjustment of the employee 
ratio before the peak productivity age, expectedly, yielded a higher mean value for the 
Thornqvist index of approximately 0.85, with the corresponding employee ratio 
spread between 3% and 7% Japanese staff.  The ratio of Japanese staff, however, was 
higher than in the unadjusted state, which in this ownership range suggests higher 
initial influence of the Japanese staff compared to the previous ownership range.  
Given the comparatively low Japanese ownership ratio, the result is somewhat 
unexpected but could be explained by the local partner’s higher motivation in 
contributing their knowledge to the IJV more pro-actively due to higher local 
ownership.  A framework and discussion are provided in the qualitative chapter.  
The corresponding mean value for the Thornqvist index after adjustment was also 
higher than in the previous ownership range, which could point to the possibility that 
local partner motivation and new technologies and processes learned from the 
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Japanese partner could have contributed to the growth in technology/knowledge-based 
productivity growth in the beginning phase of the IJV.    
After peak year for productivity growth: The mean value for the Thornqvist 
index after the peak year for productivity had passed declined only slightly, while the 
ratio of Japanese employees also changed slightly to between 6% and 8%.   
Therefore, a combination of an ownership structure favorable to the local partner and 
the value of employee ratio combined could have contributed to the relatively high 
sustained long-term productivity growth in this ownership range.  However, results 
in this ownership range were based on relatively low numbers of observations with 
complete data and should therefore be interpreted accordingly 
 
Ownership range 5: 
In this ownership range, the average unadjusted employee ratio yielded a 
mean value for the Thornqvist index of approximately 0.24 at a corresponding 
Japanese employee ratio of 0.031 (3.1%).  Compared to previous ownership ranges, 
the employee ratios show little change, with the mean value for the Thornqvist index 
decreasing slightly.  However, this could be an issue of low Japanese ownership 
which would diminish the incentive to transfer technologies and knowledge from the 
point of view of the Japanese IJV partner.  From the point of view of the Chinese 
partner, high Chinese ownership contributes to a high willingness to cooperate and 
engage in knowledge sharing by the Chinese partner.   
Before peak year for productivity growth:  A slight adjustment in the 
employee ratio to between 3% and 4% was followed by a noticeably higher mean 
value for the Thornqvist index.  The fact that the ratio of Japanese staff remained 
little changed could be reflective of weak Japanese control (low ownership share).  
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However, it could also be reflective of higher local partner contributions because of its 
higher ownership share.  There could also be high initial learning by the Japanese 
partner, who is exposed to a greater pool of knowledge from the higher share of 
Chinese staff. 
After peak year for productivity growth:  Both mean values for the 
Thornqvist index and employee ratios for the period after the peak productivity year 
observed the smallest change among all ownership ranges.  Both values changed 
only marginally lending further support to the explanation of ownership in lower 
Japanese ownership ranges as a motivation for the local partner to contribute more to 
the IJV. 
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7. Qualitative analysis 
In this chapter, I will discuss the results of the quantitative data analysis from a 
qualitative perspective using the example of four case studies.   The cases are 
Sino-Japanese joint ventures that were shortlisted from the quantitative analysis 
according to their technology/knowledge-based productivity growth.  Case studies 
were categorized by subsidiaries that had shown very high, high, medium, and low 
technology/knowledge-based productivity growth. 
Questions were designed to seek answers about causes for different 
magnitudes of technology/knowledge-based productivity growth among subsidiaries 
and explore the feasibility for changes to ownership structures to improve 
technology/knowledge-based productivity growth and drew upon previous studies of 
entry modes, technology, and knowledge transfer (Currie, 1995; Tye and Chau, 1995; 
Lee and Kim, 1997).   Accordingly, the case studies focus on the process of 
subsidiary setup and ownership choice, which had previously been identified as the 
independent variable.  Further topics focus on theoretical aspects discussed in the 
literature review.  These relate mainly to control, information asymmetry, ownership 
adjustments, human resources and learning. 
The questions covered four main parts: The first part covered the background 
of the IJV and the setup process.  The second part covered ownership structures and 
their utility in the transfer of tangible and intangible assets.  The third part consisted 
of the implementation of transferred tangible and intangible assets within the IJV, 
while the fourth part sought answers about the feasibility and utility of ownership 
adjustment with regard to technology and knowledge transfer. 
Answering the above questions the case studies show that the perceived 
benefit of higher ownership share and thus control by the technology transferor may 
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not be beneficial.  This is in line with the previously conducted data analysis which 
has shown that equity distribution that is skewed towards one partner does not 
necessarily result in higher levels of technology transfer and knowledge absorption.  
Several interviews I conducted have shown that ownership slanted overly in favor of 
the Japanese partner could be harmful to the Japanese partner as the local partner 
became unpredictable over time and began to act against the interest of the IJV.  
Bounded rationality and information asymmetry played a strong role in the 
relationship between both IJV partners.   This finding enhances a previous finding 
by Makino and Delios (1996) who asserted a negative relationship between ownership 
that is skewed towards one IJV partner and an IJV’s financial performance (Makino 
and Delios, 1996). 
 
7.1 Background of case studies and sources 
7.1.1 Choice of subsidiaries for interview 
Subsidiaries were chosen from a shortlist of the analysis of growth in 
technology/knowledge based productivity in the previous chapter.  The list of 
subsidiaries yielded a sample of 692 in total, of which 212 were given further 
consideration.  They were categorized further into subsidiaries with ownership 
change and without ownership change.  Furthermore, I narrowed down the list 
further choosing to interview those subsidiaries with at least 8 years of subsidiary age 
due to the high likelihood of impending performance decline (Makino and Delios, 
1998).  They were then categorized by very high, high, medium, and low 
productivity growth, for which one typical case study is presented in the chapter 
selected among a total of 38 subsidiaries that were interviewed.  
Interviews were conducted with both the Japanese and the Chinese IJV 
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partners in order to obtain a clear impression of both side’s motivations to enter into 
an IJV relationship.  The GM of the IJV was selected as the interviewee representing 
the Japanese side, while the Vice-GM (a Chinese national) was interviewed as the 
representative of the respective Chinese IJV partner. 
In each instance, the GM and Vice-GM were interviewed separately.  
Follow-up interviews were conducted occasionally in order to clarify and/or seek 
additional information.  In several instances, engineers and supervising staff were 
also present and furnished additional information.  In order to ascertain the extent of 
knowledge asymmetry, it was necessary to interview both IJV partners. In sum, more 
than 80 individuals were interviewed. 
 
7.1.2 Interview location and administration 
In a few instances, the locations of the IJV and its Chinese partner company 
were far from each other, and even required travel to other cities within a province.  
The interviews took place in several cities in China, including Beijing, Tianjin, Jinan, 
Suzhou, Shanghai, and Zhuhai. 
Interviews with a GM were conducted on-site at the subsidiary’s meeting room 
or the GM’s office.  Interviews with the Chinese Vice-GMs were conducted either at 
the Chinese partner company’s headquarters (usually an SOE’s headquarters) or at the 
IJV itself in cases where the Vice-GM had an on-site office or was present there. 
Interviews were conducted during a period of five months over a time period 
from early February, 2007 to late June, 2007.  The interviews were semi-structured.  
According to Mintzberg (1979), ‘‘semi-structured interviews provide a controlled 
framework which facilitates analysis but also allows for the collection of ‘soft’ 
anecdotal data’’ (p. 587).  The latter means that I asked additional questions to probe 
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what respondents were saying further. 
Interviews were recorded to increase the accuracy of data collection (e.g. 
Khalfan, 2004).   Recordings were later transcribed, and the data categorized. 
Before the interview, participants were asked permission to record the 
interviews and document their permission.   
In one instance where the interviewee did not agree to be recorded on tape, the 
content of the interview was recorded by note-taking instead. 
All participants were assured of their anonymity and confidentiality of their 
responses.  Companies and individuals are therefore not identified by their names.  
All interview data will be deleted once all requirements for the dissertation have been 
fully completed. 
 
7.1.3 Interview language and validity of questions 
Questions were asked in the respective languages of each IJV partner – 
Japanese and Chinese (Putonghua).  The questions were reviewed by native speakers 
of Japanese and Chinese (Putonghua) and back-translated into English to ensure they 
conveyed the meaning I intended.  They were then followed by a pilot test which 
was carried out on the first three IJVs, which are not included in the case studies.  A 
revised version of the questions was then completed, translated, and back-translated. 
 
7.2 Framework 
7.2.1 Arm’s-length and non-arm’s length IJV relationships: an overview 
The cases follow a framework that classifies subsidiaries into those where 
ownership was either concentrated (in favor of the Japanese partner) or diffused.  I 
considered an ownership structure in which the Japanese partner held 70% of equity 
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or less as diffused with the local partner owning the difference (Fernandez and 
Underwood, 2006).  Minority Japanese ownership was not considered.  Fernandez 
and Underwood (2006) have previously used this framework in the set up of IJVs.  
Instead of using a pure equity approach in deciding whether a particular IJV 
relationship is arm’s length or non-arm’s length, they argue that an IJV relationship 
can still be arm’s length despite the equity held by the local partner.  Instead, the 
extent of the local partner’s active involvement in the IJV can determine the type of 
IJV relationship (arm’s length or non-arm’s length).  As such, two factors – amount 
of ownership and participation – determine the type of relationship. 
Accordingly, the case studies are categorized into these two main categories.  
Due to the two main determinants (above) of the type of IJV relationships, two more 
subcategories emerge.  Cases have been further sub-classified as conventional and 
non-conventional arm’s length and non-arm’s length relationships.   
For example, a conventional arm’s length relationship is one in which the local 
partner holds low equity share (e.g. ownership is concentrated in Japanese hands) and 
exercises a low amount of participation in the IJV. 
A non-conventional arm’s length relationship is one in which the local partner 
holds a high equity share (e.g. ownership is diffused), but exercises disproportionately 
low participation in the activities and decision-making of the IJV relative to its equity 
share.  A silent local partner would be an example for the category of 
non-conventional arm’s length relationship. 
As for non-arm’s length relationships, the conventional type is one in which 
ownership is diffused, and the local partner exercises a proportionate amount of 
participation in the IJV (e.g. management, HR, as supplier) relative to its level of 
ownership. 
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By contrast, an example of a non-conventional non-arm’s length relationship is 
one in which ownership is concentrated in the Japanese partner (i.e. low equity for 
local partner), but the local partner nonetheless exercises a high degree of 
participation in the IJV relative to its ownership share.  Figure 7.1 illustrates the 
categories of IJV relationships used in framing the case studies and their impact on 
technology/knowledge-based productivity growth. 
 
Figure 7.1: Framework for case studies by IJV relationship and ownership 
Ownership IJV Relationship 


































Case D Case A 




The following discussion provides a summary of the Japanese and Chinese 
partners’ goals from the IJV according to the categories established.  The categories 
are discussed in descending order of technology/knowledge-based productivity 
growth within the two relationship categories. 
 
                                                   
24 Main source: China Europe International Business School (2006). http://www.ceibs.edu/knowledge/strategy/11867.shtml.  
Accessed February 24, 2010 
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7.2.2 Arm’s length relationships 
7.2.2.1  Conventional pattern 
  (Technology/knowledge-based productivity growth: low) 
The conventional pattern of arm’s length relationships (i.e. concentrated or 
majority ownership skewed towards the Japanese partner) tended to result in low 
technology/knowledge-based productivity growth owing to factors such as 
insufficient incentives for the local partner to contribute to the IJV.   
Even in cases where the local IJV partner volunteered to contribute 
significantly in the early stages of the IJV, acquisition of technological knowledge and 
experience eventually led the local partner to seek other business opportunities.  This 
became a problem in cases where both IJV partners were from the same or similar 
industries, and the IJV was founded on the premise to localize production.  As 
special state-owned enterprises affiliated with the Chinese Academy of Sciences 
(CAS), which was a frequent occurrence in this relationship category, the local 
partners’ technological capabilities were already high at the time of IJV setup, and the 
technological gap was thus low.  As a result, the Japanese partner was more worried 
about technology protection relative to other cases.  The local IJV partner that was to 
be the main local supplier eventually, however, sought opportunities to become 
supplier to other large MNCs due to a lack of financial incentives from the ownership 
structure of the IJV and marginal representation in its managerial decisions.  
Eventually, the local partner diverted its resources from the existing IJV to pursue 
other contracts – mainly as supplier to MNCs.  This arrangement resulted not only in 
low productivity growth but also instability induced by the local partner.  From the 
point of view of the Japanese partner, a highly undesirable situation of uncontrolled 
instability ensued. 
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 Expectations of Japanese partner 
The Japanese partner wanted to gain the local partner’s sophisticated 
technological tangible assets for localization of components production but failed to 
do so due to non-alignment of interests (through ownership), resulting in a dichotomy 
between technology protection and technological cooperation. 
 
 Role of local partner 
The local partner was not likely to be involved in higher management of the 
IJV, with its management functions limited to HR and the recruitment of workers.  
Nonetheless, this area was still important as the Japanese management could more 
easily implement policies and reach consensus among both locally hired engineers 
and assembly staff. The legitimacy of policies increased when conveyed by local HR 
managers.  Interview data showed that this scenario also impacted residual values 
with regard to technology/knowledge-based productivity growth favorably.  
Subsidiaries where the local partner was in charge of HR despite low management 
involvement had higher technology/knowledge-based productivity growth versus 
those IJVs in which the local partner was absent from all managerial functions. 
Furthermore, the Chinese partner would act as a supplier of simple tangible 
assets that were necessary in setting up the IJV and provide a range of limited 
intangible assets such as access to government officials, tax negotiations, and 
procurement of operating permits. 
In terms of technology contributions, the Japanese partner did not, from the 
beginning of IJV, require the Chinese partner to make any contributions related to its 
present or future technological capabilities, and had no intention of doing so in the 
future. 
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Common occurrences of relationship pattern 
This relationship pattern occurred when the Japanese partner needed a local 
partner only for initial and subsequent contributions such as land, permits, and tax 
negotiations.  The difference to the previous relationship pattern, however, was the 
lack of efficiency by the Chinese partner to provide complementary assets.  The IJV 
with the Japanese partner was not a top priority for the Chinese partner since it 
already had other IJVs with western MNCs.  Forming the first IJV with a Japanese 
partner was more akin to testing the waters.  However, involving the local partner in 
a key HR function could positively impact technology/knowledge-based productivity 
growth.  In the absence of such involvement, however, productivity growth values 
tended to be low in this relationship. 
 
7.2.2.2   Non-conventional pattern 
(Technology/knowledge-based productivity growth: low) 
This relationship pattern resulted in low technology/knowledge-based 
productivity growth in the long term, despite high initial productivity growth at IJV 
formation.  The partner was motivated to contribute what the Japanese partner 
requested (usually non-technological tangible and intangible assets) by means of high 
profit share and the opportunity to upgrade technological and some managerial 
capabilities.  Normally, this relationship occurred when the technological gap was 
large and both partners came from either the same or similar industries. 
It also occurred in cases where the IJV partners came from different industries 
resulting in low product complementariness, and the Japanese partner did not need to 
worry about technology leakage.  Although both instances allowed for high initial 
productivity growth, this could not be maintained and decreased over time. 
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 Expectations of Japanese partner 
With regard to ownership, the Japanese partner sought a strong local partner, 
but one who was silent in terms of daily operations and management.  The Japanese 
partner expected the Chinese partner to be content with high ownership and the 
resulting high share of profits.  Therefore, the local partner should be motivated 
enough to contribute non-technological tangible and intangible assets to the IJV 
efficiently and without delay.   
The Japanese partner did not generally seek the local partner’s tangible (e.g. 
technological) assets since no localization that would potentially involve the local 
partner was planned.  Moreover, the Japanese partner would not generally provide 
opportunities for capability upgrading. 
This relationship worked well as long as the Japanese partner did not decide to 
change plans by e.g. localizing component production.  Components continued to be 
imported from Japan and used in final assembly locally even when capabilities to 
localize component production clearly emerged over time. 
 
 Role of local partner 
The local partner provided tangible assets necessary in the setup and daily 
operations of the IJV, and contributed a limited range of intangible assets, which 
included government and business connections, and limited local market access. 
It chose to leave the management fully to the Japanese partner because it was believed 
that the Japanese partner was experienced and skilled.  The local partner would 
willingly limit itself to providing support for local matters in which it was competent. 
With regard to growth in technology/knowledge-based productivity, the 
relationship is still at arm’s length in which the local partner did not gain significant 
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managerial or technological knowledge despite diffused ownership.  In addition, the 
Japanese partner was largely able to protect its technologies from the local partner. 
 
 Common occurrences of relationship pattern 
This form of relationship was useful for Japanese companies that did not seek 
to localize production by making the local partner a supplier or finding local suppliers 
through the local partner’s contacts.  However, the Japanese partner still required 
other intangible assets that the local partner would readily provide due to an alignment 
of the local partner’s interest with a high ownership share.  With regard to ownership 
change, the following two scenarios emerged: 
Depending on whether the local partner voluntarily chose to be treated at 
arm’s length, i.e. if it chose not to participate in management, changing ownership 
was difficult - for instance if the Japanese partner were to seek a deeper involvement 
by the local partner through technological contributions (e.g. components) in cases of 
localization.  However, if the local partner had been treated at arm’s length 
involuntarily, the Japanese partner could more easily accomplish the task of involving 
the local partner in the IJV on a more involved level, provided the local partner had a 
foundation of relevant technological capabilities. 
Either case limited technology/knowledge-based productivity growth in the 
long term (beyond 8 years) but provided a high degree of technology protection and 
high initial technology/knowledge-based productivity growth. 
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7.2.3 Non-arm’s length relationships 
7.2.3.1  Conventional pattern 
(Technology/knowledge-based productivity growth: high) 
The conventional non-arm’s length relationship tended to produce the highest 
level of technology/knowledge-based productivity growth among the four types of 
relationships.  In this type of relationship, many IJVs exhibited a high degree of 
product complementariness, and the Japanese partner could systematically develop 
the local partner’s capabilities in order to achieve higher rates of localization over the 
life of the IJV for activities that were originally conducted in Japan.  These are 
mainly component supply and, increasingly, R&D. 
Several IJVs indicated they were considering localizing R&D functions that 
were being conducted in Japan at the time.  Most IJVs, however, did not achieve 
successful localization of R&D due to still significant technology and knowledge gaps.  
A case study of an IJV in this category will show the example of successful capability 
upgrading through strong technological involvement in the IJV by the local partner, 
which eventually resulted in the creation of a new wholly-owned R&D subsidiary 
from the existing IJV. 
 
Expectations of Japanese partner 
The Japanese partner required a strong partner with respect to both ownership, 
managerial, and technological participation.  The main reason for forming the IJV 
was that the local partner’s products or components were required.  In addition to the 
common intangible complementary assets (e.g. government connections, tax 
negotiations, and procurement of permits), the Japanese partner required a high degree 
of specific tacit knowledge from the local partner.  The Chinese partner was 
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expected to bring knowledge-based, technology-related intangible assets to the IJV, 
including those derived from its own R&D experience. 
 
 Role of Chinese partner 
Due to high ownership, active participation in management, and a strong sense 
of both financial and learning achieved from technological cooperation on a high level, 
the interest alignment was such that the local partner efficiently provided its 
contribution in an environment of minimal information asymmetry.  In this 
relationship, interest alignment was strongest. 
  
Common occurrences of relationship pattern 
A successful relationship was possible in the presence of comparable 
technological understanding and capabilities between both partners and a high degree 
of asset complementariness.  It was useful where the Japanese partner entered China 
with a long-term strategy of localizing the supply chain by using the partner as 
supplier of components and intermediary for sourcing other suppliers in China.  
Additionally, components had to be technologically sophisticated with a perspective 
for further R&D activities. 
 
7.2.3.2  Non-conventional pattern 
(Technology/knowledge-based productivity growth: medium) 
Subsidiaries in non-conventional non-arm’s length relationships tended to 
display medium productivity growth relative to the other categories.  Even though 
ownership was concentrated on the Japanese side, local partners with low 
technological capacities and high determination to learn were successful, and the 
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Japanese partner relatively cooperative in skills upgrading, supporting productivity 
growth. 
In cases where the Chinese partner’s technologies were already advanced, this 
arrangement did not work well.  In these cases, interests were misaligned and the 
Chinese partner was not compensated adequately in terms of profit sharing relative to 
its perceived contribution.  By contrast, new technological capabilities were a 
compensating factor for local partners with fewer advanced technologies. 
However, local partners with relatively advanced technologies and high 
degrees of product complementariness still entered into this type of joint venture 
relationship because they sought managerial knowledge.  The Japanese partner 
usually required the local partner to contribute as a supplier of components in the 
future, in addition to the usual contributions (e.g. guanxi, tax negotiations, licenses 
and permits, labor, land).  Therefore, efficiency still tended to be high in the initial 
years.  However, dependencies between Japanese and local partners were not even.  
The local partner’s dependence on the Japanese partner tended to decrease (relatively) 
more over time compared to the Japanese partner who increasingly depended on the 
local partner to localize production and decrease production costs.  Productivity 
growth slowed as a result.  Nonetheless, this type of relationship yielded medium 
growth in technology/knowledge-based productivity over time. 
 
 Expectations of Japanese partner 
The Japanese partner essentially wanted a weak local partner with regard to 
ownership but strong with regard to managerial and technological involvement. 
As in conventional non-arm’s length relationships, the Japanese partner required the 
local partner’s contribution of immediate complementary assets necessary in setting 
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up and operating the IJV (e.g. land, labor, guanxi).  The Japanese partner would later 
require higher-level technological complementary assets from the local IJV partner, 
such as components. 
 
 Role of Chinese partner 
Direct management participation and the opportunity to learn technologies and 
new skills were initially a greater incentive than the ownership share.  However, the 
marginal benefit to the Chinese partner eventually declined when it realized that its 
contributions gradually began to exceed its rewards from the IJV relationship.  As 
such a small share of equity and profits was no longer enough to justify the level of 
the local partner’s contributions. 
 
Common occurrences of relationship pattern 
This IJV relationship was useful where the Japanese partner wanted to retain 
equity control of the IJV.  Otherwise, the arrangement was not useful with regard to 
the increasing unpredictability of the local partner at a later time when it realized it 
should be entitled to higher equity relative to the value of its contributions to the 
Japanese partner.  Consequently, the local partner’s displeasure resulted in potential 
IJV instability.  High initial productivity growth was followed by lower growth rates. 
 
7.3 Structure of cases 
 Each case is structured into a table summarizing conditions at the time the 
IJV was set up and at the time the interview was conducted, a general section, and two 
sections on interview results. The tables provide information on the motivation for 
each IJV partner to enter the IJV and remain IJV partners.  The general section 
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contains information about the significance of the case, ownership structure, historical 
background of the IJV, as well as background information about both IJV partners.  
The first section on interview results provides analysis of interviews conducted with 
the Japanese IJV partner, while the second section on interview results provides 
interview data from the Chinese IJV partner. 
 As a result of the structure of the cases, some repetitions occur.  However, 
by separating the different perspectives, I seek to discuss the motivations of both sides 
in choosing to enter into IJV agreements and to highlight instances of interest 
misalignment and information asymmetry that resulted from given ownership 
structures over time.
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7.4 Case A 
7.4.1 Case characteristics 
 
• Year of subsidiary formation:   1995 
• Ownership structure:    85% (Japanese); 15% (Chinese) 
• Productivity growth:    Medium 
• Feasibility of changing ownership structure: Low 
• Instability:     High 
• Type of IJV relationship:   Non-conventional non-arm’s length 
 
Table 7.1: Interview results - Japanese perspective (Case A) 
JAPANESE PERSPECTIVE 
 At time of IJV 
formation 




Experience in foreign 
market entries  
High High N/A  
Experience in China High High N/A  
TANGIBLE ASSETS  IMPORTANCE IMPORTANCE   
Items: 
- Land 
- Factory (building) 




- Partner’s technology 






























INTANGIBLE ASSETS     
Guanxi 
 - Tax negotiations 
- HR 
- Localization 





















Medium Low  N/A Government was not 
inclined to interfere much. 
The company already had 
other subsidiaries in China 
Efforts by Chinese partner 
to secure large ownership 
share (as perceived by 
Japanese partner) 
Medium Medium N/A  
Knowledge spillovers 
from Chinese partner  
Low  Medium N/A In beginning, little contact 
with Chinese partner, other 
than skill upgrading with 
respect to explicit knowledge 
Technology transfer 
(tangible assets, e.g. 
machinery, products, 
manuals) 
Medium Low N/A  
Knowledge transfer 
(transfer of intangible 
assets, e.g. tacit 
knowledge) 
High Medium N/A Chinese partner acquired a 
high level of technological 
sophistication owing to the 
close location of both 
partner companies despite 
arm’s length relationship 
Knowledge uncertainty 
towards Chinese partner 
Low High N/A Chinese Local partner 
successfully diversified its 
base of international 
clients/MNCs, e.g. Korean 
MNCs 
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Table 7.2: Interview results - Chinese perspective (Case A) 
CHINESE PERSPECTIVE 
 At time of IJV 
formation 

























    
Managerial experience 
 
Other tacit knowledge 
(e.g. problem-solving 


















OTHER ITEMS     
Government influence 
(as reported by Chinese 
partner) 
Medium Low N/A  
Efforts to secure large 
ownership share 
Medium Weak N/A Chinese partner 
will oppose 
ownership 
change if its 
ownership share 
were to decline 
Technology transfer 
(tangible assets, e.g. 
machinery, products, 
manuals) 
















Medium  Medium N/A Local partner 




plans, needed to 
keep up 
investment itself 





7.4.2 Background of IJV 
The IJV was set up in 1995 with two partners – a Japanese parent company with 
85% and a Chinese SOE that owned 15%.  It coincided with more flexible laws on 
market entry and therefore allowed the Japanese partner to retain high equity control 
while the Japanese partner’s policy to transfer state-of-the-art technology and upgrade the 
local IJV partner to that of a full supplier was welcomed by the national-level economic 
development zone and city government officials.  The Japanese parent company already 
had a sales-related wholly-owned subsidiary and another manufacturing IJV in different 
locations in China.   For the current subsidiary, the Japanese parent company therefore 
had more confidence to operate independently due to its prior experiences in both sales 
and manufacturing within China.  The accumulated experience was therefore perceived 
as a replacement for a local IJV partner as a contributor of intangible assets (General 
Manager C, 2007).  From the Japanese partner’s perspective, the JV was set up with the 
intent of using the local partner as the main supplier.  As an SOE, the local partner’s 
objectives from the JV were common among SOEs.  These included obtaining capital, 
technology, technological know-how and managerial skills.  The setup was 
accomplished in a short time, and high productivity was achieved initially due to the local 
partner’s low equity share and the Japanese partner’s prior experience from two other 
IJVs in China.    The ownership structure, however, turned into a disadvantage for the 
Japanese in the later life of the IJV. 
Case A is an electronics company which produces motherboards and intermediate 
electronics equipment for computers, laptops, mobile phones, and mainframes.  The 
Japanese parent company is a market leader in producing motherboards for laptops.  
 246 
Some of the IJV’s main clients are large international PC makers, which use integrated 
circuits made by Company A.  Although the subsidiary is an equity IJV, it is notable for 
being managed like a WOS, due to the high share of Japanese ownership (85%).  The 
local partner’s equity stake is 15%. 
The IJV partner was only to be the main supplier of components needed for 
integrated circuits, and was otherwise kept at arm’s length with respect to both ownership 
and management.   It is worth mentioning, however, that the IJV’s new plant was set up 
next to the Chinese IJV partner’s plant (an SOE) in order to facilitate just-in-time 
(kanban) production and to retain the ability to resolve technological matters and other 
issues in the local partner’s own SOE plant since this plant was to be the main supplying 
plant.  The Japanese partner had high confidence technology leakage would not occur. 
This IJV was also fully localized since the local IJV partner’s company supplied 
the full range of components.  Activities in the IJV included assembly of the final 
product and product design.  At the time of the interview (2007), the IJV’s production 
was fully exported. There was thus little need for the local IJV partner to contribute its 
market knowledge and knowledge relevant to local market access in the opinion of the 
Japanese manager, and thus justified the arm’s length relationship for the Japanese side.  
Any products to be sold internally in China were first exported to Japan and then 
re-imported and sold locally through the Japanese parent company’s sales subsidiary in 
China. 
The importance of this case is to illustrate the local partner’s quick acquisition of 




7.4.3 Significance of case 
Case A presents a case of uncontrolled instability in its later years due to a 
misalignment of interests between the Japanese and local IJV partners.  The subsidiary 
has been characterized by declining technology-induced productivity over time, in which 
the local partner internalized technologies and knowledge offered by the Japanese partner 
but failed to use its capabilities to the benefit of the IJV in its later years.  The local 
partner was an electronics maker that had already been producing components for mobile 
phones and communications equipment, and therefore entered the IJV with a relatively 
high level of technological sophistication.  At the time, the local partner had already 
benefited from the cooperation with the Japanese partner and had been able to further 
upgrade its technologies and processes.  One of the main achievements was the 
implementation of the kanban system, under which the Chinese partner made and 
delivered its components to the Japanese IJV partner.  The local IJV partner was later 
approached by other MNCs to supply components to. 
At the time of IJV set-up, the ownership structure had been fixed contractually 
between both partners.  This meant that equity proportions could not be changed 
throughout the life of the IJV.  Any additional investment had to be proportional so as to 
preserve the ratio.  The length of the IJV contract was set at 30 years.  The IJV 
ownership structure was slanted in favor of the Japanese partner, and neither reflected the 
importance of the local partner’s contributions in the early years of the IJV nor in the 
later years.  The Japanese company was not supportive of the idea of changing these 
terms. 
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This case thus highlights a subsidiary in which the local partner had acquired a 
relatively high level of technological capabilities through its function as a supplier to the 
Japanese parent company, in the process of which it had been able to absorb new 
technological and process knowledge, despite the arm’s-length relationship it was in.  
Technology learning and upgrading, however, has led the Chinese partner to expand its 
own supplying network to other MNCs from the same industrial park.   The local 
partner was also kept out of management participation.  Other commitments the local 
partner was beginning to make with other MNCs induced the process of instability in the 
IJV as the local partner was diverting resources and focusing its commitment to more 
lucrative contracts.  The case highlights an undesirable scenario for the Japanese IJV 
partner.  Despite the retaining a high ownership share and what the Japanese partner 
thought control, the opposite had occurred.  The local partner had little 
motivation/incentive to continue the IJV partnership.  Instead, it took its augmented 
knowledge and technologies elsewhere.  The scenario works only if the local IJV 
partner joined the IJV with an already high level of technologies and asset 
complementariness.  In this case, the strategy of according the local partner low 
ownership in order to retain high control and removing the possibility of adjusting 
ownership by fixing its ratio in the IJV contract proved to effect the opposite. 
To make up for the local partner’s complete non-involvement in management, a 
close location for the new IJV plant to the local partner’s parent firm (an SOE) was 
chosen to facilitate communication between management and engineers. 
As its third subsidiary in China, the Japanese partner already had experience and a 
sales network in China; therefore it had no particular need for the local partner’s 
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intangible assets (e.g. guanxi, access to distribution channels, or access to other suppliers).  
The main purpose for the Japanese partner was thus to develop the local IJV partner into 
a full components supplier. 
 
7.4.4 Local IJV partner 
Similar to the prior cases, the local partner was a large SOE with similar 
background.  Its main products included electronic components used in integrated 
circuits and components for telecommunication equipment.  At the same time, the SOE 
was developing its semi-conductor capabilities, and implemented its first clean room for 
semiconductor finishing in 2002.  By 2005, the SOE was a sought-after supplier of 
electronic components among international firms in the electronics and 
telecommunications industry, including PC and cellular phone makers from the US and 
notably Korea.  At the time of JV formation in 1995, the local partner was facing capital 
challenges, outdated product lines, and outdated production equipment.  It therefore had 
an urgent need to acquire capital and new technologies.  Similar to the acquisition 
strategies of other SOEs, capital and technology acquisition was to be accomplished 
through a JV partnership as well. 
 
7.4.5 Technology and knowledge transfer 
The special case of technology transfer here is that the local partner acquired a 
high degree of technologies quickly, until the year 2003, as the data shows, after which 
the rate of technology implementation/skill absorption started to decline.  Two 
conditions distinguish this local partner company from other cases.  First, the local 
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partner company in this case was a subsidiary of a large SOE which had been attached to 
the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) until the year 2000 and specialized in computer 
equipment.  Therefore, the IJV’s second-tier partner already had a high-level of 
technology and engineering skills relative to IJV partners in other case studies.  Its rate 
of learning and technology absorption was also likely to be higher.  The local partner 
was then able to acquire the skills of the Japanese partner in a shorter time.  Table 7.2 
shows that the Chinese partner’s priorities were similar to those of others, placing high 
priority on the acquisition of both tangible and intangible assets.  However, compared to 
the Japanese partner, who did not place much importance on the local partner’s intangible 
assets, the Chinese partner’s tangible assets played a greater role.  These were mainly 
components. 
As for the distribution of incentives, however, the Chinese partner had more to 
gain from the Japanese partner: the Chinese partner still needed to obtain both tangible 
and intangible assets in order to upgrade its capabilities.  The Japanese partner, however, 
only needed the local partner’s tangible assets.  All else being equal, the Japanese 
partner would then be obtaining less from the local partner than vice versa, and less 
compared to the other Japanese partners from other case studies, who did depend on the 
local partner’s intangible assets.   This would seemingly justify a higher ownership 
share for the Japanese partner.  However, the local partner also provided all of the 
components needed for the IJV to maintain production, and therefore the Japanese 
partner’s dependence on the local partner can be argued to be greater than in other case 
studies and relationships.  The high dependence on the local partner, however, is not 
reflected in the equity structure.  Therefore, the distribution of ownership may not be 
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optimal, and diminish the Chinese partner’s loyalty towards the Japanese partner by 
giving it opportunity to seek higher returns elsewhere, particularly in the later life of the 
IJV.  During the life of the IJV, the Chinese partner’s technological capabilities had 
reached a level where it started to supply state-of-the-art components to other foreign 
MNCs in China which included Korean and US MNCs.  Eventually, this move reduced 
the local partner’s dependence on orders and technology assistance from the Japanese JV 
partner while it managed to absorb its technology and knowledge.  Case A, therefore, 
highlights a situation where IJV instability originated from the Chinese partner.  In other 
words, the Japanese partner lost control over the act of continuing or the timing of IJV 
termination - a highly undesirable situation for the technology transferor. 
 
7.4.6 Technology protection 
To prevent technology leakage, the Japanese parent company set up an 
arm’s-length relationship with the local partner by keeping its equity involvement as low 
as possible.  As such, the management of the JV resembled that of a wholly-owned 
enterprise.  Employees were also separated.  Different from other IJVs, this IJV 
preferred to hire its own employees from the beginning instead of relying on the local 
partner to contribute its employees.  Moreover, the entire hiring process and HR 
function was overseen by Japanese management – which had some experience because of 
the parent company’s previous subsidiaries in China.  The Chinese partner was not 
further involved in the recruitment process. 
Since state-of-the-art-equipment was transferred to the newly formed IJV, there 
was no option to involve the partner in the daily operation/management of the JV to 
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prevent the Chinese partner from learning the technology.  The Chinese partner was 
therefore kept at a distance with some exceptions.  In order to assume the role of 
supplier, the Chinese partner needed to learn the kanban process and certain production 
processes required for the production of electronic components.  Both partners therefore 
agreed to set up the new IJV next to the plant of the local partner.  This location should 
facilitate communication, knowledge exchange, and troubleshooting, which was 
important as the IJV had implemented the kanban system, and the local partner had to 
supply according to the kanban system.   By choosing this site, the Japanese company 
hoped to enable the local partner to learn the kanban process, while it intended to prevent 
further technological know-how to leak to the local partner by otherwise keeping it arm’s 
length. 
 
7.4.7 Technology/knowledge-based productivity growth 
Technology/knowledge-based productivity growth in this IJV continued to rise 
until 2003, after which it started to decline.   Since the Japanese partner did not place 
much importance on the local partner’s tacit knowledge (intangible assets), not much 
learning took place in the opposite direction (Chinese to Japanese partner).  From the 
perspective of knowledge exchange, the IJV had already become obsolete.  In terms of 
learning, the JV had reached its peak when the Chinese partner acquired enough skills 
and technological sophistication when it became supplier to another Korean electronics 
MNC, with whom it commenced a supplier relationship in 2003.  It was in the same 
year that technology-induced productivity growth started to decline and the IJV entered 
potential instability induced by the local partner. 
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7.4.8 Objectives for ownership 
With regard to ownership objectives, the Japanese side wanted to have higher 
ownership because of the technology it was going to use in the JV while still giving the 
partner equity in order to align motives and reduce the possibility for unpredictable 
actions caused by the partner’s bounded rationality.  Therefore, the Japanese company 
preferred not to set up a WOS.  The ownership structure was meant to ensure the loyalty 
of the local partner. 
However, the equity participation was less than the SOE management desired, but 
entered the JV because of the potential for the acquisition of new technologies and 
suasion by the city government was actively promoting the setup of companies with 
advanced technologies in the industrial park. 
 
7.4.9  Interview results: Japanese partner 
7.4.9.1  Tangible assets 
The orientation of the parent company towards localizing production using an 
exclusive supplier in China has been planned from the beginning.  Therefore, the 
Japanese company did not place great importance on the local partner’s contribution of 
initially required tangible assets such as land, factory space, and utilities, which the other 
companies demanded.  The Japanese parent company already had several subsidiaries in 
China whom it could contact for help with setting up a factory.  Although the local 
partner contributed some initially required simple tangible assets, their importance to the 
Japanese company remained low.  The only initial contribution required of the local 
partner was labor.  However, the IJV began to recruit its own labor after the local 
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partner’s initial contribution.  This is reflected in the table, where the importance of 
labor contributed by the local partner decreases. 
As for technology-related tangible assets, the Japanese partner’s strategy to 
localize the supply chain with one partner thus placed great emphasis on the JV partner’s 
contribution of complementary products.  However, as most SOEs, the local partner did 
not have the equipment, technologies, nor capital necessary to produce components at the 
required quality and with the required production processes such as kanban.  However, 
compared to other SOEs, the local partner already had a higher technological knowledge 
level and experience with R&D from its affiliation with CAS, which would result in 
higher technology-induced productivity levels initially, and therefore a shorter 
unproductive IJV lifespan.   With regard to the partner’s capability to contribute 
tangible assets, however, the GM had confidence in the technological capability of the 
local partner:  
We helped the partner to acquire the skills to make their own production 
entirely… They had experience in product design, and they also had the 
skills to design the necessary production equipment and prototypes… 
Their company had experience in robot development!  We started out 
with kanagata first, our kanagata requirements were high, and their skills 
did not yet match our requirements.  That’s when we sent engineers over 
to their factory help them…They were soon able to make their own 
kanagata to our standards… We followed the same pattern for other 
products for some time…until two years ago when they started to 
accommodate our orders immediately…  (General Manager A, 2007) 
 
The quote highlights how the Japanese partner improved the ability of the local 
partner to contribute complementary products.  A further reading of the quote also 
suggests a declining relevance of the Japanese partner in building the local partner’s 
technological capabilities since the local partner’s absorption of technological assistance 
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resulted in its acceleration in designing and producing new components.  The Japanese 
partner’s technical help thus became less relevant as a result of the local partner’s higher 
learning rate. 
From the Japanese side’s point of view, the increase in capabilities of the local 
partner that led to shorter lead times for component production made the local partner an 
invaluable asset.  Furthermore, the local partner’s ability to contribute high-quality 
components within kanban production methods further raised asset specificity of the 
partner’s products and made the local partner indispensable.  An important outcome is 
that the Japanese partner became dependent on the Chinese partner but did not consider 
the motivation of the Chinese partner to contribute and remain a partner to the IJV.  The 
Chinese partner company, on the other hand, had more options to use the skills acquired 
and offer them to other MNCs.  IJV instability thus began to originate from the local 
partner. 
 
7.4.9.2  Intangible assets 
The Japanese partner entered the IJV with a perceived higher level of intangible 
assets due to its prior experience in foreign market entries in both China and other 
countries.  Therefore, the Japanese partner did not deem the local partner’s potential 
intangible contributions such as guanxi and the ability to negotiate with Chinese 
bureaucracy important to the IJV set up or the subsequent life of the IJV.  The Japanese 
partner, however, did hope to gain a long-term supplier relationship from its local partner.  
This strategy, however, was problematic. The Chinese partner entered the IJV with a high 
level of technological knowledge as a result of being directly affiliated with CAS before.  
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The small ownership share the Japanese partner accorded to the Chinese partner was too 
small to create a financial incentive for the local partner, and the local partner’s 
motivation to learn had reached a ceiling without further incentives in terms of intangible 
assets added by the Japanese partner such as additional training in Japan.  The 
relationship became one-sided in that the Japanese partner was benefiting from the local 
partner through the supply of components, but the local partner was stagnating in terms 
of learning and profit sharing due to its small ownership share.  The local partner thus 
had an incentive to seek other financial and technological opportunities.  With regard to 
the objective of obtaining intangible assets from the local partner, the GM noted:  
Precisely because of our strategy of transferring state-of-the-art 
technology here, we needed a partner with state-of-the-art knowledge and 
technology. The main reason we chose this partner is because of its 
advanced technological level and product similarity… We did not need 
the partner to negotiate for us or do day-to-day administrative things on 
our behalf…  Our parent company had asked another subsidiary in Wuxi 
to do it for us… They also introduced the local partner from the CAS 
[Chinese Academy of Sciences]-affiliated Zhonghuan Group to us… 
(General Manager A, 2007) 
 
With regard to exchanging intangible assets with the local IJV partner, the GM 
added:  “We did not expect the Chinese partner to reach the current technological level 
in (such) a short time since we didn’t provide much training…  We thought that they 
would be content with the orders and income received from being our supplier…” 
(General Manager A, 2007)  The GM’s statement thus shows that the Japanese partner 
did not consider the continuous acquisition of intangible assets through learning to be a 
decisive motivator for the Chinese partner to remain a partner to the IJV. 
 
 257 
7.4.9.3  Ownership 
The Japanese partner’s ownership share was high, which was unusual for the time 
at which the IJV was set up (1995).  The ownership share of this IJV is a manifestation 
of the government’s policy of pressuring foreign companies into transferring advanced 
technologies in return for being allowed to keep a high ownership share (General 
Manager A, 2007). 
When asked about the ownership structure with reference to the Chinese partner’s 
ownership share, the GM offered an explanation based on incremental foreign-market 
experience and level of technology: 
When we set up the JV, we considered our own experience, technology 
level, and capital.  We already had two JVs in China, the first was set up 
with a 60% to 40% structure, and the second with 80% to 20%.  We 
tried to secure higher ownership each time we set up a new subsidiary.  
In this JV, we have state-of-the-art production technology, so we needed 
to take it into account and manage the subsidiary as if it were 
wholly-owned. (General Manager A, 2007) 
 
With regard to changing the ownership structure in favor of the local partner, and 
thus having a flexible ownership structure, the GM recognized the asset specificity 
arising from the transfer of advanced technologies and the resulting dependence on the 
local partner (asset specificity):  
We are concerned about our partner’s latest diversification efforts.  We 
cannot do without our partner… We would have to stop our production… 
It is not realistic to find a supplier with the products and skills tailored to 
our needs… If we start to treat them (JV partner) like a regular market 
supplier, we will lose our cost and kanban advantage, they will have other 
customers.  But we cannot change the JV contract easily…(General 
Manager A, 2007) 
 
Therefore, for the reason of asset specificity alone, the Japanese side has no other 
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choice but to continue to involve the local partner in the IJV.  Due to high asset 
specificity created through the supplier relationship with the local partner, becoming a 
wholly-owned subsidiary and continuing to source complementary products through 
arm’s-length market transactions without increasing transaction costs would be difficult. 
The manager’s statements reveal that ownership change in favor of the local 
partner was presumed to be useful eventually and discontinuing the IJV out of the 
question.  Ownership change, however, entails potential government involvement, 
which is discussed below. 
 
7.4.9.4  Government influence 
Government influence was limited during the set up of the IJV.  Due to its prior 
experience in China, the Japanese parent company did its own search of potential IJV 
partner companies and shortlisted the current company.  Unlike other cases, the 
government did not explicitly interfere by assigning or persuading the Japanese parent 
company to form an IJV with this particular partner.  In fact, the government was even 
liberal towards the ownership share.  It accepted the current high ownership share for 
the Japanese partner as a tradeoff for a state-of-the-art production line and the kanban 
production process.  Since there is little room to change ownership upwards, any 
subsequent ownership would be in favor of the local partner; therefore government 
resistance would be expectedly low.  According to the GM, the government was 
cooperative for the following reason: 
The government was helpful, they gave us the plot of land in the location 
we needed.  When we came here, everything was already prepared for us.  
The communication between our other subsidiary and the government 
here was effective.  Our subsidiary in Wuxi acted as a proxy for the set 
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up of this joint venture… (General Manager A, 2007) 
 
However, the GM expected government objections if the Japanese partner were to 
try to acquire the Chinese partner’s share and convert the subsidiary into a WOS.  
According to the GM: 
When we applied to set up the JV here, the government assured us that we 
would continue receiving tax benefits, tax write-offs, and fast service as 
long as we kept renewing our product lines, production equipment, and 
localize training.  Another important reason we continue to operate as a 
JV is that we do not want to jeopardize these benefits… (General Manager 
A, 2007) 
 
It is clear from the manager’s words that the Japanese IJV partner company 
believes that government benefits and preferential treatment can deteriorate if conditions 
such as localization, equipment transfer, and shared ownership were not fulfilled. 
 
7.4.9.5  Technology transfer and technology leakage 
As discussed in the sections Tangible Assets and Intangible Assets, the leakage of 
technology was a consideration when the current ownership and management structures 
were selected.  The Japanese partner insisted that IJV be managed similar to a 
wholly-owned subsidiary, which therefore meant that the Chinese partner was to be left 
out of management.  Therefore, processes that were mutual in other IJVs were kept 
separate in this IJV.   The effort by the Japanese partner to keep the local partner at 
arm’s length stemmed from the Chinese partner’s higher technological levels (through its 
prior affiliation with CAS), and therefore the local partner’s faster learning capabilities.  
According to the GM, the Chinese partner could not receive a greater share without 
getting more voting rights. The Japanese partner, however, could not accept.  According 
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to Harris and Moure (2006), treating the local IJV partner as such is rare in China.  
However, it has offered advantages to those IJVs in which the foreign partner tries to 
leverage on its increased experience in the host country.  In addition to transferring staff 
from its previous IJVs, the current management could hire local staff without the fear that 
the Chinese partner could bring in “friends, family, or other acquaintances we [Japanese 
partner] don’t know well.” (General Manager A, 2007)  With regard to leakage of 
technology, the GM further stated that, 
We do not involve the partner in vital tasks and the sharing of vital 
information.  This is how we can best prevent leakage of technology and 
knowledge.  For example, we do not let our partner hire the staff, and 
we do not trust staff unless they have been here for a long time…  This is 
how we reduce the possibility that staff are friends or relatives of our 
partner.  Since our partner does not know the staff, we have equal 
conditions.  If our partner had known the staff members beforehand, we 
would not trust our partner. (General Manager A, 2007) 
 
In addition to hiring practices, technology leakage is also controlled through 
systematic training programs and deployment of expatriate managers and engineers.  
Similar to other cases, these are Japanese engineers from the headquarters who are 
stationed at the IJV for a period of time to oversee the introduction of new production 
equipment and to train workers to use it.  It is mostly a process of explicit rather than 
tacit knowledge transfer since anything beyond operating the machines and conducting 
simple repairs are not taught.  Consequently, adjusting production equipment to 
customized product requirements by clients is done by Japanese engineers.  However, 
the proximity of the IJV to the Chinese partner’s company moderates the impact of the 
withheld tacit knowledge.  Japanese engineers also conduct training at the local 
partner’s SOE and train the local partner adjust their technology to supply components to 
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the new production line within three to six months. 
 
7.4.9.6  Knowledge transfer 
According to the table, the Japanese partner rated its knowledge transfer to the 
Chinese partner in both instances as medium.  The Japanese partner avoided teaching 
theoretical aspects of new products and their production to the Chinese employees and 
the Chinese partner SOE.  The design of new products was left entirely in Japan.  
Similar to other case studies, however, the GM acknowledged that it would only be a 
matter of time that the Chinese partner will understand the design aspects.  By then, he 
argues, “new equipment will have replaced the old equipment, and their [local partner’s] 
knowledge about the old equipment will help them to understand new equipment faster 
each time it is introduced…”  With regard to the learning of technology’s tacit 
knowledge, therefore, General Manager A (2007) conceded that “some technology and 
knowledge leakage cannot be helped, we do our best to maximize the utility of the new 
technologies we bring here…” 
 
7.4.9.7  Knowledge uncertainty towards Chinese partner 
The perceived knowledge uncertainty towards the Chinese partner has increased 
over time.  The Japanese partner is now aware that with the local partner’s 
diversification towards other suppliers, it has become extremely difficult to predict what 
the partner’s next step will be with regard to a) remaining a partner to the IJV, b) 
demanding a higher ownership share within the IJV, and c) retaining a reliable supply of 
components from the partner since the partner’s diversification to other suppliers has 
 262 
caused disruptions in the timing of the partner’s deliveries under the kanban system.  
The latter have caused the Japanese partner company to send engineers to the local 
partner’s company to ensure kanban schedules were met.  The cause for the delays had 
been “a diversion of their [local partner’s] engineering and production resources to 
develop samples/prototypes for another [Korean MNC],” according to General Manager 
A (2007).  
The GM also mentioned that the local partner would need to have a higher 
ownership share in the near future. “We realized our JV partner was searching for new 
sources of income.  Through a higher ownership share, we thought we could alleviate 
the problem, so that they [local IJV partner] could have a higher share of the profits.” 
(General Manager A, 2007)  The quote shows that the necessity to make adjustments to 
the ownership structure had been recognized as important in order to create incentives for 
the local partner to remain loyal and continue its role as supplier. 
 
7.4.10  Interview results: Chinese partner 
7.4.10.1   Ownership 
In addition to contributing value-added products, the Chinese partner wanted 
active involvement in the management of the IJV for which it sought a reasonable equity 
share.  However, the local partner did not pursue its ownership requests further since the 
central government had backed the Japanese partner’s investment application owing to its 
plans to transfer state-of-the-art product technologies and plans for long-term and full 
localization.  The Chinese partner, however, knew that the ownership structure did not 
reflect its (local partner’s) contribution and importance to the Japanese partner as the 
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single most important supplier in China.  However, the Chinese partner also hoped that 
the lack of any significant ownership in the IJV would be compensated for by the 
learning of technology and R&D skills, because it had to show progress reports to the 
local government Appliance Measurement Bureau (仪表局).  Despite low ownership, 
frequent initial training and exchange of engineers (which later became more restrained) 
enabled the Chinese partner absorb new knowledge at a high rate in the beginning.  
High absorption rates were a result of the local partner’s already high level of technology 
as a result of its prior affiliation with CAS.  However, knowledge absorption reached a 
plateau when the Japanese partner reduced technology assistance after the local partner 
had reached the capability to supply components.  Technology/knowledge-based 
productivity of the IJV decreased subsequently.  Since the IJV was managed as 
essentially two separate companies, the values therefore can be interpreted as a decline in 
technology/knowledge-based productivity growth that resulted from the Japanese partner 
alone, rather than productivity decline due to discrepancies between IJV partners.  In the 
meantime, the Chinese partner had used its high initial technological capabilities and 
started supplier agreements with other electronics MNCs.  The Vice-GM (2007) 
explained that, 
Financially, the partnership with our Japanese partner was limiting.  
They [the Japanese partner] had been our technology supplier for several 
years, and we were loyal to them.  On the other hand, our requests for a 
higher share in the JV went unheard.  Naturally, we took the next step 
and looked for new opportunities – we were very lucky that [a Korean 
MNC] approached us.  We are now a large supplier to them [Korean 
MNC]… (Vice-General Manager A, 2007) 
 
The Vice-GM’s quote shows the Japanese efforts to increase the Chinese partner’s 
ownership share after they learned about its other supply contracts.  The Chinese partner, 
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however, is determined to expand the business with the Korean company.  The Japanese 
now have little leverage because the local partner is their only large-scale local supplier.  
High asset specificity prevents sourcing components from other suppliers in the short 
term. 
 
7.4.10.2  Tangible assets 
Similar to other IJVs, the importance of obtaining tangible assets from the 
Japanese partner was expectedly high.  There was less emphasis on obtaining capital 
compared to other IJVs.  This was due to the arm’s length supplier-manufacturer 
relationship between the two partners and the separate nature of the local partner 
company and the IJV itself.  Although the Vice-GM stated that new capital was needed, 
he also explained that not needing to invest capital in the IJV meant that capital could be 
used to invest in the local partner company’s own product development and quality.  
The SOE already had the advantage of higher R&D capabilities, which meant that capital 
invested would have greater effect in terms of sophistication of result and time taken.  In 
a period of only three years, the SOE managed to design production equipment including 
a robot-arm that could make high-precision mechanical parts for DVD drives.  Later the 
partner opened a clean room in which semiconductor-based integrated circuits could be 
made.  The Vice-GM (2007) stated that, 
Our JV expanded a lot since we set it up.  We were able to increase our 
product range using the profits from the JV.  Because our share was 
small, we needed to think about the future of our own company more, so 
we kept investing almost all of our profits in hiring engineers and some 
new production equipment.  It was risky, but we have come out with new 
products much faster since then…  Our own productivity has increased 
tremendously, and we have made more new products than our Japanese 
partner since 2002… (Vice-General Manager A, 2007) 
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Therefore, it can be interpreted that the Japanese parent company’s arm’s length 
strategy ultimately benefited the Chinese SOE.  The benefit for the IJV in the short-term 
was that the Japanese partner still achieved technological progress without disclosing 
vital technologies.  In the long-term, however, both partners’ interests became 
misaligned.  The arm’s length relationship did not provide a foundation for the Chinese 
partner’s continued loyalty, and low profit that came with low ownership ultimately 
caused the Chinese partner to look for opportunities with other customers. 
 
7.4.10.3  Intangible assets 
As in other the other cases, the importance of intangible assets was high for the 
Chinese partner at the time of IJV set-up but declined over time as the partner’s 
capabilities rose.  As discussed previously, however, the decline in the importance for 
the Japanese partner’s intangible assets was due to the local partner company’s own 
strengths in product design and R&D capabilities.  The Vice-GM expressed, “We 
wanted to expand our company and seek new customers for our products… We needed to 
put our potential to make new products according to custom requests to good use.  So 
we started looking for other MNCs…” (Vice-General Manager A, 2007)  With respect to 
the Japanese partner he said, “When we found [the Korean MNC], we knew we really did 
not need the Japanese partner for technology transfer anymore…  We knew we could 
not get their know-how, at least not with the current ownership structure… Koreans were 
more cooperative…” (Vice-General Manager A, 2007). 
However, the Vice-GM added that shortly after IJV set up, engineers from the 
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SOE were sent to the IJV for training.  The IJV was located next to the SOE in the same 
industrial park.  The training, however, was limited to operating the machinery and did 
not include the teaching of know-how or problem-solving skills.  
As a previous member of CAS, however, the Chinese IJV partner already had 
advanced technological capabilities.  For example, the Chinese partner company was 
able to develop the prototype for a new electronic component to be used in cellular 
phones within eight months and mass-produce it within one year.   
Vice-General Manager A (2007) declared that the product development and 
engineering capability gap between the Japanese company and the Chinese partner was 
closed when “[the Korean MNC] approached us [Chinese partner company] to supply 
telecommunication components.”  Noting this, he added that with the status quo in the 
number of order maintained by the Japanese IJV partner, “there is no reason to consider 
dissolving the joint venture.” (Vice-General Manager A, 2007)  In other words, the IJV 
was now being kept stable at the control of the local partner since the burden of keeping 
the IJV together had shifted to the Japanese partner which had to maintain its order level.  
Otherwise, there may not have been adequate financial incentive and the Chinese partner 
may have left.  Ironically, the Japanese side’s tendency for technology protection and 
lack of a long-term technology assistance strategy has resulted in the Chinese partner 
considering leaving the IJV.  The Japanese partner would thus lose control of IJV 
stability. 
 
7.4.10.4  Government influence 
Due to its state-of-the-art technology the government left the SOE with a high 
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degree of independence, which included IJV formation.  The Japanese partner located 
the Chinese partner through its previous network of subsidiaries, and the Chinese partner 
agreed to become an IJV partner for the purpose of supplying complementary products 
(components) because it needed order predictability and large order volume.  It also 
wanted to upgrade technological and managerial knowledge.  The two partners then 
negotiated the ownership structure, and the government approved the IJV without further 
intervention.  The low ownership share of the Chinese partner is partly a result of the 
company’s shortage of capital.  During its affiliation with CAS, the partner company 
had received R&D funding, but this was not the case when it became independent.  The 
company also lacked marketing experience.  Regarding the partner company’s 
commercial experience, the Vice-GM explained that, 
The government encouraged us to enter a JV with [the Japanese 
company], but said they would leave the decision on ownership up to us.  
We did not have much capital to invest, and we needed their [Japanese 
partner’s] marketing experience…  The setup negotiations ended quickly, 
and we settled for a 10% share.  We did not request financial assistance 
from the Appliance Measurement Bureau, it would have slowed down the 
process by at least a year… (Vice-General Manager A, 2007) 
 
4.4.10.5  Knowledge uncertainty towards Japanese partner 
The previous discussion has shown that the Japanese partner’s sole source of 
locally sourced components is the Chinese IJV partner’s company (SOE).  In terms of 
intangible assets, the Japanese partner has effectively not made use of the Chinese 
partner’s tacit knowledge, which encouraged the Japanese partner to keep the Chinese 
partner at arm’s length. 
Even though the Chinese partner was kept at arm’s length, it has managed to 
upgrade its own capability through the Japanese partner’s initial assistance in upgrading 
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technologies and skills (i.e. explicit and tacit knowledge). The partner’s embedded 
technological knowledge embodied by its high-ability pool of engineers from the time of 
the company’s affiliation with CAS enabled it to process both new explicit and tacit 
knowledge fast.  According to the Vice-GM (2007), 
We had less knowledge on equipment technology, so for some complicated, 
sophisticated problem, we had to consult the Japanese.  We sought 
active communication with them… We tried to learn their technologies, 
and after a short time we could already apply them… Eventually, we did 
not depend on the Japanese partner’s training anymore… (Vice-General 
Manager A, 2007) 
 
High existing technological capabilities helped the local partner to become 
relatively independent of the Japanese company even to the extent of training.  Many 
other local partner companies complained about the inaccessibility of training and 
problem-solving skills (i.e. transfer of tacit knowledge).  The Chinese partner in this IJV, 
however, had effectively absorbed tacit knowledge to the extent that it could develop its 
own problem-solving skills (tacit knowledge).  In this sense, the Chinese partner 
depended much less, if at all, on the Japanese partner for the transfer of tacit knowledge.  
Therefore, the motivation to remain loyal to the IJV had faded due to the non-transfer of 
tacit knowledge from the Japanese partner and the lack of financial incentives due to the 
low ownership share.  The rapid self-sustained technological development of the 
Chinese IJV partner eventually became a pull factor for its interest in diversifying its 
customer base away from the Japanese IJV partner.  As for knowledge uncertainty, it 
was now the Chinese partner who had gained the upper hand over the life of the IJV.  It 
had successfully diversified its component making to other international customers while 
benefits from remaining in the IJV were small.  The Japanese partner, however, stood to 
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lose its main supplier.  In theory, the Chinese partner could therefore initiate termination 
of the IJV first.  Vice-General Manager A (2007), however, denied by saying “there has 
been no talk of changing the [IJV] structure on both sides so far…”  Despite his quote, 
the potential for IJV instability induced by the local partner is high.  As such, the 
Japanese partner is justified in maintaining a high level of knowledge uncertainty towards 
the Chinese partner.
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7.5 Case B 
7.5.1 Case characteristics 
 
• Year of subsidiary formation:   1995 
• Ownership structure:    65% (Japanese); 35% (Chinese) 
• Productivity growth:    High 
• Feasibility of changing ownership structure: Medium 
• Instability:     Low 
• Type of IJV relationship:   Conventional non-arm’s length 
 
Table 7.3: Interview results - Japanese perspective (Case B) 
JAPANESE PERSPECTIVE 




Experience in foreign 
market entries 




Experience in China Medium High N/A Second subsidiary 
in China 
TANGIBLE ASSETS  IMPORTANCE IMPORTANCE   
Items: 
- Land 
- Factory  




- Partner’s technology 
































INTANGIBLE ASSETS     
Guanxi 
- Tax negotiations 
- HR 
- Localization 





















Medium  Low  N/A Govt. influence 
declined when IJV 
was profitable and 
transferred 
technologies 
Efforts by Chinese partner 
to secure large ownership 
share (as perceived by 
Japanese partner) 
High  Medium N/A Chinese partner 
kept up with 
subsequent 
investments 
Knowledge spillovers from 
Chinese partner  
Low Medium N/A  
Technology transfer 
(tangible assets, e.g. 
machinery, products, 
manuals) 
High High N/A Transfer of new 
equipment 
Knowledge transfer 
(transfer of intangible 
assets, e.g. tacit 
knowledge) 
High Medium N/A Knowledge was 
increasingly being 
created within the 
subsidiary 
Knowledge uncertainty 
towards Chinese partner 
Low Low N/A  
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Table 7.4: Interview results - Chinese perspective (Case B) 
CHINESE PERSPECTIVE 
 At time of IJV 
formation 












































relied on own 
engineers’ high 
capabilities 
OTHER ITEMS     
Government influence 
(as reported by 
Chinese partner) 
High Low N/A  
Efforts to secure large 
ownership share 
Strong Weak N/A  
Technology transfer 
(tangible assets, e.g. 
machinery, products, 
manuals) 
















7.5.2 Background of IJV 
The IJV was formed in 1995 between a Japanese electronics company that 
specializes in automotive and aviation GPS and mobile communications equipment and a 
Chinese SOE that specializes in navigation and telecommunications equipment.  The 
IJV was set up at an ownership ratio of 65% and 35% for the Japanese and Chinese 
partners, respectively.  Ownership in this IJV has not changed since.  Productivity 
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growth has been high. 
 
7.5.3 Significance of case 
The significance of this case is that despite no change in ownership, productivity 
has risen over time, which shows that the partner’s value of contribution to the IJV 
relative to its ownership share began to match more closely over time.  The case is an 
example of a conventional non-arm’s length relationship with diffused ownership 
structures.  The local partner has high ownership and is actively involved in 
management. 
The ownership the local partner received at the time of IJV set-up was high 
relative to its level of contribution in the early stages of the IJV.  In other words, the IJV 
partner was overcompensated (relative to its initial contribution to the IJV).  Despite the 
local partner’s high ownership share, the Japanese company still transferred key 
knowledge necessary to upgrade the local partner’s know-how and production 
capabilities, including drawings of integrated circuits in incremental steps. The incentive 
for the partner to remain loyal to the IJV was therefore established; in other words, the 
partner did not become complacent in receiving profits.  Instead, the local partner 
upgraded its own capabilities which would enable it to become the main supplier of 
semiconductor and other high-tech components to the IJV.  Therefore, the 
overcompensation from the high ownership share eventually became worthwhile in 
retaining the local partner’s loyalty, in contrast to the previous case study.  The high 
value for productivity growth was ultimately resulted from a carefully planned and 
incremental technology transfer to the local partner who helped the Japanese parent 
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company almost fully localize its component supply chain in China.  The learning effect 
in this subsidiary eventually went further leading to the set-up of a new R&D subsidiary.  
The initial overcompensation of the IJV partner with regard to the ownership share was 
successful in combination with the planned and incremental technology and knowledge 
transfer to the subsidiary, so that it became unnecessary to renegotiate the ownership 
share in the later life of this IJV, which also means that no further inefficiencies arose 
from ownership renegotiation. 
The IJV was founded on an initial understanding to gradually and systematically 
upgrade the local partner’s skills through a technology contract in which the partner 
would receive technological assistance by using expatriate Japanese technical 
personnel/engineers without charge to the IJV.  This was different from the other cases, 
where the local subsidiary had to pay a fee for engineers who were sent from the 
Japanese parent company, and which both IJV partners split according to their equity.  
The setup and required assets that the local partner would provide made such no-fee 
engineer-import arrangement possible.  An important expectation of the local partner 
was that it would increase its supply of component types to the JV and help the JV 
achieve full or near to full localization rates within a 10-year time frame, following which 
the Japanese parent company planned to transfer most R&D functions to China and 
ultimately localize its entire supply chain in China including the supply of 
yet-to-be-developed components through the R&D process.  In the meantime the JV 
partner was to learn the production technology together with some sensitive know-how. 
 
 274 
7.5.4 Local IJV partner 
The local partner is an SOE and a market leader in China in GPS and OEM 
communications equipment.  At the time of IJV formation, this SOE already had four 
IJVs with US and European MNCs, and the current case was its first IJV with a Japanese 
company. 
Therefore, the Chinese partner had relatively high product complementariness and 
greater knowledge symmetry with the Japanese company.  It was already capable of 
supplying about 10% among all types of GPS navigation components that the Japanese 
partner required at the IJV setup stage; eventually the localization rate with regard to 
these components was to be raised to above 80%.  The areas that needed improvement 
were the quality of existing products and new product development. The localization rate 
of 10% could have been higher, but some quality issues had to be resolved first. 
 
7.5.5 Technology protection 
From the perspective of the Japanese partner who sought a local partner to 
localize most of its component supply, technology protection was approached differently 
from case A (previous case).  Although the Japanese parent company transferred 
first-generation equipment to the newly formed IJV, it did not attempt to protect 
knowledge by keeping the local partner arm’s length.  Active involvement in 
management, such as employing Chinese staff at both upper management and lower 
management levels (i.e. line supervisors) was done in the interest of imparting new 
knowledge.  Moreover, the Japanese parent company arranged for technical staff to 
supervise new production equipment and processes when they were introduced, and offer 
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free technical assistance in the same form when problems arose.  The goal was to 
localize activities at the highest level – the R&D level.  In the meantime, the Japanese 
parent needed the local partner to provide regular contributions necessary to operate in 
China, such as the contribution of HR functions, clearing bureaucracy (customs, taxes, 
etc.), and liaising with the government. The regular introduction of new technologies 
motivated the local partner to learn and make counter-contributions in the form of new or 
improved components.      
   
7.5.6 Productivity growth 
Technology/knowledge-induced productivity growth in this IJV has attained a 
high level.  Both partners later agreed to create a new R&D subsidiary from the existing 
IJV at the wish of the Japanese parent company.  A new wholly-owned subsidiary would 
allow the Japanese partner to engage in R&D without a local partner but with some of the 
local partner’s employees trained previously in the IJV.  This option, the GM explained, 
would enhance the protection of know-how, or tacit technical knowledge, since asset 
specificity between the two IJV partners had become low as a result of their close 
cooperation. 
The engineering background of Chinese managers often enables them to learn and 
internalize Japanese technology and implement it in the production process, particularly 
within the open culture of this IJV.  Furthermore, the local partner’s management 
participation has compensated for the insufficient management skills, which have limited 
the local partner’s ability to “engage in fundamental changes that concern managerial 
tasks such as work processes and delegating decision making and responsibility.” 
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(Nguyen and Meyer, 2005:48).  Therefore, participation at all management levels has 
ultimately compensated for the lack of management skills and aided in the 
implementation of production and innovation processes.  As a result, 
technology/knowledge-based productivity has risen over the years. 
 
7.5.7 Objectives for ownership 
By giving the local partner high ownership and preserving a flexible ownership 
agreement, the incentive structure of the IJV remained largely intact throughout the life 
of the IJV.  For the Japanese partner, it meant that majority ownership enabled it to 
retain control of the joint venture, technologies, and strategy in the short term.  In the 
long-term, the Japanese partner could focus on developing the joint venture, increasing 
product lines, and increasing the local partner’s capability to act as supplier and provider 
of other tangible and intangible assets.  For the Chinese partner, the ownership structure 
meant that at IJV setup time and the short term, they could contribute what they were 
competent in such as tangible assets which included finding and negotiating land, 
building factory space, providing utilities, labor, and contacts to local and national 
governments.  In addition, the local partner was also able to supply a limited range of 
components.  As for intangible assets, the local partner’s most important contribution at 
the time of IJV setup included mainly contacts to national and local governments and 
negotiating favorable tax terms for the production. 
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7.5.8  Interview results: Japanese partner 
7.5.8.1  Tangible assets  
Contrary to case A, the difference with regard to securing contributions from the 
Chinese partner has been long-term and systematic planning of upgrading the IJV 
partner’s capabilities from the time of IJV formation.  The Japanese partner has actively 
pursued a higher value-added strategy towards the subsidiary and acknowledged that the 
key in securing an effective relationship was to upgrade both partners’ capabilities.  The 
IJV in this case study was the Japanese parent company’s second IJV in China and 
overseas; therefore it had limited experience in foreign market entries.  Another IJV was 
located in southern China, but had been built on an export-oriented and low-value added 
strategy several years before.  The company’s goal had been to localize component 
production in the long term. The current IJV therefore needed a number of the local 
partner’s simple tangible assets at setup time and more sophisticated tangible assets later.  
These included operating permits, land, labor, factory space, and tax concessions initially, 
while locally-produced and locally-sourced components would be sourced locally later .  
The latter, however, could only be attained after exchange and absorption of tacit 
knowledge (intangible assets) had taken place successfully.  The significance is that the 
shift from simple tangible assets to value-added sophisticated tangible assets required 
internalization of intangible assets (e.g. tacit knowledge).  The GM not only wanted to 
localize production but also wanted to do away with the strategy of exporting finished 
products to Japan and re-importing them to China to be used mostly by other foreign 
MNCs.  Most of the products the subsidiary was producing at the time were 
intermediate industrial products. 
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The subsidiary’s full export orientation was part of an IJV setup requirement by 
the government, which signals its weak bargaining power vis-à-vis the Chinese 
government and the local IJV partner.  In the future, however, all production was to be 
sold in China directly.  While the Chinese industrial market continued to increase 
rapidly, the subsidiary also began to diversify its production to include products for 
individual consumers.   The subsidiary eventually shifted from a full export orientation 
to a partial export orientation for both industrial and individual consumers. 
The GM was aware that the utility of these simple tangible assets would 
eventually decline and the partner overcompensated if a future flow of increasingly 
value-added contributions from the local partner was not maintained in order to justify 
the ownership share.  According to the GM (2007), “We wanted to ensure the local 
partner would continue to be of value to us after their initial contributions when we set up 
the company”.  Doing so, however, would not be possible without the transfer of high 
technology, to which the GM delivered the following comment: 
Our customers are MNCs that demand the latest technology and best 
product quality… We have a strong reputation which we have to 
maintain… We had already decided at the negotiation stage that in the 
future we would be setting up R&D facilities here… We were going to 
implement it systematically, and we needed a competent local partner… 
We could not afford to lose a good local partner. (General Manager B, 
2007) 
 
Furthermore, the GM added that over time component production would be 
incrementally localized as the Chinese partner learned new production technologies. 
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7.5.8.2  Intangible assets 
The shift from a reliance on the partner’s simple tangible assets to higher 
value-added tangible assets and their requisite intangible assets had been a set strategy 
since the time of IJV set up. Therefore, the local partner knew its role from the start, and 
knowledge uncertainty was minimized.  Moreover, the non-fixed ownership structure in 
this case simplified the process of any change in ownership that would reflect the local 
partner’s higher value-added contributions. 
Even though the Japanese partner in this IJV did not intend to change the 
ownership in the future, the GM also did not rule it out for the sake of preserving a 
harmonious and long-term oriented relationship with the local partner.  According to the 
GM, the reliance on the local partner’s intangible assets had transgressed the increasingly 
important roles of dealing with government agencies and sourcing local suppliers to one 
in which the local partner had been increasingly made part of the Japanese parent 
company’s R&D network.  Despite the fear about weak intellectual property protection 
in China, the GM believed that so long as they created incentives for the partner to stay, 
the problem of knowledge leakage could be kept to a minimum.  Ownership and new 
knowledge were indispensable in maintaining the local partner’s loyalty. 
The local partner, whose engineers were eventually to be employed in a 
separately-created R&D subsidiary first received experience and training to increase their 
capabilities in quality control, product knowledge, and knowledge of the production 
process with the eventual goal of product development for the industrial market. 
The company’s customers were large MNCs which also exported their products 
and therefore had high quality demands.  The GM believed that in order to transfer 
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know-how necessary for the production of high-quality, advanced industrial goods, the 
subsidiary should first expose local staff to product development in consumer goods 
when the skill level had been reached.  Unlike industrial customers, among whom the 
company had been highly regarded, the subsidiary was still relatively unknown among 
end-users, which made it less risky to test the acceptance of locally developed products 
with end-users first. 
We decided to transfer our consumer goods development to China first, 
while maintaining industrial R&D in Japan.  We had decided to enter 
the consumer goods when we set up the JV.  Setting our JV up in China 
was a method to test locally developed consumer goods among 
consumers in China and assess the potential for further R&D localization 
for our industrial goods.  We were new in the consumer market, so we 
could afford to experiment since we had no reputation to lose…  We will 
assess our R&D subsidiary first and its success in the R&D of consumer 
goods, but it will take a few years until we reach a decision on whether 
we will conduct R&D for our core industrial products there. (General 
Manager B, 2007) 
 
The main mechanism for transfer was the use of experienced transfer teams and 
temporary expatriate engineers together with extensive education and training (three to 
four months) of managerial and engineering personnel in the parent company in Japan 
from early on in the project. Considerable on site involvement by engineers from 
headquarters in Japan has also been critical for the successful transfer of essential tacit 
knowledge and problem-solving skills.  According to the GM, 
We wanted to establish a culture of innovation, but we had to start almost 
from scratch.  The (local) engineers had some training and theoretical 
knowledge but did not know how to apply it…  They also had no idea 
how to use the research budget, so we had to create this knowledge first.  




7.5.8.3  Ownership 
According to the GM, the IJV was set up on the premise that the ownership 
structure had to be adjustable in order to reflect the partner’s contributions in the future.  
When the IJV was formed, the goal of localizing production and expanding sales in the 
Chinese market directly (as opposed to re-importing) was already in existence. 
However, at the time of setup, the GM also mentioned that the Japanese parent 
company did not consider entering the Chinese market immediately because the Japanese 
partner wanted to accumulate experience in China first, including experience with the 
Chinese partner.  Furthermore, the GM believed the Chinese consumer market did not 
have the purchasing power and quality orientation for high-quality and high value-added 
end products at the time of IJV setup.  Therefore, he believed it would be useful in the 
meantime to learn from the Chinese partner and expand the Chinese partner’s 
technological skills and tacit knowledge. 
He also mentioned that in the course of time, the Japanese parent company 
expected the Chinese partner’s contributions to shift to more value-added tangible and 
intangible assets in connection with the upgrading of the partner’s capabilities along with 
the gradual increase in capabilities of manufacturers within China.  The GM explained 
with regard to reflecting each partner’s contributions through the ownership share, 
We gave up a higher share as a bonus to the Chinese… Their share did 
not initially reflect their contributions or their value-added to our joint 
venture, but we hoped to create goodwill and gain the partner’s trust 
through it.  We entered China for the long-term and we were sure that in 
the future we would gain the appropriate value-added contribution from 
our local partner. (General Manager B, 2007) 
 
The ownership structure was thus used a tool to motivate the Chinese partner; or, 
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as the GM maintained – it would eventually deliver higher value-added contributions 
from the partner in the future.  At the time of the interview, the ownership share did not 
have to be changed yet. 
 
7.5.8.4  Government influence 
Government influence was perceived by the GM as strong: 
The government seemed eager to get us to form a JV with them [SOE].  
The government should not even have tried so hard because our trading 
company already advised us to form a JV with this particular SOE before.  
We had a clear plan for the JV partner to become part of our production 
network and possibly R&D network later.   First, we needed the partner 
to set up our production facilities speedily and with all the necessary 
production equipment. (General Manager B, 2007) 
 
The general manager further added that, 
Taxes and duties were complex, opaque, and illogical...  This has not 
improved much in recent years despite China’s entry into WTO, we will 
always need the partner for negotiating the arbitrary duties on 
components and equipment… Sometimes the import and depreciation tax 
we are assessed depends on the mood of the official.  At least we are 
now able to localize more of our production thanks to our partner.  As 
for new production equipment, we will still need to import it for a long 
time, and we cannot cope without our partner in this regard. (General 
Manager B, 2007) 
 
The quote shows the extent to which the GM depends on the local partner to 
negotiate with the government.  Even though localization of production has taken some 
pressure off tax negotiations for components supplies on one hand, increase localization 
had resulted in more frequent equipment imports, where the Japanese partner had a 
difficulties in negotiating import taxes.  The quote above also implies that localizing 
anything but final component production is unlikely, and that despite strong tax pressures, 
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the company would not consider sourcing or developing any production equipment 
locally.  As a required intermediate step, production technologies remain the core of 
technological know-how, and these will not be localized, despite higher tax liabilities 
(GM, 2007).  This indicates strong unwillingness and inability with regard to local 
technological capabilities to transfer production equipment, in spite of the fact that 
transferring production equipment would mean time and cost savings.  However, it is 
not likely because of the variety of contractors involved.  The GM mentioned that, 
We do not know of any local company that could make the equipment to 
our specifications within the time, advancement, and quality we require.  
At this time, we would not develop the design of production equipment 
with our partner, since we would be giving essential know-how away…In 
the future, we will still receive it from Japan... (General Manager B, 2007) 
 
Accordingly, the Chinese partner will remain an essential link between the IJV 
and the government.  In this sense government connections – an intangible asset 
contributed from the start of the JV, (thus a simple intangible asset) have and will likely 
remain important throughout the life of the JV.  The above quote highlight the pressure 
companies can face to transfer and impart know-how to China and discourage the sole 
importation of key technologies.  The Japanese partner, by contrast, chose to protect the 
know-how.  In addition, the transfer of sophisticated intangible assets, such as 
technological knowledge, has perpetuated the Japanese partner’s reliance on the simple 
intangible assets that the local partner can provide, such as government connections.  
Therefore, the local partner’s role has retained and possibly increased in importance.  
The Japanese partner has required more of the Chinese partner’s tacit knowledge over 
time.  With regard to obtaining the local partner’s intangible assets, the strategy by the 
Japanese parent company to concede a higher ownership ratio to the Chinese partner in 
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the beginning was therefore justified.  The local partner did not have reason to claim 
that the value of their contributions to the IJV exceeded the value of their ownership 
share. 
 
7.5.8.5  Knowledge transfer 
According to the summary of the interview results in the table, it can be seen that 
tacit knowledge transferred to the local partner increased over time from a reported level 
of ‘medium’.  According to Kremic (2003), a higher rate of knowledge absorption by 
the technology transferee over time is the result of increasing absorption of tacit 
knowledge that could be internalized only after explicit knowledge had been absorbed.  
Therefore, the indication from the data in the previous chapter and the self-reported 
results stated by the GM indicate that the transfer of explicit knowledge resulted in tacit 
knowledge being implemented more efficiently later.  According to the GM, 
We wanted to train our engineers and managers to be capable of 
conducting R&D later.  They already had the skills to modify products 
for the local market; we also knew they had the potential for further 
R&D… But local staff had weak managerial skills..they could not manage 
the R&D budget… we could not trust them to spend the R&D budget 
wisely...  We spent a long time teaching them… (General Manager B, 
2007) 
 
The above quote highlights the importance of a wide range of tacit knowledge 
that ranges from product-specific knowledge (modification of products, R&D) to 
managerial knowledge such as managing the R&D budget.  The linkage between skills 
upgraded from absorbing tacit knowledge and skills upgraded from learning explicit 
knowledge became evident in the retention of local engineers.  The GM further 
mentioned that, 
 285 
We also wanted our engineers to be challenged and avoid letting them 
feel underused by limiting them doing product modifications; this is why 
we let them manage the R&D budget… We did not want them to feel that 
they were just wasting their time here when they could have acquired 
other skills from other companies...  We had already invested in their 
training… (General Manager B, 2007) 
 
He also explained that retaining these engineers was important since they had 
already invested in their training, and they had reached a higher skill level.  
State-of-the-art R&D, however, could not be conducted in the IJV for fear of leakage of 
proprietary knowledge.  A newly created wholly-owned subsidiary for R&D had 
therefore been spun off from the IJV one year before the interview.  The GM mentioned 
that engineers and managers were transferred to the newly set-up WOS, where product 
design was initially conducted.  As for technology leakage through staff turnover, the 
GM had the following to say: 
We cannot control staff turnover or knowledge leaking through engineers 
that leave the company.  However, we pay them a high salary, we give 
them job autonomy, and continuous training programs in Japan…So we 
don’t think they will go back to working at an SOE…They cannot take any 
technical drawings (設計図面) outside the premises, but whatever they 
memorize and take out, we cannot help…(General Manager B, 2007) 
 
The above quote highlights that engineer retention plays an important role.  As 
for knowledge transfer, although this case shows that R&D is most likely achieved in 
wholly-owned subsidiaries (WOS), it also highlights that newly-formed R&D-focused 
WOS had been formed from an IJV that had laid the necessary infrastructure in both 
tangible and intangible assets for R&D activities to occur in the future.  With regard to 
knowledge transfer, this type of IJV with its ownership structure has been useful. 
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7.5.8.6  Knowledge uncertainty towards Chinese partner 
With regard to knowledge uncertainty about the misappropriation of the Japanese 
partner’s technology, the manager mentioned two concerns.  The first concern was 
leakage of technology through structural market failure; in other words, government 
action (Dunning, 1999).  Structural market failure outweighed concerns about leakage 
through company-internal channels.  For both, however, fears about technology leakage 
seem to be greatest in the first two years of operation.  According to the manager: 
The largest potential for leakage of our intellectual property (proprietary 
knowledge) was during the establishment phase.  We had to obtain a 
business license, and in the process of applying for it we were required to 
submit drawings, which were then reviewed by government departments.  
We do not know who gets to see the drawings… (General Manager B, 
2007) 
 
Such structural failure was perceived as the first instance where commercially 
sensitive information could be leaked.  In order to obtain a business license, the 
company had no choice but to abide.  As for the leakage of technological knowledge 
within the subsidiary, the GM was more confident of the Japanese side’s ability to control 
it, citing ownership structure as a useful tool: 
From what we heard from other managers, we knew that the Chinese 
partner would try to study our products and techniques within the first 
two years of operation… We wanted the partner to learn but didn’t want 
them to use this knowledge against us.  So we tried from the start to 
make sure their goals were the same as ours so they would have no 
incentive to act against us.  (General Manager B, 2007) 
 
The GM further elaborated on the determination of the Chinese partner’s equity 
share and its role in reducing uncertainty about the local partner’s behavior: 
If the Chinese side had a lower than 30% share, we felt they would not be 
of use to our JV.  In the short term, we had their cooperation because 
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they had contributed part of the land, capital, management staff, and 
engineers, and together with their ownership share, they would have a 
strong incentive to ensure our company would succeed… In the long term, 
we thought they would be interested in seeing their profits increase and 
participate in management, so we decided to give them a proper 
ownership share. (General Manager B, 2007) 
 
The quote shows that the Japanese partner had given consideration to the 
motivation of the Chinese partner when determining the ownership share.  As for the 
technology aspect, the manager further mentioned that the local partner would “benefit 
from the continuous upgrading of production technologies and skills unless they [local 
partner] since they knew that we were in the process of localizing most of our production 
and R&D…why should they go elsewhere?”  The Japanese GM thus believed there was 
interest alignment between both partners, and that uncertainty and that ownership and 
systematic technology transfer would ensure continued non-adverse behavior by the local 
IJV partner. 
 
7.5.9  Interview results: Chinese partner 
7.5.9.1  Ownership 
• High management participation 
• High ownership wanted 
• Important to obtain capital first and technologies later 
Similar to other SOEs formed in the mid-1990s, the Chinese IJV partner also pursued 
a strategy of high ownership.  Initially, a higher ownership strategy was pursued for 
higher immediate returns.  Later, the focus shifted to obtaining technologies and 
managerial knowledge.  As a large leading SOE in the electronics industry in China, the 
 288 
local IJV partner had already formed IJVs with other foreign MNCs in the same industry, 
such as Philips and Siemens.  Its expectations of the IJV with the Japanese company 
were moderated by its other IJVs with western companies.  This was the SOE’s first IJV 
with a Japanese company.  The Vice-GM described the goal of the IJV with the Japanese 
company cautiously as one where “we would get to know what it is like to work with 
Japanese managers… we already had other sources where we could acquire technological 
knowledge and expertise… we hoped to learn Japanese management style first and 
technologies later…” (Vice-General Manager B, 2007).  As for the local partner’s high 
ownership share, the Vice-GM mentioned that “We thought we could at least benefit from 
higher profits in case there was no other benefit to this joint venture” (Vice-General 
Manager B, 2007). 
The last quote is somewhat contradictory to the long-term orientation under which 
the IJV was set up.  Further comments revealed that the importance to acquire new 
technologies was high and that the Chinese partner was selected as an IJV partner 
because of its high technological level.  As such, the local partner felt its future 
contributions justified its high ownership share.  According to Vice-General Manager B 
(2007), “we wanted our share to reflect our importance to the Japanese partner, and they 
gave in easily; we secured a share of 35% without much effort.  The most we had 
initially hoped for was 30%... “ 
The Vice-GM’s quote shows that the Chinese partner had indeed considered the 
ownership share as an important tool in the exchange of knowledge and the SOE’s (its) 
value to the Japanese company. 
In this sense, the Chinese partner was also aware that the Japanese partner could 
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secure its contributions reliably only by means of ownership share first and technology 
second. 
With regard to ownership, the Vice-GM’s goals differed with regard to the 
specific amount and possible ownership adjustment.   He showed more determination to 
defend its company’s ownership share at a 35% level, below which he was not willing to 
adjust it.  The Japanese partner, however, showed more willingness in adjusting 
ownership in either direction in order to account for the contributions and changing 
nature (sophistication) of complementary assets received from the Chinese partner.  
Therefore, any ownership adjustment in favor of the Japanese partner’s share could 
become difficult. 
 
7.5.9.2  Tangible assets 
As a capital-challenged SOE, the Chinese partner agreed to form another IJV in 
order to secure an additional stream of finances through the profits expected from the IJV.  
This priority remained high throughout the life of the IJV.   Subsequent investment 
increases were financed through its share of profits that the Chinese partner re-invested, 
which enabled the Chinese partner to maintain its equity share and shifted its focus to a 
more long-term one. 
Other tangible assets such as the Japanese partner’s products and production 
technology were high, and their importance grew with time.  Technology-induced 
productivity, or the implementation rate of new knowledge and technologies, was high, 
which suggests that adequate technologies and skills were being introduced and absorbed.  
A negative value in technology-induced productivity (Thornqvist index) would suggest a 
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declining implementation rate or absorption of technologies and knowledge transferred.  
The importance of the Japanese partner to the Chinese partner therefore remained high in 
terms of capital, capital-intensive technology, and its accompanying tacit knowledge. 
At the time of IJV setup, the Vice-GM mentioned that his SOE did not have the 
confidence in the Japanese partner’s providing long-term benefits in terms of new 
technology.  Rather than blaming the Japanese partner, however, the Vice-GM 
acknowledged a lack of suitable technologies and skills within his SOE and admitted that 
absorption and learning capacities might not be enough to close a “large technology gap” 
(Vice-General Manager B, 2007).  The Chinese partner had less confidence in its 
capabilities than the Japanese company had judged it to have. 
Similar to other cases, the local partner first provided simple tangible assets such 
as land, contractors to build the factory, and labor and later shifted to component 
production.  The Vice-GM attributed the role as component supplier to the Japanese 
partner’s willingness to have let the Chinese partner a high ownership share that reflected 
the importance of contributions.  By becoming a component supplier, the SOE became 
indispensable to the Japanese partner due to the asset specificity of specific components 
and the tacit knowledge they involve. 
As reported by the Vice-GM, the SOE would not have been motivated to 
contribute to the IJV beyond simple tangible assets if ownership had been below 33% 
when it was formed.  Therefore, the issue of ownership has been important in the 
context of this case.  The Vice-GM’s following quote emphasizes the importance of the 
ownership share again: 
We contributed a lot of things to the new JV.  First, we found and 
negotiated the land, we took them to see many places and we put in our 
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best effort to find the best location and land deal.  Second, we helped 
them with all formalities, and obtained operating permits from the 
government, which saved a lot of time. Third, we organized the 
construction of the factory, so we had to find a suitable construction 
company and negotiate the contract conditions with them.  Fourth, we 
had to lend our management personnel in the beginning in order to 
recruit workers and to teach the Japanese about how to adapt to Chinese 
HR practices…  They [the Japanese managers] didn’t understand how 
to treat Chinese workers, how to reward and punish them, and they [the 
Japanese managers] lacked credibility among local staff…  Without a 
proper ownership share, we wouldn’t have helped them to the extent we 
did, and we may not have been able to get favorable set-up conditions in 
a short time. (Vice-General Manager B, 2007) 
 
The Japanese partner’s policy of giving an adequate ownership share to the 
Chinese partner was essential in receiving the Chinese partner’s support, as the Chinese 
partner’s quote has shown.  The Japanese partner had thus correctly expected the 
ownership share to play an important role in obtaining complementary assets efficiently.   
In later stages, the Chinese partner’s improved learning and improved capabilities 
resulted in an increasing importance to the Japanese partner for more advanced tasks such 
as localization of component production.  According to the Vice-GM, 
We expected the IJV to reflect our contribution.  In the end, we adapted 
our learning, and we became faster at understanding new technologies.  
Our engineers could add greater value and we were able to become a 
supplier to the IJV.  This had been the plan when the IJV was set up.  
We would not have been happy with a lower ownership share. 
(Vice-General Manager B, 2007) 
 
As such, the Japanese partner was able to obtain higher value contributions from 





7.5.9.3  Intangible assets 
The Japanese partner’s goal was to involve the local partner in the IJV actively, 
both through high ownership and participation in management.  According to the table, 
the significance of intangible assets, such as managerial experience, problem-solving 
skills, and access to training has shifted from either high in the beginning to medium in 
later stages of the IJV or remained at a medium level.  In comparison, case A benefited 
from its own high initial level of technological capabilities by the local partner, where 
transfer of intangible assets seldom took place, and the local IJV partner eventually 
sought new business partners, which resulted in partner-induced IJV instability.  By 
contrast, in non-arm’s length transactions, I have shown an initially high need for 
intangible assets.  The benefit of non-arm’s length transactions is that they are more 
suitable for the transfer of intangible assets.  A decline in learning incentives over time, 
such as through the non-development or transfer of new knowledge or technology, could 
explain why the Vice-GM indicated that the need for intangible assets in the later stages 
of the IJV became lower.  A lower need for intangible assets could in itself become a 
problem since it could signal the end of the productive lifespan of the IJV.  It coincides 
with Makino and Delios’ (1998) findings with regard to the productive lifespan of IJVs 
which tends to decrease after ten years.  This IJV tends to fit the theory in that the local 
partner’s need for the Japanese partner’s intangible assets declined after 13 years of IJV 
operation.  According to the Vice-GM: 
Our engineers had reached a level skill and they wanted to be involved in 
R&D activities.  We experienced a short period of higher turnover 
among our engineers before plans for an R&D subsidiary became 
finalized.  Our productivity was bound to decline without the R&D 
subsidiary. (Vice-General Manager B, 2007) 
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However, the Vice-GM also pointed out that productivity growth was declining 
was pre-empted by the opening of a new R&D-focused wholly-owned subsidiary, which 
could only be run with engineers and management personnel who were previously trained 
in the IJV.  The creation of a new wholly-owned R&D subsidiary from the IJV, however, 
should not be interpreted as a sign that the IJV became unstable.  Instead, the IJV had 
reached a stage of technological maturity beyond which it was unlikely to advance in its 
existing ownership form.  However, this case has also shown that the transfer of R&D 
would not have occurred without the setup of the IJV itself first.  Therefore, IJVs remain 
relevant as an entry mode choice for the gradual localization of activities with high asset 
specificity. 
 
7.5.9.4  Government influence 
As with many other SOEs that became IJV partners, government influence during 
the setup process was relatively strong, but declined over time.  At the time the IJV was 
formed, the Vice-GM said that the SOE was ordered by the local enterprise promotion 
agency to make sure it would receive a share of 30% or more in an investment with the 
Japanese (Vice-General Manager B, 2007).  Ideally, the share should be within a range 
that the Chinese partner could finance immediately or obtain through a government loan 
(Vice-General Manager B, 2007).  However, the Vice-GM also mentioned that he 
wanted his SOE to remain independent from the government as much as possible; 
otherwise, it would not gain the trust of the Japanese partner.  He further said that, “We 
are satisfied with our current ownership share and that we have been able to maintain it 
without any loans from the government…” (Vice-General Manager B, 2007) 
 294 
This quote shows that government intervention could have remained strong after 
the formation of the IJV if the SOE had not been able to raise its share of capital.  The 
ownership share of 35%, however, is higher than what the government had initially asked 
for (30%).  Consequently, government influence did not extend significantly beyond the 
stage of IJV formation.   
Another factor the government placed importance on during the initial stages of 
negotiation was a commitment by the Japanese company to set a goal for future transfers 
of R&D to China.  Conditions remained broad, however, and left the Japanese partner a 
large amount of discretion to decide how and when to transfer R&D.  According to the 
Vice-GM, 
As an SOE, the government’s first priority was to ensure our survival in 
financial terms first and later in competitiveness terms.  The Japanese 
IJV partner was a tool to achieve both.  When it became clear that the 
IJV did all right in both, interference from government officials stopped.  
When we decided to open an R&D subsidiary, there was strong support 
from the government at that point. (Vice-General Manager B, 2007) 
 
7.5.9.5  Knowledge uncertainty towards Japanese partner 
The case is an example in which high technology-driven productivity within the 
IJV has been the result of high partner involvement.  Among the cases presented in this 
chapter, this IJV has remained stable without either partner inducing instability, despite 
having reached the limits of technology transfer that were achievable under an IJV setup.  
The next activity with higher asset specificity was R&D, for which a separate 
wholly-owned subsidiary was established mainly to protect proprietary knowledge.  The 
Chinese partner had been informed of possible plans for R&D under different ownership 
conditions at the time the IJV was being negotiated.  According to the Vice-GM, 
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We knew from the start that we would not be able to have R&D here 
under as an IJV.  But we didn’t mind, ultimately, we would profit from 
the close cooperation with the (wholly-owned) R&D subsidiary in terms 
of new orders and personnel transfer.  That we didn’t get a share in the 
R&D subsidiary didn’t matter so much… We still receive profits from the 
R&D subsidiary because as its parent [IJV], we still handle sales for the 
new company [R&D WOS]… (Vice-General Manager B, 2007) 
 
As for benefiting from the learning of new technological knowledge that was 
created within the R&D WOS, the Vice-GM answered: 
We could still take advantage of the know-how from our close 
relationship… We often need their [the R&D subsidiary’s] engineers to 
come over and help us with setting up new production equipment, or 
whenever there is a problem.  As the local partner, we still retain 
financial and technological incentives for a successful cooperation. 
(Vice-General Manager B, 2007) 
 
The Vice-GM’s quote thus highlights an important issue with regard to the 
incentive structure.  The spin-off of the R&D WOS does not seem to have affected the 
local partner’s incentive structure adversely.  The local partner retains a high share in a 
continuously profitable IJV that supports some functions of the newly formed R&D WOS 
(e.g. sales, marketing).    
With regard to technology, there are still spillover effects that benefit the Chinese 
partner as the quote has shown.  From the Chinese side’s point of view, inducing IJV 
instability thus seems unlikely. 
In this relationship, the Japanese partner retains full control over IJV termination.   
Reduced knowledge uncertainty towards the Japanese partner is likely to have reduced 
the potential for IJV instability and positively affected technology/knowledge-based 
productivity growth. 
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7.6 Case C 
7.6.1 Case characteristics 
 
• Year of subsidiary formation:   1996 
• Ownership structure:    63% (Japanese); 37% (Chinese) 
• Productivity growth:    Low 
• Feasibility of changing ownership structure: Low 
• Instability:     Low 
• Type of IJV relationship:   Non-conventional arm’s length 
 
Table 7.5: Interview results - Japanese perspective (Case C) 
JAPANESE PERSPECTIVE 
 At time of IJV 
formation 
At time of interview Did Chinese partner 
meet expectations?  
Comments 
Experience in foreign 
market entries 
High High N/A  Parent company has 
several subsidiaries 
in US, EU, SE Asia, 
China 
Experience in China High High N/A  
TANGIBLE ASSETS  IMPORTANCE IMPORTANCE   
Items: 
- Land 
- Factory  




- Partner’s technology 

































INTANGIBLE ASSETS     
Guanxi 
- Tax negotiations 
- HR 
- Localization 





















Medium Medium N/A  Medium govt. 
interference in JV 
set-up, but less later 
Efforts by Chinese partner 
to secure large ownership 
share (as perceived by 
Japanese partner) 
Strong Weak N/A Ownership share 
Japanese partner’s 





Knowledge spillovers from 
Chinese partner  
Low Medium N/A  
Technology transfer 
(tangible assets, e.g. 
machinery, products, 
manuals) 
High High N/A  
Knowledge transfer 
(transfer of intangible 
assets, e.g. tacit knowledge) 







towards Chinese partner 
Low Low N/A  
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Table 7.6: Interview results - Chinese perspective (Case C) 
CHINESE PERSPECTIVE 
 At time of IJV 
formation 

























- New products 






    
Managerial experience 
 
Other tacit knowledge 
(e.g. Problem-solving 















ng skills not 
transferred 
OTHER ITEMS     
Government influence 
(as reported by Chinese 
partner) 




Efforts to secure large 
ownership share 
High N/A N/A  Chinese 
partner will 
oppose 
change of IJV 
contract 
Technology transfer 
(tangible assets, e.g. 
machinery, products, 
manuals) 







towards Japanese partner 














7.6.2 Background of IJV 
This subsidiary is an IJV between a Japanese electronics maker, a Chinese 
automotive-affiliated SOE, and a trading company.  The setup of this IJV was 
commissioned by the head office of the Japanese parent company for China in Dalian in 
1995 because locally-sourced parts were needed for the supply of the parent company’s 
other 30 subsidiaries in China.  Due to the size of this company, the setup of the IJV was 
a priority for both the Japanese company and the Chinese government.  Due to the large 
network of subsidiaries, the head office in Dalian tasked its other subsidiaries to research 
and propose a location and partner for the subsidiary to be set up.  Eventually, Tianjin 
was proposed as a location for its close proximity to Beijing (central government), its 
proximity to the local IJV partner’s main production location, as well as its moderate 
distance from Dalian, (where the regional head office for the Japanese company was 
located). The IJV was eventually set up in 1996.  The IJV’s main products are GPS 
systems used in automotive, shipping, and aviation navigation systems. 
The Japanese company is a maker of telecommunication and navigation parts, 
while the Chinese partner company – part of an SOE – is a large automotive 
conglomerate, whose SOE in this case study was involved in the assembly of cars.  
Therefore, product complementariness was reasonably high at the beginning, even though 
product similarity was not.  Therefore, protection of technology was not the main 
concern for the Japanese company.  The diffused ownership structure was an indication.  
However, the IJV would be involved in the production of key components in which the 
Japanese partner had a core competence.  These could be used in domestically-built 
Chinese cars and technologies used in other industries.  The IJV became a priority for 
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the Chinese government, which wanted to retain a high amount of control in the IJV.  At 
37%, Chinese ownership is highest among all case studies.  The Japanese parent 
company owned 60%, while an affiliated Japanese trading company retained the 
remaining 3%. 
The Japanese parent company has 32 manufacturing subsidiaries in other 
countries including the US, EU, and territories in Asia such as Taiwan, Malaysia, and 
Thailand.  This IJV is the Japanese parent company’s first subsidiary in mainland China, 
and therefore had a certain amount of accumulated tacit knowledge with regard to foreign 
market entries.  However, the GM has had four years’ prior experience as managing 
director of the parent company’s subsidiary in Thailand. 
 
7.6.3 Significance of case 
The Japanese trading company was familiar with both the Japanese parent 
company and the Chinese company through previous business relationships and therefore 
acted as an intermediary in introducing the Chinese company to the Japanese parent 
company.  The Japanese parent company could also draw on the experience of the 
trading company, which limited the dependence on the Chinese partner.  Despite the 
presence of the trading company, the Chinese partner retained a high ownership share. 
This case illustrates a situation in which a high ownership share went to the 
Chinese IJV partner during IJV setup in order to secure the local partner’s full 
cooperation initially by reducing unpredictability of the partner’s behavior.  The 
Japanese partner justified giving the local partner a high ownership share in order to 
avoid adverse behavior and secure the local partner’s full contributions that were required 
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when the IJV was set up.  Low initial product complementariness between both IJV 
partners also alleviated the Japanese partner’s fears about technology protection at the 
IJV setup stage.  The IJV partners were from different industries with no significant 
technology similarities that would warrant special caution in technology protection.  The 
ownership share was contractually fixed.  With changing customer needs and new 
product development over time, however, product complementariness between both 
partners increased and led the Japanese partner to have concerns about technology 
leakage.  However, ownership adjustment was no longer possible with the local 
partner’s high ownership share which gave weight to its strong objections to having its 
ownership reduced. 
Due to the surfacing of technology protection motives, technology-induced 
productivity did not grow after the year 2001 and remained below its optimum thereafter.   
The important point to keep in mind for this case is the comparatively high initial 
ownership share for the Chinese partner and stagnating technology-based productivity 
growth for the IJV without the possibility for ownership adjustment.  In comparison, IJV 
contracts in other cases allowed for ownership adjustments, even though not every 
partner opted to proceed with it.  The Japanese partner later attempted – unsuccessfully - 
to adjust the ownership structure when it introduced new product lines in which product 
similarity between the local partner’s SOE and the IJV increased, following which 
control of technology became an issue. 
Since the IJV was in the key automotive and electronics industries, the Chinese 
government regarded the IJV a high priority for which it had made a large investment 
from cash obtained from trust funds through the SOE.  Despite the high priority the 
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government gave to the IJV, technology-based productivity growth, however, remained 
moderate alongside an increase in controlled instability when the Japanese partner 
signaled intent to dissolve the IJV. 
The Japanese partner depended on the local partner to contribute a number of 
simple tangible assets which included capital, land, and business licenses as well as 
non-technological but nonetheless sophisticated intangible assets.  For example, the 
local partner was involved in the management of the IJV and was responsible for HR 
functions which included recruitment, contract drafting, and supervision of local staff.  
Other intangible assets were already available to the Japanese IJV partner through the 
main office in Dalian and the large subsidiary network and experience it already had in 
China.  At the time of IJV setup, the Japanese partner did not depend on the local 
partner for access to the local market or other local suppliers.  As such, the high equity 
share that the Chinese partner held was no longer justified in the opinion of the Japanese 
IJV partner. 
Since the local IJV partner company was an SOE, the trading company had to 
approach the local government to apply for the setup of the new IJV.  The trading 
company’s main contribution was in choosing among and introducing a suitable local IJV 
partner to the Japanese parent company.  The purpose of the local IJV partner was to act 
as a supplier of simple tangible assets, such as capital, land, and labor, in addition to 
guanxi and market knowledge as intangible assets.  At the time, the Japanese partner 
was not interested in using the local partner as a supplier, citing unbridgeable technology 
and quality gap (General Manager C, 2007).  Localization had not yet occurred at the 
time the interview took place. 
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The new IJV was set up before the main company’s plant became operational 
because the IJV was required to meet kanban requirements from the day the main 
company started its production. 
 
7.6.4 Local IJV partner 
In order to set up a subsidiary within 10 months, the Japanese company needed a 
local partner with capital, an ability to provide land, factory space, and qualified labor 
within a short time.  Moreover, the local government granted tax exemptions, building 
infrastructure, and free training of labor at state-owned technical colleges due to the 
importance of this IJV.  The Chinese partner’s SOE had several other IJVs with foreign 
automotive companies.  However, this IJV was the local partner’s first IJV with a 
Japanese company and the first IJV in a different industry; i.e. the Chinese company was 
an automotive company while the Japanese partner was an electronics company.  
Therefore, there were no products that the Japanese parent company could use directly 
from the local partner, (or vice versa), and most experience was drawn from the Japanese 
parent company’s network of subsidiaries in China.  As such, the degree of product 
complementariness with regard to both tangible and intangible assets was low, and any 
possibility of technology or knowledge leakage to the local partner was unlikely.  From 
this perspective, the diffused ownership was justified.  However, interest alignment still 
did not occur; since the Japanese company had no long-term plan to involve the local 
partner’s tangible and intangible assets in the long-term development of the IJV.  The 
utility of the local IJV partner came from its industry background which was the same as 
the main customer company’s to which this IJV was going to be a supplier.  Therefore, 
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the local partner understood the issues that arose from being a supplier to an automotive 
company.  This may have been a compensating factor for technology-induced 
productivity over the life of the JV.  From the Japanese partner’s perspective, however, 
the benefit received from the local partner in the long term did not justify the ownership 
structure. 
 
7.6.5 Technology transfer and technology protection 
The Chinese government was seeking to cultivate engineers and improve 
managerial skills.  However, the local partner did not involve its staff in the 
management of the IJV, instead preferred to learn technological skills and basic Japanese 
communication skills that would facilitate communication with the Japanese management.  
At the time of the interview, Japanese managers were still communicating with local staff 
and engineers through interpreters.  The GM had been with the subsidiary since 2001, 
and was still making use of a Chinese interpreter in addressing local staff.  Local 
engineers were therefore eager to learn Japanese.  Training for engineers took place in 
Japan.  Based on the responsibilities of the job, engineers were sent to Japan for periods 
ranging from three months to one year.  For instance, five of the seven Chinese section 
chiefs (課長) were sent to Japan for half a year, reported that the training was useful, 
even if the focus was non-technological.  Acquiring Japanese language skills and an 
understanding of Japanese culture became priorities.  Eventually, it helped them 
improve product quality and accelerated new product development by “learning Japanese 
methods” (General Manager C, 2007).  The example shows that non-specific language 
and some management training helped the Japanese partner to extract higher value-added 
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from its engineers while not revealing technologies. 
The IJV had increased production and product development for other types of cars 
as a result of the familiarization by section chiefs and engineers with the Japanese parent 
company, even though no specific engineering skills had reportedly been acquired and 
highlighted as a point of dissatisfaction.  Therefore, technology protection was 
successful, while training in Japan elicited the goodwill of Chinese staff whose 
knowledge could be more readily implemented.  As such, medium technology-based 
productivity growth could be a result of exploiting more fully the potential of local 
engineers, rather than a result of active technology transfer and implementation from 
Japan.  It also means that the quality of locally-hired engineers is high and that by 
learning the language, the knowledge/technological plateau of the subsidiary could be 
raised initially by enabling local staff to ‘understand’ the Japanese. 
 
7.6.6 Objectives for ownership 
The contractually fixed structure of the ownership entailed mixed results.  It was 
counter-productive with regard to technology protection when product lines changed and 
product complementariness increased. However, the policy was helpful in that the 
Chinese partner was required to contribute a proportional amount of new investments and 
therefore motivated to contribute its knowledge and help.  As a priority IJV for the 
Chinese government, the Chinese partner was not capital-constrained to the same extent 
that other SOEs were and therefore made all required investments without delay.  The 
Chinese partner could contribute 40% of capital which it had accumulated as a large 
supplier to a domestic car manufacturer.   The State Asset Commission reserved the 
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right to influence the policy of the IJV through the Chinese partner by way of its board 
members.  The high share for the Chinese partner, however, does not reflect the 
importance of its contributions to the IJV in terms of complementary products, locally 
sourced parts, labor, or the potential for providing access to the Chinese market.  The 
Japanese partner eventually regretted this ownership structure and sought to dissolve the 
IJV.  Instability was therefore high; however, unlike case A, it was not induced by the 
Chinese partner.  The Japanese partner has thus still managed to retain control. 
 
7.6.7  Interview results: Japanese partner 
7.6.7.1  Tangible assets 
The Japanese parent company had no firm initial plans to use the local partner’s 
products in its parts production.  Localization, however, became an issue soon after the 
IJV was set up.  Prior to IJV setup, the Japanese parent company was seeking to 
diversify its sales network within China.  The company had been too dependent on a 
single main customer that was located nearby.  The reason the Japanese partner felt it 
could do so was that problems with kanban (just-in-time) production had been overcome, 
and the IJV was able to open new production lines and cater to more customers.  New 
customers, however, were mostly non-Japanese, including foreign MNCs in China and, 
increasingly, Chinese companies.  A more internally-oriented market strategy 
necessitated a higher percentage of local components due to higher cost pressures from 
non-Japanese MNCs.  The percentage of local components used in production was 
higher among Western competitors.  The cost of locally sourced components is about 
30% the cost of importing them from Japan (General Manager C, 2007). 
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Although any reliance on the local partner’s products was low at the time of IJV 
setup, the Chinese partner eventually became more important as its capabilities increased.  
However, increased capabilities were not necessarily a result of technological knowledge 
imparted by the Japanese side.  Instead, increased capabilities by the Chinese partner 
were a combination of the Chinese partner’s own high initial technological level within 
its own industry, an ownership structure that favored the Chinese partner, and the ability 
of Chinese engineers to put their skills to better use when they returned from their 
training in Japan as speakers of Japanese. 
The local partner’s capabilities increase the Japanese partner’s expectations that 
orders from other customer could lead to higher product complementariness with the 
local partner in the future, and that products could be modified faster with the help of the 
Chinese partner now that its capabilities had increased.  However, when the product 
range was to be expanded in support of new customers, the local partner could not 
contribute new components.  On the other hand, the local partner’s increased 
technological capabilities enabled it to source locally made components from 
manufacturers in China more efficiently.  This signifies an addition in the local partner’s 
contribution of intangible assets, as guanxi-building now extended beyond government 
negotiations to new potential business partners.  In this sense, the local partner’s added 
capabilities compensated for its high ownership share and initially higher 
technology-based productivity, but resulted in little technology transfer, unlike the 
Japanese partner had expected. 
The GM had been confident that the Chinese IJV partner “could adjust to 
changing product life cycles quickly and that this was exactly their advantage”. (General 
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Manager C, 2007)  As far as local technological knowledge was concerned, the GM 
opined that “It could be improved with proper training and experience…” (General 
Manager C, 2007)  He added that due to their “willingness to work for long hours and a 
combination of their increased knowledge and creativity they would achieve speedy 
product development through which we would be able to meet short 
production-to-market times…” (General Manager C, 2007), particularly since the focus 
started to shift towards Chinese customers.  According to him, “local workers lacked the 
experience in dealing with modern production equipment and the quality orientation that 
we would expect… This has improved with time, though.” (General Manager C, 2007) 
 
7.6.7.2  Intangible assets 
From the GM’s words, one can therefore conclude that the importance of the 
partner’s tangible assets has increased over a relatively short period of five years.  As 
the discussion above has shown, the increase in the importance of tangible assets has 
partly been the result of the transfer/imparting of the Japanese partner’s tacit knowledge 
on the Chinese partner through the IJV mode of entry (e.g. training in Japan).  The 
above discussion, however, has shown that the Japanese partner has also acquired tacit 
knowledge about the working culture in China including customers.  In reference to 
their local partner, the GM aptly acknowledged that, “We need to be able to respond to 
local market needs more quickly; customer-wise we can do it now, production-wise, we 
could do it now, but quality-wise won’t be able to for some time” (General Manager C, 
2007).  The quote highlights the limited impact of tacit knowledge spillovers that have 
not resulted in the Chinese staff’s increased orientation towards quality even though the 
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GM believes that their ability to deal with new technology and production processes was 
firmly a result of their introduction by the Japanese partner.   
The Japanese partner’s accumulation of intangible assets related to working in a 
Chinese environment was beneficial and led the Japanese partner to believe that it could 
extend the utility of the Chinese partner’s contribution in tangible and intangible assets.  
However, intangible assets transferred by the Japanese partner have had limited impact 
on the Chinese partner so that there was no evident combined practical utility beyond a 
theoretical intent to localize production and product development, which, however, could 
not materialize. 
The significance of the Chinese IJV partner to the Japanese IJV partner has 
outgrown the significance of the Japanese partner to the Chinese partner.  The Chinese 
partner was essentially only benefiting from tangible assets (share of profits, hardware) 
while it was increasingly not benefiting from the transfer of the Japanese partner’s tacit 
knowledge (e.g. quality control, technological knowledge). 
As for the Chinese partner’s contribution of intangible assets, their importance has 
remained high and likely increased by shifting to new areas such as an intended 
localization of production.  Sales to the Chinese market have also resulted in product 
modifications and more equipment imports.  More negotiations with the government for 
import clearance, tax, and depreciation terms became necessary as did a higher need for 
labor in order to meet rising production demands.  Sourcing local labor, creating 
employment advertisements, and drafting employment contracts all remained 
responsibilities of the Chinese partner.  The following quote by the GM highlights the 
dependency of the Japanese partner on the local IJV partner. 
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We needed our [local] partner to liaise with government and local entities.  
This is China and everything runs on relationship basis.  Our partner 
has these relationships.   We just need to tell them our conditions, and 
they will take care of them… We also need them to recruit workers, they 
understand the local employment market better, and they have more trust 
among local workers… (General Manager C, 2007) 
 
The statement is significant in the sense that it attests to perception/image 
problems among local employees towards Japanese companies and emphasizes the local 
IJV partner’s importance towards Japanese companies. 
 
7.6.7.3  Ownership 
The previous discussions have explained the incentives in terms of the exchange 
of tangible and intangible assets to each partner.  From the point of view of the Japanese 
partner, the importance of tangible and intangible assets has shifted over time in terms of 
sophistication.  As for tangible assets, the Japanese partner initially required simple 
contributions from the Chinese partner, such as land, factory space, and basic utilities.  
Over time, however, some absorption of new skills and technologies has resulted in a 
limited increase in the capabilities of the Chinese partner. 
The high ownership share of the local partner and thus its high share of profits, 
and high stream of new production equipment and product development would likely act 
as a disincentive for the local partner to act against the interests of the subsidiary.  The 
GM was aware that unpredictability and the partner’s bounded rationality were an 
important issue when the JV was formed.  Since each partner’s share was fixed for the 
duration of the IJV contract, as a result of which incentives did not change. 
The GM maintained that the purpose of fixing the ownership share as part of the 
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IJV contract was to “reduce unpredictability and assure the Chinese partner that we 
needed them for the long term.” (General Manager C, 2007)  He also stated that it was 
done to reduce the possibility the Chinese partner to “suddenly withdraw the capital if 
they needed it for their own company [SOE].  The proportion of each partner in this JV 
is fixed, so if one partner invests more, the other has to match the investment 
proportionally.  We are constrained by this condition…” (General Manager C, 2007) 
Therefore, this type of ownership contract gave an additional incentive for the 
local partner not to withdraw from the IJV.  However, it ultimately adversely affected 
the Japanese partner’s incentive to remain with the IJV. 
 
7.6.7.4  Government influence 
Government negotiations provided by the Chinese partner have remained high in 
importance for the Japanese partner both at the time of IJV set up and present.  In 
reference to the table, it can be seen that the Japanese partner came to China with the 
expectation that government influence would be high.  In fact, government influence 
was high in the beginning, particularly in the spheres of partner selection, land cost, and 
tax related matters.   Due to the industry and size of the investment, the national-level 
development zone decided to grant a nine-year tax break to the IJV.  Regarding the local 
partner’s guanxi and ability to negotiate with local authorities, the GM mentioned: 
We require favorable conditions; until now, these have been tax-related to 
our production equipment.  The procedures for company set up are very 
different here, especially with regard to taxation.  There are many 
bureaucrats with individual powers and they decide everything 
case-by-case.  We need our partner to speed up their [bureaucrats] 
decision-making and make sure they [bureaucrats] give us good and fast 
service in the future.  This can mean the difference between several 
years and one week for an important decision to be made.  For this, we 
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still need the local partner… (General Manager C, 2007) 
 
The ability to navigate bureaucracy therefore remains an important asset that the 
local partner contributes to the IJV in that it can significantly affect time and costs.  
However, even despite this requirement, the Japanese partner still openly talked about 
terminating the IJV. 
 
7.6.7.5 Moderating effects of experience in company’s prior foreign market entries  
As for the company’s prior experience in foreign market entries, and whether they 
would have a moderating effect on the need for a local partner, the GM had the following 
to say: “We used the experience from our other subsidiaries as a reference…, but we 
knew that guanxi would be necessary in China, and that is why we considered entering 
only as an IJV with sufficient local partner involvement...” (GM, 2007) Therefore, 
considering that the parent company had prior experience in China, it can be inferred that 
prior experience overseas did not result in a higher share of ownership for this subsidiary.  
The Japanese parent company has 32 subsidiaries in culturally and geographically close 
territories such as Taiwan and Southeast Asia.  The importance of guanxi as an 
intangible asset in China was highly regarded and building an ownership framework that 
would ensure long-term access to guanxi became important. 
With regard to ownership, the GM explained the importance of the presence of a 
trading company, main company, and other Japanese companies in the region as follows: 
“We used other Japanese companies’ experience and opinions as a reference.  They 
advised us to form the current ownership structure… We understood the importance of 
local connections [guanxi] here, and we listened to our trading company…”(General 
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Manager C, 2007) 
 
7.6.7.6  Technology transfer and knowledge spillovers 
The table and previous discussion have shown that the Japanese partner’s need for 
the local IJV partner had increased in terms of the sophistication of the partner’s 
contributions.  In the category of Tangible assets, the Japanese partner needed the local 
partner to make basic contributions such as land, factory space, and utilities.  As 
expected, the importance of these assets declined over time, while the local partner’s 
contributions in terms of local component sourcing, guanxi, labor recruitment, and capital 
contribution increased in their importance to the Japanese partner over time.  Higher 
expectations with regard to the local partner’s contributions, however, raises the question 
of where the limit is to providing the local partner with technological knowledge. 
Productivity growth results have shown slowed growth in technology-based 
productivity and therefore a medium implementation rate of new capabilities in the IJV.  
Thus, when asked whether technology leakage was a problem, the GM answered: 
Presently - we cannot do component design here.  Basically, any 
change/increase in demand by our main customer results in the Japanese 
home branch designing a new design and technical drawings… We would 
like to do them here but have to keep them in Japan…  In the future we 
want to localize both component production and component design…  
Right now, we are only getting a small percentage of components from 
other locally-based Japanese and Taiwanese companies; we do not have 
the confidence to localize a greater share of component production or 
produce them in our subsidiary with the current ownership structure... 
(General Manager C, 2007) 
 
According to the quote, existing ownership structures are a hindrance to 
transferring higher value-added production and design activities to China. 
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7.6.8 Interview results: Chinese partner 
The table suggests that the Chinese partner relied strongly on the Japanese 
partner’s tangible and intangible assets.  The need for the Japanese partner has remained 
strong.  As the discussion with the Japanese GM has suggested, the Chinese partner 
values the Japanese partner’s capital, production technologies, products, and tacit 
knowledge. 
The Chinese partner reported that the government’s influence in exercising its will 
on the IJV through the Chinese IJV partner (an SOE) was limited and tended to decline 
over time.  Moreover, the SOE remained neutral about assuming management 
participation, and preferred to leave it to the Japanese partner as long as the subsidiary 
remained profitable.  Profitability was seen as confirming technological advancement 
and competitiveness. 
In summary, the Chinese partner’s perception of the Japanese partner’s transfer of 
tacit knowledge has remained medium.  A reason for tacit knowledge transfer not being 
rated as “high” could be the reported experience by engineers of their training in Japan, 
which was limited to cultural and language instruction.  As a result, there was little 
accumulation of technological skills.  However, a steady rating of ‘medium’ rather than 
‘low’ with regard to the transfer of tacit knowledge could indicate the subsidiary’s 
increased orientation towards the local market and localization in which new mutual 
product development played an increasing role. 
As for knowledge uncertainty, an increased cooperation between both partners 
could signal a lower level of distrust.  However, the Japanese partner constantly rated 
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knowledge uncertainty towards the local partner higher than vice versa, which affected 
technology transfer negatively. 
 
7.6.8.1  Ownership 
When asked about their ownership strategy, the Vice-GM answered that they 
required a share which reflected their contribution.  The Chinese partner therefore 
sought equitable profit sharing.  The Chinese partner was confident in the Japanese 
parent company’s technological and managerial competencies.  Reflecting their lack of 
management experience, the Chinese partner entrusted most management functions to the 
Japanese side.  With regard to how the ownership was initially determined, the Vice-GM 
replied: 
We determined the ownership percentage through the board member 
meeting.  However, we were not interested in management 
participation… Because we needed to borrow the products and 
production technology from Japan, and in return, our part was to 
contribute capital, labor (manpower), and land.  We wanted our share to 
reflect our contribution… Our share is greater than we expected. 
(Vice-General Manager C, 2007) 
 
The quote suggests that the Japanese partner had overcompensated the Chinese 
partner with shareholder equity.  From the Japanese partner’s perspective, the demands 
for ownership by the Chinese partner were a tool to align the Chinese partner’s interest in 
the company and reduce knowledge uncertainty for the Japanese partner.  In this sense, 
the ownership structure could readily be accepted by both partners when they formed the 
IJV. 
For the Chinese IJV partner, the fixed ownership structure also created the 
incentive of a predictable and significant share of profits.  In this sense, the long-term 
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relationship could be maintained by both the IJV’s profitability and a positive, albeit 
decreasing, rate of technology transfer.   
The local partner’s orientation gradually began to expand to one where capability 
building through re-investment of profits was put into greater focus, which thus lowered 
the possibility of ownership change in favor of the Japanese partner.  The following 
quote by the Vice-GM suggests: 
We would oppose any movement by the Japanese partner to increase their 
ownership share… We can re-invest our profits.  Since 1996, we have 
increased investment twice already, once in 2002, and again in 2003.  
For now, we have the capital and the motivation to maintain additional 
investment… (Vice-General Manager C, 2007) 
 
The Chinese partner is thus satisfied with the current ownership structure and 
wants to keep it.  The quote also suggests re-investment of profits and a potential for 
technological innovation, which, however, has not materialized. 
 
7.6.8.2  Tangible assets 
The local IJV partner previously established IJVs with several western MNCs in 
the early and mid-1990s.  The IJV with the Japanese partner was the first IJV with a 
non-western company.  The Vice-GM’s response (below) confirmed that this SOE was 
in need of capital and protection of its workers’ jobs.  However, rather than simply 
providing jobs for local workers, he emphasized the need to obtain equipment and 
technologies through the IJV so that there could be a buildup of new capabilities.  
Therefore, the local partner’s tendency to build long-term capabilities through the 
learning of new technologies became evident.  Emphasis was thus on long-term 
orientation rather than only maintaining jobs for state-employed workers.  The Vice-GM 
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stated that, 
We had invested a large amount of cash in the IJV, so any mis-investment 
could have put us at risk of extinction.  Many people would have lost 
their jobs.  Forming the joint venture gave us the confidence (and 
knowledge) to overhaul/ exchange our dated production equipment with 
the Japanese partner’s help… Since we formed the joint venture, we [the 
Chinese partner] have come out with some new components such as 
keypad sensors that are now used in the mass production of [IJV’s] final 
products. (Vice-General Manager C, 2007) 
 
7.6.8.3  Technology 
Child’s (2000) argument states that Chinese partner firms’ behavior becomes 
increasingly unpredictable as they learn from the foreign IJV partner and where product 
complementariness is high.  The Japanese partner’s cautious transfer of knowledge (e.g. 
training methods) keeps new technologies at arm’s-length from the local partner, while 
new knowledge is still being received from the local partner, which is still an incentive 
for the Japanese partner not to terminate the IJV as long as such knowledge remains 
needed.  According to Child (2000), the partner with the lower technological knowledge 
advancement (i.e. Chinese IJV partner) will take a longer time to absorb new knowledge 
than the partner with the higher technological sophistication.  In application to this IJV, 
this would mean that the Japanese partner will take less time to acquire the Chinese IJV 
partner’s knowledge.  Therefore, by acquiring new knowledge at a faster rate than the 
local partner, the Japanese partner would at some point lose the incentive to remain in the 
IJV, whereas the Chinese partner would still be in the process of learning from the 
Japanese partner.  This condition applies unless there is a substantial change in the needs 
for the local partner’s tacit knowledge, such as a shift of focus of the IJV to the internal 
Chinese market.  However, this was neither the case with regard to the customers nor 
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with regard to internal processes.  There was a main customer and high 
knowledge-intensive processes such as product development and design were kept in 
Japan.  
The Vice-GM had taken notice of the Japanese partner’s technology transfer 
strategy when he reflected on the achievement of their company’s original purpose for 
entering the IJV.  According to him, “Although we obtained technologies and 
management skills from the Japanese, our technology gap has not closed at all...” 
(Vice-General Manager C, 2007). 
Therefore, the transfer of technological capabilities was carefully controlled by 
the Japanese partner, and this ensured that there would be a continued reliance on the 
Japanese partner’s technologies by the Chinese partner.  The Japanese partner was 
relatively less dependent on the Chinese partner’s contributions of tacit knowledge 
compared to the Japanese partner’s reliance on the Chinese partner to provide market 
access or access to local suppliers. 
With regard to the ownership structure and its role in technology protection, the 
Japanese company largely managed to exert control over its technology despite the 
diffused ownership structure. 
 
7.6.8.4  Intangible assets  
The Chinese partner’s high ownership share and difficulty to obtain new 
technological knowledge has led the Chinese partner to doubt whether the ownership 
structure is still appropriate in current times despite defending the share vis-à-vis the 
Japanese partner.  From the Vice-GM’s point of view, his side’s ownership share and the 
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fixed structure potentially provide a disincentive for the Japanese partner to improve 
training beyond basic training on how to operate machines - particularly problem solving, 
adjusting machines to custom orders, and machine repair.  The Vice-GM conceded that, 
Because the ownership structure is fixed, we realized the Japanese 
partner will not share more knowledge.  In a way, we’ve traded financial 
gain for knowledge – we keep receiving profits, but we do not get new 
knowledge.  At the moment, we are okay with the profits, though.  We 
think the current structure has so far worked well for us. (Vice-General 
Manager C, 2007) 
 
While expectations at the time of IJV set up were to “attract technologies and 
management skills from Japan and to develop our own technologies and management 
skills from those,” (Vice-General Manager C, 2007) the reality is that these expectations 
have not been met.  Accordingly, the Vice-GM expressed that, “Our problem in every 
aspect is that we do not understand the technology beyond operating its standard 
functions, and we cannot train our staff to cope with any non-standard problems 
ourselves, and the Japanese won’t…Sometimes we feel we contribute more than they 
do.” (Vice-General Manager C, 2007)  While the incentive of tangible assets in terms of 
capital, profits, and new equipment still exists, the Vice-GM believes their ownership 
share could be too high to induce higher-level knowledge transfer. 
 
7.6.8.5  Government influence 
The discussion in this case study has shown that the entry mode decision was 
mainly a result of the Japanese partner’s efforts to achieve interest alignment with the 
local partner rather than active government suasion towards such ownership share.  
Therefore, government involvement regarding ownership became redundant since the 
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Japanese partner actively chose such ownership structure.  Regarding government 
involvement, the Vice-GM confirmed the limited involvement of the government in 
setting the ownership structure: 
The city government gave us general guidelines, and introduced the 
Japanese company to us according to their (technology) industrial 
strategies/goals. Officials just told us to form a joint venture with the 
Japanese and they told us to be profitable and to make sure new 
equipment and products frequently arrive.  They left the internal 
management and ownership negotiations up to us.  The city government 
overlooks that we contribute to the development of the local/city’s 
electronics (car) industry and that we make profits... (Vice-General 
Manager C, 2007) 
 
Beyond matching the foreign company to the SOE, government involvement 
through the local IJV partner remained limited.  The local IJV partner retained enough 
latitude to negotiate the ownership share with the Japanese partner and divide 
management functions within the subsidiary. 
 
7.6.8.6  Knowledge uncertainty towards Japanese partner 
According to Hoffman and Hammonds (1994), two parties to a business 
transaction are faced with two kinds of knowledge uncertainty.  The first type of 
knowledge uncertainty can result from a fixed but unknown outcome at a future point in 
time, while the second type can result from the endpoint being an unknown distribution 
of results.  This theory is applicable to this IJV because the IJV contract fixes ownership 
proportions.  In order to maintain the proportion, the Chinese partner must follow by 
investing a proportional amount of capital when the Japanese partner acts to change 
investment. 
Thus, the fixed nature of the IJV contract eliminates the unpredictability of the 
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relative outcome but not the absolute outcome.  Since ownership proportions are fixed, 
the local partner will know the relative amount to invest; in other words, a relative 
percentage amount which is equal to its ownership share, but not the absolute amount of 
an additional investment or the timing of such investment.  The Japanese partner gets to 
decide the timing and the amount.  With regard to any possible investment increases, the 
Vice-GM answered: 
Then we have to follow...  Currently the development of our subsidiary is 
quite good.  Profits, productivity…all are there.  We are satisfied with 
our current investment structure, but investment increases may follow.  
We don’t want our partner to change either in the foreseeable future, but 
we don’t know. We are prepared to take on any additional investment… 
(Vice-General Manager C, 2007) 
 
It is mandated in the IJV contract that ownership structure cannot change with 
changes in capital (additional investment).  The Chinese partner has no choice but to 
invest if the Japanese partner chooses to invest in order to maintain the same ownership 
structure.  The quote also implies that the local partner was not dissatisfied with the 
ownership structure despite some knowledge uncertainty.  However, the ability to 
re-invest profits means the local partner was satisfied with its share of the profits and 
would likely not agree to have its share of profits diminished if the ownership structure 
were adjusted in favor of the Japanese partner.  As a further disincentive to change 
ownership, a formal change to the IJV contract would be necessary. 
At the present ownership structure and conditions, there is knowledge uncertainty 
towards the Japanese partner’s actions regarding investment, but the Chinese partner 
seems to be able and willing to manage this perceived uncertainty towards the Japanese 
partner. 
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7.7 Case D 
7.7.1 Case characteristics 
 
• Year of subsidiary formation:   1994 
• Ownership structure:    88% (Japanese); 12% (Chinese) 
• Productivity growth:    Low 
• Feasibility of changing ownership structure: High 
• Instability:     Medium 
• Type of IJV relationship:   Conventional arm’s length 
 
Table 7.7: Interview results - Japanese perspective (Case D) 
JAPANESE PERSPECTIVE 




Experience in foreign market 
entries 
High High N/A  
Experience in China High High N/A  
TANGIBLE ASSETS  IMPORTANCE IMPORTANCE   
Items: 
- Land 
- Factory  




- Partner’s technology 






























INTANGIBLE ASSETS     
Guanxi 
- Tax negotiations 
- HR 
- Localization 





















High Medium N/A  
Efforts by Chinese partner to 
secure large ownership share 
Medium Weak N/A Partner could not raise 
capital to maintain 
ownership share and 
could not object to a 
buyout later 
Knowledge spillovers from 
Chinese partner  
Medium Medium N/A Japanese managers often 
have to communicate 
through interpreters 
Technology transfer 
(tangible assets, e.g. 
machinery, products, 
manuals) 
High High N/A  
Knowledge transfer (transfer 
of intangible assets, e.g. tacit 
knowledge) 
High High N/A Japanese partner 
accepted that local JV 
partner and suppliers 





towards Chinese partner 
High Low N/A Knowledge uncertainty 
toward assets obtained 
on the open market 
higher than towards JV 
partner 
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Table 7.8: Interview results - Chinese perspective (Case D) 
CHINESE PERSPECTIVE 
 At time of IJV 
formation 

























    
Managerial experience 
 
Other tacit knowledge 
(e.g. problem-solving 




















OTHER ITEMS     
Government influence 
(as reported by 
Chinese partner) 
High Medium N/A  
Efforts to secure large 
ownership share 
Medium Weak N/A  
Technology transfer 
(tangible assets, e.g. 
machinery, products, 
manuals) 





actual tech. gap 




Low High  N/A Knowledge 
uncertainty 
toward assets 







7.7.2 Background of IJV 
This subsidiary was set up by a large Japanese electronics company with about 
30 subsidiaries in China, including joint ventures and wholly-owned subsidiaries.  
The parent company has pursued a strategy of wholly-owned subsidiaries in its newer 
subsidiaries, which it began opening in the late 1990s.   The company began 
investment in China in 1992, and 1993 through equity joint ventures, and later 
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re-focused its strategy into WOS, although in the first joint ventures, the ownership 
structures were revised and adjusted with time. The subsidiary interviewed for this 
case is one of the first Sino-Japanese Joint Ventures in China, which has gone through 
two phases of ownership adjustment in its lifetime.  Its early products included 
(motherboard, conductors, transformers, signaling equipment. 
A first step was taken in 1995, when Company D opened an electronics parts 
subsidiary in (close to Beijing) with an annual capacity of 500,000 units.  The plant, 
similar to other plants that the company would open in China in the years to come, 
imported most of its necessary parts and materials from Japan.  Company D believed 
this strategy would allow the company to maintain its traditional advantage of 
high-quality Japanese production components while still benefiting from the 
economies associated with China’s low-cost labor and land.  The subsidiary was 
successful in reducing costs, but only temporarily, since all companies in China were 
not only benefiting from low labor and land costs, but also capitalizing on less 
expensive local production components and increasingly sophisticated technical 
expertise.  Due to its high cost structure and slow product innovation, Company D 
started facing the problem of declining sales.  Recognizing this, Company D moved 
to reform its supply-chain management in China for which the local partner would 
become essential.  This included four steps: 1) movement of all manufacturing 
activities to China, 2) establishment of R&D in China, 3) procurement of most 
supplies in China, and 4) establishment of more effective distribution channels in 
China.  Part of this strategy was the re-organization of the ownership structures of 
the subsidiaries.  The case study will examine the example of one subsidiary.  
Although the partners had different priorities on which their entry into the JV 
was based, the shift to a wholly-owned strategy to achieve higher localization and 
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local competence for the Japanese partner had limited positive impact on productivity 
growth.  It is argued that the shift away did not help Company D increase its local 
competence, nor did it help achieve higher localization levels.  By becoming a 
wholly-owned subsidiary, the Japanese partner had lost its main vehicle for 
internalization of such intangible assets as connections, knowledge of the local market, 
knowledge of local suppliers, and access to local markets through the JV partner.  As 
a result, localization rates have remained low increasing from 2% in the beginning to 
about 16% currently, compared to a target of achieving at least 70% of localization 
rates.  The case study also discusses the importance of having had a local JV partner 
in the beginning, and how the use of IJV partners in China does not decline if interests 
can be aligned correctly through ownership. 
The following aspects were revealed as important during the interviews:  
For the Japanese partner, as expected, the initial need for basic items such as land, 
utilities, and labor was important (tangible assets).  The local partner was going to 
provide these.  From an intangible asset perspective, the local JV partner was 
indispensable for recruiting workers and provide legitimacy to the company before the 
workers, it was responsible for drawing up employment contracts, explaining 
employment conditions to the workers, and taking care of other HR functions 
(punishment, reward) within the local context, which the Japanese were “not 
knowledgeable about” at the time.  From an ownership perspective, the Japanese 
partner wanted the Chinese to have a large share in the subsidiary to, as Japanese GM 
believed, ensure an alignment of interests to some extent, so that the Chinese partner 
would “not act to the detriment of the company,” (General Manager D, 2007), despite 




7.7.3 Significance of case 
This case shows an example of an IJV with a non-fixed ownership structure.  
The local partner in this case study held a low ownership share at the time of IJV 
setup but with support for higher ownership share from the Japanese partner in the 
later stages of the IJV, when the local partner was able to contribute more capital.  
The intended larger share for the local partner was thus intended to align its interests 
towards those of the IJV later. 
As an IJV established in the mid-1990s, the gap in technological capabilities 
between the two partners was large.  Therefore, in the early life of the IJV, the local 
partner contributed simple tangible and intangible assets necessary in IJV setup and 
initial operation.  The opportunity to learn new management style and technological 
knowledge, however, served as a compensating factor for the initially low ownership 
share.  Over time, however, this compensating factor diminished as the local partner 
was catching up and increased its own capabilities.  Since the IJV implemented a 
flexible ownership structure, there was opportunity to increase the local partner’s 
ownership share through additional investment in the IJV.  However, the small initial 
ownership share prevented the local partner from re-investing its share of the profits 
in the IJV since it used the profits to invest in its own SOE first.  The low overall 
growth in technology/knowledge-based productivity growth could be attributed to 
inefficiencies that occurred when the Japanese partner became dissatisfied with the 
Chinese partner. The latter had reduced its contributions to the IJV as it thought that 
the value of contributions given no longer reflected its ownership share. 
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7.7.4 Local IJV partner 
The local partner company is one of the largest SOEs in China.  It is 
manufacturer of computer and telecommunications hardware and software and 
developer of software. It is one the top ten electronics firms in China and has formed 
several alliances with companies from the US, EU, and Korea.  The Chinese partner 
company has a network of 30 factories across China that are highly specialized and 
only loosely linked together.  Each of the sub-companies is city-specific, and is thus 
managed by city or provincial governments.  However, the SOE as whole (the 
group) is funded and supervised by the central government’s administrative body.  
The companies within this SOE also do not closely cooperate with one another, and 
do not invest in each other.  Even so, this particular sub-company of the SOE has a 
strong reputation in China, and it is the number three electronic equipment and 
semi-conductor maker by sales in China.  The local partner company has 14,000 
employees and specializes in electronic equipment and semi-conductors.  Its primary 
function within the newly formed joint venture was to supply parts and source local 
suppliers in the future.  Due to the large size of the newly formed joint venture, the 
deal was lucrative and the Chinese partner wanted a relatively large share in the joint 
venture in order to be able to share in the profits later.  Being an early joint venture, 
the Japanese partner in fact wanted the Chinese partner to have a large share in the JV, 
so long as the Japanese side would keep a controlling majority, due to a lack of 
experience in the Chinese market.  The Japanese side also wanted to make sure the 
Chinese partner had a substantial investment in the newly formed JV in order to 
prevent the local partner from acting selfishly.  According to the GM of the JV, the 
strategy was for the local partner to hold at least one-third stake in the subsidiary. 
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7.7.5 Technology and knowledge transfer 
Company D has prevented the technology from spilling over.  The Japanese 
partner focused on keeping training methods relevant to the transfer of explicit 
knowledge, which has been adequate in maintaining its manufacturing activities.  It 
has kept training methods within a time frame of two to three months of problem 
anticipation, which has effectively prevented the Chinese partner from learning 
problem-solving skills. Tacit knowledge has thus not been transferred.  From a 
manufacturing point of view, this can be a tradeoff for technology protection since for 
any sophisticated problem, an engineer had to be sent from Japan. 
Although the Japanese partner gained confidence in running the subsidiary as 
a wholly-owned unit after a few years of IJV experience, substantial transaction cost 
factors have prevented Company D from internalizing tangible and intangible factors 
on open markets after becoming wholly-owned.  These are discussed in the 
‘Interview results’ sections subsequently. 
A viable option for Japanese high-tech companies is to allocate a separate 
entity for R&D purposes.  Company D has located a separate R&D subsidiary in 
China as a wholly-owned entity, rather than concentrating R&D in its existing 
manufacturing subsidiaries.  In 2001, Company D decided to move much of its R&D 
activities to China, creating the second largest R&D center of 16 worldwide, in 
Beijing, as a separate entity and under full ownership.  Only the company HQ R&D 
center would be larger.  Company D hoped that this would create a link to the 
Chinese consumer, and depend on the employment of Chinese engineers and R&D 
staff.  Engineers and researchers for the new subsidiary were transferred from 
existing IJVs and recruited on the open market.  Company D was confident about its 
own ability to operate in China. 
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7.7.6  Interview results: Japanese partner 
7.7.6.1  Tangible assets 
This IJV follows a pattern in which technology complementariness did not 
rank high in importance at the time of IJV set up.  The Japanese partner, however, 
gave high priority to reducing knowledge uncertainty instead, which resulted in its 
favoring diffused ownership.  Reasons that it did not initially seek any technological 
involvement from the Chinese partner included the large technology gap, technology 
protection, as well as the desire to keep key technologies and processes requiring 
sophisticated tacit knowledge (R&D) in Japan. 
However, this view was dynamic and changed over time. Product 
complementariness became an issue as the IJV evolved.  According to the GM 
(2007), “Our Chinese partner’s learning capacities had increased, and we even began 
to consider making them one of our suppliers.”  Successful technology transfer can 
occur through complementary products if the local partner takes on a role of supplier 
to the Japanese IJV partner.  In this IJV, the adaptation of the local partner as a 
supplier, however, was met with obstacles due to strong objections by the head office 
in Japan.  The possibility of letting the Chinese partner become a supplier was 
remote because “The entire management strategy was overseen and dictated by our 
headquarters (HQ) in Japan.  HQ is not very knowledgeable about our subsidiary, 
they were not receptive to our suggestions to localize more of the supply chain and 
build a network of local suppliers…” (GM, 2007)   In the early stages the rationale 
for choosing an IJV partner was limited to simple tangible assets: 
They had to find suitable land for us, negotiate the terms of the land, 
negotiate tax terms, set up utilities, and provide us with an initial pool 
of workers and engineers… Capital was important in so far as to 
ensure our partner’s stake was large enough so they would act in the 
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interest of our joint venture. (General Manager D, 2007) 
 
Both sides’ desired capital ratio was not achieved, which means that interest 
alignment did not materialize to the extent desired by the Japanese partner.  This 
would provide a valid justification for higher distrust towards the local IJV partner, 
and thus higher knowledge asymmetry between the IJV partners. 
 
7.7.6.2  Intangible assets 
Intangible assets at the basic level affected the choice of local IJV partner and 
structure of the IJV relationship.  The Japanese partner relied on the Chinese partner 
to handle tax negotiations for the import of production equipment and utilize its 
guanxi with local officials. Market access was also sought.  Subsequently, utilization 
of the local partner extended to the Japanese partner being able to access the Chinese 
market through the partner’s distribution networks, access to wholesalers, and 
marketing skills.  These were assets that the local partner provided despite its low 
ownership share.  Compensating factors are discussed under the same section for the 
Chinese partner subsequently. 
Targeting the local market had not initially been an important issue since 
production was meant for export and so were the initial functions of the Chinese 
partner.  The Chinese partner acted as negotiator and liaison with decision-making 
individuals in government to negotiate favorable taxation terms on imported 
equipment. In addition, the local partner kept managerial involvement in the IJV, 
through the HR function. 
In the later life of the IJV, the Japanese partner contemplated localization of 
some components, for which the local partner’s guanxi would become valuable.  
With regard to the importance of tax negotiations, the GM said: 
 330 
Part of our strategy was to find local suppliers, and we wanted our JV 
partner to be the main supplier.  We also wanted the partner to 
maintain good contacts with the Government for us… 
We needed fast import clearance on equipment with as little tax as 
possible.  (General Manager D, 2007) 
 
With regard to subsequent efforts to localize components, the GM said that, 
We had several expectations of our partner.  First, we expected them to 
do the recruiting and take care of the labor relations and contracts.  
Second, we wanted to increase our own production of electronic 
components in China and reduce production and import cost.  We 
could get parts supplied in China at 30% of the cost than Japan for our 
DVD/TV production with their [local partner’s] help.  They should 
help us find suppliers on the local market. (General Manager D, 2007) 
 
In the first instance, the Japanese partner did not consider the local partner’s 
potential role in the supply chain.  However, the Japanese partner recognized the 
potential of the local partner as a means to overcome their lack of experience and 
knowledge in the Chinese market.    According to the GM, the partner’s 
contribution of intangible assets was important: 
We considered our partner’s most useful contribution their ability to 
negotiate with any Chinese entity on our behalf…We knew we needed 
their knowledge, experience, and connections in dealing with 
government agencies and local businesses…There are many problems 
we could not resolve on our own in China. (General Manager D, 2007) 
 
The GM cited two examples that were of immediate concern in the areas of 
HR and negotiations:  “We depended on our partner for two items: their ability to 
provide us with staff and engineers immediately and their ability to negotiate 
(favorable) tax rates for our production equipment in a short time.” (General Manager 
D, 2007) 
New production equipment was frequently imported.  Equipment in 
production lines had to be replaced every two years.  Therefore, the localization 
gained importance within this IJV and the local partner’s guanxi were utilized to 
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“locate and negotiate with local suppliers, and provide product samples fast.”  This 
also increased the demand for engineers at the IJV, where the local partner fulfilled 
the requirement to “find engineers fast.” (General Manager D, 2007)  With regard to 
the local partner’s providing HR and related services, the GM mentioned: 
Hiring people was an important contribution by our partner.  They 
created and ran the advertisements, and we left it to them to create the 
employment contracts and explain the terms and conditions of 
employment to our staff.  Initially, we did not know how to recruit 
people here.  Now we have learned how manage the HR function in 
the local context, but we still think the Chinese partner is better suited.  
It is difficult for us to get the trust of the staff. (General Manager D, 
2007) 
 
An important benefit of the local partner’s HR management was its credibility 
among local staff.  According to Barro (1998) residual productivity values and 
therefore technological efficiency can benefit if potential for conflict is minimized. 
 
7.7.6.3  Ownership 
For the Japanese partner, the goal was to “follow the example of other 
companies in China and to contribute experience from our more than 100 own 
subsidiaries overseas to this JV… However, foreign companies were not allowed to 
set up wholly-owned subsidiaries then, so this left us with little choice other than to 
seek a local partner.” (General Manager D, 2007) 
On what the goals were for the ownership level, the GM said that, “We had to 
start thinking about how to best protect our property including… technology, 
capital…, so we began thinking of how to involve our partner without jeopardizing 
them… so we thought the best method would be to give them enough share of the 
ownership.” (General Manager D, 2007)  He added: “However, this was difficult for 
us to negotiate because we had very little prior experience with JVs, our subsidiaries 
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overseas [Thailand, Malaysia] are all wholly-owned.” (General Manager D, 2007) 
With regard to the specific ownership share, a prior lack of experience with 
IJVs played an additional role.  The GM continued to explain that, “We did not want 
them to own a large share… Our existing subsidiaries in Thailand and Malaysia were 
wholly-owned.  We were afraid of interference and disagreements with the local 
partner.” (General Manager D, 2007) 
The quotes clearly show the tendency of the Japanese manager towards low 
ownership levels for the Chinese partner in order to reduce (knowledge) uncertainty 
concerning possible access to proprietary knowledge and the uncertainty of dealing 
with an IJV partner. 
This entry mode also made sense from the point of view of the transfer of 
simple intangible assets to the Japanese partner.  At the time of IJV setup, the state 
was still keeping significant control over the entry modes of foreign companies with 
technologies that were being promoted, with a strong preference towards IJVs.  The 
state’s strategy ranged from tax incentives to the efficient provision of basic utilities to 
persuade foreign companies to choose local IJV partners.  General Manager D 
(2007) added: “We needed the partner for everything…finding land, negotiating land 
cost, and negotiating the tax terms for the import of equipment… We also needed 
them [local partner] to arrange electricity, water, and phone lines.” 
The quotes show a strong need for a local partner that was mainly due to 
structural market failure (i.e. government interference).  In order to overcome 
structural market failure, the Japanese partner had to seek the best method of 
involving the IJV partner relevantly; in other words, the contribution received should 
enable the IJV to operate efficiently.  Contributions ranged from basic utilities to 
factory space and tax negotiations for imported production equipment. 
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With regard to actual technological contribution, the GM said that, “We had no 
expectations of our partner concerning technology… There was a gap of at least 20 
years between our companies…” 25
In anticipation of unpredictable future events, the Japanese partner also took 
precaution in keeping the equity share flexible, so that ownership levels could be 
changed if the need arose.  Accordingly, General Manager D (2007) explained: “We 
adopted a floating ownership system.  Each partner could contribute more capital in 
the future, and this would change the ownership structure proportionally.” 
 (General Manager D, 2007) Therefore, the 
Japanese partner had no strategy and no need for using the partner as a potential 
contributor of components.  As such, involving the local partner in the IJV at either 
an arm’s-length or a non-arm’s length relationship but low ownership that would keep 
the local partner in a weak position was considered useful. In this case, the local 
partner retains low ownership but is involved in managerial functions with access to 
technology as a motivational tool for it to contribute efficiently. 
 
7.7.6.4  Government influence 
Government influence has been high in the setup of this IJV.  The city’s 
investment promotion agency steered the Japanese company towards partnering with 
its current IJV partner.  Although the partner selection process had been steered by 
the government, it still made sense from a perspective of asset complementariness, 
with respect to both tangible and intangible assets for both partners.  The GM 
explained: 
An important reason for the government to allow this IJV was that the 
SOE could more easily obtain capital, capital-intensive technologies, 
and secure jobs at the same time.  Therefore, it could bypass 
commercial banks for loans since loans became difficult to obtain for 
                                                   
25 This is and exaggerated statement the GM had made in order to highlight what he perceived to be a large technological gap 
and the strong need to catch up. 
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(underperforming) SOEs.  Owing to its weak financial disposition, 
the government had simply told the SOE to partner with the Japanese 
company.  As such, both partners were left with little choice.  
(General Manager D, 2007) 
 
With regard to technology/knowledge-based productivity growth, the intent of 
the government to save an SOE from bankruptcy, however, did not produce entirely 
bad results (i.e. negative technology/knowledge-based productivity growth) for the 
IJV. 
Moreover, government interference was not necessarily unwelcome for the 
Japanese partner, either.  In the GM’s words: “At the request of our Chinese 
headquarters in Dalian, we approached the Appliance Measurement Bureau to consult 
about possible local partners.” (General Manager D, 2007) 
 
7.7.7  Interview results: Chinese partner 
7.7.7.1  Ownership 
The IJV partner wanted its ownership share to reflect the importance of 
its contributions to the Japanese partner over time.  The local partner was 
dissatisfied with the ownership structure.  A large portion of the profits 
received from the IJV were re-invested in the SOE, and no capital was left to 
increase the IJV share.  However, this was also a problem since the SOE itself 
was trying to continue to provide employment to its own staff members and 
therefore needed to ensure survival.  When asked about the use of the 
ownership structure changing in favor of the local partner, the Vice-GM 
answered: 
We want a greater share of the profits.  Our contributions have been 
valuable to the partner. We want to make more contributions, but we 
presently cannot afford to invest more into the joint venture.  Our 
share is too small to re-invest profits back [into the IJV].  We 
 335 
currently use all the profits we gain from the joint venture for our own 
company [SOE]. (Vice-General Manager D, 2007) 
 
7.7.7.2  Tangible assets 
The interviews for the Chinese partner suggest a high reliance on the Japanese 
partner’s tangible assets.  These are capital as the most important tangible asset to be 
acquired by the Chinese partner.   This result is somewhat unexpected because the 
assets such as technologies, machines, and products, although important, are only 
second to capital.  In this case, the interviews have suggested that there is a strong 
rift between the Chinese partner’s short term goals and long term orientation.  At the 
time the SOE entered the IJV with the Japanese partner, it was close to bankruptcy 
and obtaining capital and saving jobs were priorities, to be achieved partly by 
re-deploying employees in the IJV. The recruitment process was perfunctory and 
unsuitable employees frequently transferred to the IJV as a result.  Securing social 
stability and employment therefore implies significant government suasion toward 
forming this IJV.    The results also show that the need for tangible and intangible 
assets has increased but not always been met by the Japanese partner.  The need for 
new equipment, new products, managerial experience and knowledge necessary to 
process new technologies has become more important to the Chinese partner over 
time.  For this IJV partner, ensuring financial survival came before technology 
upgrading.  The following quote expresses the situation the Chinese partner faced at 
the time of IJV setup: 
Our first priority was to obtain capital.  At the time, we (SOE) were 
short on capital, just like many other SOEs.  The second priority was 
technology… Setting up a JV with a foreign company was the easiest 
way to obtain capital, it let us bypass commercial banks and loans.  
Through a foreign partner, we could obtain capital easily…and this 
ensured our survival and employment for our people…  Technology 
and management skills became important later.” (Vice-General 
Manager D, 2007) 
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With regard to technologies that the Japanese partner was transferring, 
the Vice-GM mentioned: 
We knew they weren’t transferring the latest equipment to us.  They 
were still an attractive partner because they have a long history, so we 
expected to obtain superior scientific knowledge and managerial 
knowledge and concepts from them [Japanese partner]…  We hoped 
they would provide our engineers and staff with good training. 
(Vice-General Manager D, 2007) 
 
In return, the IJV partner made the following contributions: 
Our contribution has been great.  We obtained the land use rights, 
we organized the contractors to build the factory, and we organized 
the utilities (electricity, water, phone lines).  Another important 
contribution we made was recruiting people.  We created and ran 
recruiting advertisements, and we crafted the employment contracts 
and explained the conditions of the contracts to staff.  All HR matters 
were left up to us… The Japanese did not know how to recruit and 
manage workers here…  They still do not know how to motivate 
[local] staff… They cannot get their [local staff’s] trust... 
(Vice-General Manager D, 2007) 
 
7.7.7.3  Intangible assets 
This discussion shows that the Chinese partner was disappointed at not being 
able to receive the knowledge it hoped to gain from the Japanese partner.  For the 
Japanese partner, this could translate into successful technology protection, which 
would challenge the notion that technology is leaked within IJVs and that IJVs should 
be avoided for this reason.  It can also positively influence 
technology/knowledge-based productivity growth.  As for the transfer of tacit 
knowledge from the Japanese partner, the Chinese Vice-GM said: 
There were no systematic training measures in place.  We learned 
everything through daily interaction, we even learned how to speak 
Japanese.  In the managerial sense, there was plenty of opportunity 
for us to learn from the Japanese just by communicating and 
observing… Their technological training was not very useful.  Their 
training was centralized and not relevant to our JV.  Training for all 
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Company D subsidiaries in China took place in three training centers: 
Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou.  We sent our engineers there 
sometimes, but each training session lasted only about 3 days, so there 
wasn’t much they could learn.  They just received knowledge on how 
to operate certain machines, but no one taught them problem-solving 
skills.  Sometimes, we sent our engineers to subsidiaries in Malaysia 
or Thailand to learn from their experience.  In the end, however, if 
there was a problem with the production line, or we needed 
adjustment to custom orders, we had to bring engineers from Japan 
every time.  This was very costly. (Vice-General Manager D, 2007) 
 
As for the minimal incentives to contribute intangible assets arising from the 
Chinese partner’s low ownership share, the Vice-GM stated: “The IJV contract was 
flexible and did not fix the proportion of the equity.  Any partner could contribute 
additional investment and change the ownership structure; but this still had to be 
discussed and agreed on with the Japanese partner.  We are interested in the JV doing 
well…” (Vice-General Manager D, 2007). 
The quote reveals the motivation of the Chinese partner to contribute to the 
IJV.  Raising financial incentives through higher ownership were still an option for 
the future, which the Chinese partner did not discount.  However, with a large 
technology and skills gap, the opportunity to learn played a greater role during the 
initial catching-up (learning) phase.  Productivity growth also lends some credibility 
to the Chinese partner’s aforementioned quote. 
 
7.7.7.4  Government influence 
The Chinese IJV partner’s strategy was strongly influenced by the government.  
The Vice-GM mentioned that, 
The government has had a large influence on company policy.  SOE 
bosses still have a mindset from the times of a planned economy.  
They have a strong say in selecting which foreign company we partner 
with.  They directly influence upper SOE management.  This has an 
impact on the joint ventures we are involved in with foreign companies.  
We have to learn their technologies and management skills, and we try 
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to apply them to our SOE.  We want to be a supplying partner in the 
future.  (Vice-General Manager D, 2007) 
 
In the short-term, however, one needs to realize that the future of many SOEs 
seemed unstable.  “We had to ensure our survival so that there was future 
employment for our staff…” (Vice-General Manager D, 2007).  The SOE had about 
25,000 staff, of which more than 1,200 were transferred to this IJV. 
The discussion of the Chinese partner’s goals raises the issue that many SOEs 
in the 1980s and 1990s were in difficult financial dispositions.  As a result, obtaining 
capital and assuring employment for a sizeable labor force was a priority for the 
government, which wanted to ensure financial survival first and upgrade technology 
and management skills in the process.  However, both strategies did not work 
together, as productivity growth in the IJV suggests.  Therefore, a conventional arm’s 
length relationship may still be appropriate with this type of local IJV partner and 
government policy that is exercised through the local IJV partner. 
 
7.7.7.5  Knowledge uncertainty towards Japanese partner 
The example of this case has shown that IJVs in this relationship structure 
have limitations in the transfer of technology and tacit knowledge but not necessarily 
in technology protection.  As long as the function of the IJV is standard production, 
however, the benefits for the transferring side (Japanese side) in obtaining intangible 
assets from the Chinese partner can still outweigh the limitations of technology and 
knowledge transfer.  Therefore, setting up an equity IJV with a local partner will 
incur low transaction costs. 
However, technology protection and little access to training could increase the 
Japanese partner to split from the current IJV partner since asset specificity is kept low.  
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The costs of switching to another IJV partner are therefore low, too.  In this scenario, 
it could be argued, the Japanese partner has benefited fro the IJV more than the local 
partner.  However, even if the local partner were to induce instability, technology 
protection and lower asset specificity between partners than in case A could still mean 
that dissolving the IJV and switching to another partner or setting up a WOS is more 
likely.  The Japanese partner thus retains control of its own survival, regardless of 
how the IJV may fare in the future. 
 
7.8 Concluding remarks 
The case studies have shown that managers were aware of issues of 
ownership structure in the long term.  General managers may either have assumed 
duties with this mindset or have learned in the course of managing the IJV that the 
issue of ownership structure is indeed important to ensure control, stability, and 
interest alignment between IJV partners.  In high-tech industries, it is therefore 
important to have long-term ownership strategies beyond the immediate IJV setup that 
take into account the effects of learning and absorption of knowledge, changing 
partner capabilities as well as changes in external factors that may alter the role of the 
local IJV partner in the future.  Ownership structures are likely to need to reflect 
such changes over time.  In reference to the quantitative analysis, the value of 
technology/knowledge-based productivity growth is an indicator of the efficiency of 
processes that result from aligning ownership structures optimally.  This is where the 
qualitative research has been particularly useful.  Quantitative research alone could 
not put issues of ownership structures, interest alignment, IJV stability, and 
technology/knowledge-based productivity growth into perspective as such.  By 
developing the case studies, I have attempted to address this gap. 
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The cases have profiled Sino-Japanese IJVs into arm’s-length and non-arm’s 
length frameworks based on ownership structure, management participation and the 
extent of exposure to managerial and technological knowledge implementation 
processes within IJVs.  Government influence could also play a role in choosing an 
appropriate framework, particularly in case D; which, however, seemed to have 
confined its performance in technology/knowledge-based productivity growth.  
Under the circumstances, however, the framework chosen by Company D, however, 
may still have been appropriate. 
The implementation of the processes for exchanging and absorbing 
complementary assets (tangible and intangible) could compensate for a lack of 
ownership share for the Chinese partner, particularly in early stages of the IJV, when 
the Chinese partner was more willing to be compensated through new knowledge 
gained.  What constituted new knowledge to the Chinese partner depended on the 
Chinese partner’s history (e.g. affiliation with Chinese Academy of Sciences), which 
would determine its initial level of knowledge and technological level and depending 
on these, its absorptive capacity for new knowledge.  This would play a role in 
determining technology/knowledge-based productivity growth as well as ownership 
share at the IJV setup stage and equity adjustments in its later lifespan. 
In the early stages, technology/knowledge-based productivity growth could 
usually be influenced to a greater extent through the local partner’s exposure to new 
technology, technological and managerial knowledge, rather than ownership share.  
Ownership stake became a more important factor in the later stages of IJVs.  In cases 
where ownership structures were fixed or could not be adjusted, IJVs showed a 
marked tendency towards a decline in technology/knowledge-based productivity 
growth over time (cases C and D) and in severe instances, even local-partner induced 
 341 
(uncontrolled) instability (case A), provided the local partner already possessed high 
technological capabilities at the time of IJV setup. 
The cases have also discussed the non-alignment of expectations and links to 
ownership structure.  In case A, for example, contributions received from the local 
partner relative to the local partner’s ownership share were subject to the partner’s 
learning and catching-up with new technological knowledge.  An IJV would not be 
successful with regard to both productivity growth and control over the life of the IJV, 
when small ownership was granted to the local partner in the presence of small 
technological/knowledge gaps and high product complementariness.  Without 
ownership adjustment in favor of the local partner, the IJV was bound to become 
unstable as a result of the local partner’s new opportunities to cooperate with other 
firms.  This case showed an example of the technology owner (Japanese partner) 
losing control of the IJV since it was the local partner that induced instability. 
Generally, in cases with diffused ownership and/or high management 
participation, there was more potential for higher growth in 
technology/knowledge-based productivity and thus technology and knowledge 
transfer. 
Choosing an appropriate strategy at the time of IJV setup that includes 
ownership share, the degree of flexibility to change such ownership share depended 
on the local partner’s involvement in the IJV, the partner’s capabilities and the 
Japanese partner’s strategy for the subsidiary in China. 
In cases where the Japanese partner did not intend to use the Chinese partner 
beyond the procurement of simple tangible and intangible assets or assembly activities, 
Japanese companies still tended towards modifying ownership strategies in later years, 
which included either changes in equity structures or termination. 
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Case B presented the only example in which technology/knowledge-based 
productivity growth was high, within the framework of a conventional non-arm’s IJV 
length relationship.  Despite motivations to protect proprietary knowledge and 
know-how, such ownership structures were nonetheless most conducive for this 
subsidiary in the exchange of complementary assets and showed that there was a 
continuous need for the local partner’s complementary assets, whose sophistication 
evolved over time and could be used to substitute some component imports from 
Japan.  The local partner was motivated by the upgrading of its capabilities and a 
tangible share in the growth of the joint venture.  Protection of vital know-how and 
R&D could still be controlled by setting up another wholly-owned subsidiary and 
selectively transferring capabilities developed in the joint venture over time to the 
new subsidiary. 
Qualitative research, particularly case studies, can be open to questions of 
their ability to generalize results.  The four case studies have been chosen for 
inclusion in this dissertation from interview data of approximately forty possible case 
studies on Japanese-Chinese IJVs (in China).  In fact, when I selected case studies 
for interviews, I did so by shortlisting subsidiaries from the quantitative sample of 692 
subsidiaries based on the extent of their technology/knowledge-based productivity 
growth.  Among the forty possible case studies, I then chose four that best 
represented subsidiaries typical of the category of technology/knowledge-based 
productivity growth (low, medium, high) while controlling for factors such as 
subsidiary age and size of the IJV (e.g. employee numbers, capital) to include in the 
dissertation.  Therefore, my own judgment and perception in selecting case studies 
for inclusion in the dissertation may have played a role.  These limitations should be 
kept in mind when interpreting case studies and qualitative research in general.
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8. Conclusion 
The dissertation has highlighted the complexity of entry modes and ownership 
patterns from the perspective of technology and knowledge transfer.  Important to 
the discussion has been knowledge transfer in particular, which has taken two 
directions.  First, it has been discussed as new technological and managerial 
knowledge that was transferred from the owner of that knowledge to the recipient, or 
the local IJV partner in China.  Second, the owner of technology – the Japanese 
partner – was shown to have needed other, often tacit knowledge or intangible assets – 
from the local IJV partner in China.  Entry modes and subsequent ownership 
structures over the lifetime of equity-based IJV partnerships have been shown to 
affect knowledge transfer, or more appropriately, mutual knowledge exchange 
processes.  The influence of other factors essential to the process of technology 
transfer and knowledge exchange has also been discussed.  These include the 
augmentation of the productive lifespan and employee structures that produce higher 
rates of mutual knowledge transfer within Japanese high-tech companies’ 




The dissertation has provided several important contributions to the research 
on entry mode choice, ownership structures, and quantitative modeling using 
econometric and qualitative approaches. 
With regard to entry mode choice and ownership structures, the dissertation 
has developed a quantitative framework which measures performance under given 
ownership structures as the degree of efficiency in technology transfer and knowledge 
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exchange in the form of a residual productivity growth variable.  This method has 
been shown to be a proxy for or an indirect measure of transaction costs, in that 
ownership structures are validated by the growth in technology/knowledge-based 
productivity that they caused.  In the process, the dissertation has discussed 
hierarchical entry modes and adjustment of ownership structures with respect to 
minimizing transaction costs incurred in the transfer and internalization of 
complementary assets, both tangible and intangible.  Previous research has dealt with 
subsidiary performance mainly in terms of financial measures (e.g. profitability, ROA, 
ROE, ROI, etc.), instability, and lifespan.  By contrast, this dissertation has extended 
existing research by providing a specific quantitative framework for optimizing 
technology/knowledge-based productivity growth.  The dissertation has also 
extended an important concept previously developed by Makino and Delios (1996) 
which discussed the decreasing performance of IJVs after ten years that were formed 
with local partners.  On the other hand, my dissertation provides options to extend 
the productive lifespan of IJVs with local partners beyond a critical subsidiary age 
depending on the ownership range as discussed in the quantitative chapter (Chapter 
3). 
The second important contribution of the dissertation has been the linkage of 
the quantitative results to their applicability and potential for implementation in 
Japanese equity-based subsidiaries in China within the framework of a qualitative 
discussion that has addressed issues of initial entry mode choice and ownership 
restructuring over the lifetime of the subsidiaries.  Additionally, other factors 
important in the implementation and internalization of new technologies and 
knowledge, such as employee structures have also been analyzed quantitatively and 
linked to case studies qualitatively. 
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By categorizing Japanese majority-owned IJVs into likely types of 
relationships with their Chinese partners, the case studies have also provided links 
between types of subsidiary structures and associated quantitative outcomes of 
productivity growth due to technology transfer and knowledge exchange, and 
therefore information about the cost of their transaction. 
Consequently, linking the concepts of technology/knowledge-based 
productivity growth, ownership structures and adjustments with transaction cost 
theory can be considered a third important contribution to the research on entry mode 
choice. 
With regard to quantitative modeling, the dissertation has employed an 
approach that had previously been developed by economists for documenting 
macroeconomic progress.  However, in most economic literature, the approach has 
been developed only in theory and actual usage on time-series macroeconomic data 
has been limited.  Felipe (1997), Sala-i-Martin (1997), and Barro (1998) have 
discussed and extended the theory to a microeconomic context.  However, economic 
literature lacks application or implementation of the theories it develops on actual data.  
By contrast, business literature widely uses statistical methods with large datasets but 
lacks approaches in econometric modeling that can be relevant.  The dissertation 
combines the approaches from both disciplines. 
Another important contribution of the quantitative model is that given 
availability of a dataset, it could be considered for application to other countries, 
subject to limitations.  A significant limitation of the quantitative model is that 
relationships established between dependent and independent variables apply only to 
this dataset.  Therefore, statistical significance may not necessarily occur in other 
datasets, in which case the model cannot be applied as it is.  Moreover, the 
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statistically significant and negative relationship for the overall sample (regressions 1 
and 2) and, depending on subsidiary age, subsequent positive and negative 
relationships (regressions 3 and 4) between ownership change and 
technology/knowledge-based productivity growth are specific to the case of Japanese 
companies’ high-tech companies’ equity-based subsidiaries in China, as are the 
positive relationships between the logarithmic function of total Japanese ownership 
and technology/knowledge-based productivity growth for the overall sample in 
regression 2 and the specific sample of subsidiaries older than seven years in 
regression 4.  In other countries, values for the time it takes to reach peak 
productivity growth or to experience a decline in productive lifespan may be different, 
and ownership may not follow an ln function in relation to growth in 
technology/knowledge-based productivity. 
 
8.2 Practical implications 
The dissertation has shown that specific ownership structures are important 
and receive consideration by Japanese managers with long-term capability 
development strategies in subsidiaries when their parent companies chose entry 
modes.  Companies that did not pay much attention to ownership structures may 
have become aware of the importance of ownership structures over time as they 
accumulated experience with their IJV partners and underwent the dynamic process of 
learning by accumulating and exchanging experience and knowledge while operating 
in China.  Ownership structures are an important motivational tool for both partners 
to ensure that processes within subsidiaries proceed smoothly. 
In addition to academic contributions, the dissertation also provides important 
implications for policymakers and managers.  For Japanese managers, the qualitative 
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findings can help anticipate the type of IJV partner that might be encountered 
depending on government suasion and the Japanese company’s own ability and 
bargaining power in negotiating a desired ownership structure.  Therefore, Japanese 
managers could better anticipate the behavior of the local IJV partner and choose a 
framework for an IJV relationship accordingly.  The quantitative part can give 
suggestions about the extent of technology/knowledge-based productivity growth that 
can be expected from forming an IJV with a particular ownership structure and 
relationship and thus provide some information about the extent to which the IJV can 
be re-negotiated or its ownership structures adjusted in the future.  Furthermore, the 
dissertation also highlights advantages and disadvantages of forming IJVs with local 
partners of different levels of technological sophistication, and accordingly, the degree 
of managerial and equity involvement to allow the Chinese partner. 
With regard to the leakage of technological knowledge, the dissertation does 
not find strong support that knowledge can simply be leaked unless the local partner 
has the capabilities to understand, absorb, and misuse such knowledge.  However, 
case studies have addressed methods to calibrate partner motivation and learning 
through ownership structures and other adjustments.   
In cases where the local partner had a high level of technological 
understanding, cooperation between both partners was efficient (e.g. case C), leading 
even to R&D.  On the other hand, case A has shown that IJV instability could be 
induced by the local partner. However, the resulting potential for the uncontrolled 
leakage of proprietary knowledge was mainly caused by the Japanese partner through 
its neglect of ownership adjustments and managerial involvement that were 
commensurate with the local partner’s increased technological capabilities acquired in 
the IJV over time. 
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For policymakers, the dissertation can provide guidance on how to advise 
Japanese high-tech companies with little experience in China or other foreign markets 
what to expect and what they should consider before setting up an IJV in China. 
Based on the findings, the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO), for 
instance, could provide more targeted advice to Japanese companies that are seeking 
to set up subsidiaries in China with regard to a) choosing equity-based or other 
structured, b) specific ownership structures within equity-based entry modes c) other 
structures such as employee structures and d) the likely outcome of entry mode 
negotiations with the Chinese government and a potential local IJV partner based on 
the investing Japanese company’s unique attributes (e.g. technology to be transferred, 
size in terms of capital and employees, reputation, bargaining power, history of 
foreign market entries). 
The framework regarding IJV relationships in the qualitative chapter could 
provide insights for Chinese policymakers to better match SOEs and local companies 
with Japanese companies based on new technologies and managerial knowledge 
required from the Japanese partner.  It could also help them decide the extent of 
which they could be involved in an IJV and what to expect with regard to the 
acquisition of new technologies and upgrading of knowledge from the Japanese 
partner.  Such information could be useful if the Chinese company knew its nascent 
role within an IJV, such as becoming a supplier or creating higher value-added by 
taking on certain R&D functions.  As a result, more appropriate ownership structures 
and contract terms could be negotiated prior to IJV setup. 
Likewise, a better match could be found between SOEs that merely seek 
survival and continued employment for large numbers of their workers within 
Japanese companies that, for example, are more interested in mass production rather 
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than higher value-added activities. 
In addition, the dissertation would also help enable Chinese policymakers to 
understand the motives of Japanese firms better.  A more tailored strategy regarding 
IJV relationship, possible ownership ratios and flexibility for possible future 
adjustments of entry modes can be incorporated in negotiations. 
 
8.3 Limitations and further research 
While the dissertation has employed a large sample, some limitations still need 
to be acknowledged.  As with other econometric models, some assumptions needed 
to be made in order to accomplish data modeling within the econometric model.  For 
example, a price-output variable was employed without specifying prices or costs.  It 
enabled the data available to be applied to the model, but more research on price data 
and its incorporation could have made results more accurate.  Moreover, constant 
returns to scale were assumed. 
Furthermore, the data employs observations in intervals of three years.  
Although the time intervals are acceptable for technology transfer and knowledge 
acquisition, they may become outdated as product life cycles decline, thus 
necessitating shorter time intervals. 
Therefore, the quantitative model can still be refined with regard to these 
assumptions in the future. 
While the dissertation has attempted to provide numerous insights about 
Japanese high-tech companies’ subsidiaries in China qualitatively, there are other 
limitations to be aware of.  The first limitation with respect to qualitative 
interpretation of the findings is bias.  Three significant types of potential bias merit 
further consideration.  First, all local IJV partners were state-owned enterprises and 
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their representatives appointed by the government.  Consequently, government 
policy and involvement, as well as the general state of state-owned enterprises and the 
specific state-owned enterprises selected for interviews, in particular, may have been 
portrayed too favorably. 
Second, there may have been prior synchronization between Japanese and 
Chinese managers about what answers to provide before an interview took place.  
This bias could not be eliminated.  In order to minimize the bias, however, 
interviews with both Japanese and Chinese general and vice-general managers, 
respectively, had always been conducted separately without the presence of the 
respective IJV partner. 
Third, interviewees may have been mindful of how they wanted to portray 
their company or subsidiary to an outsider – the interviewer – despite assurances of 
confidentiality and anonymity.  They may also have been careful to maintain a 
harmonious relationship with the IJV partner, and therefore may have withheld 
potentially unfavorable information about the IJV partner and/or further information 
about conflicts within the IJV (Golden-Biddle and Locke, 1993). 
Fourth, since China continues to seek to upgrade capabilities through foreign 
technologies and managerial expertise, experience with R&D is still limited relative to 
those countries that transfer technologies to China.  Therefore, Chinese managers 
may not have enough experience with negative aspects such as setbacks in R&D to 
the same extent as the transferor of technology.  Their answers were also given 
against the background of a rapidly expanding Chinese economy.  As a result, their 
answers or attitudes about their companies’ capabilities may have occasionally been 
too optimistic. 
In addition, there are limitations with regard to the ability to generalize or 
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extend conclusions drawn from the interviews to other cases or countries.  China is 
still a developing country whose economic development policy is strongly shaped by 
the government.  As previously mentioned, all local IJV partners were also 
state-owned enterprises.  These issues are relevant if applications of theories, models, 
and conclusions presented in this dissertation are extended to other national 
backgrounds (companies and countries).  
Furthermore, the dissertation is based on four case studies that provide fit to a 
specific framework of IJV relationships.  It is therefore limited by categorization, 
which could not be expanded upon due to length constraints of the dissertation. 
In future research, the focus of case studies could be shifted more specifically 
to a cause and effect analysis between quantitative and qualitative chapters.  In other 
words, a larger number of case studies could be selected first and thus treated as an 
independent variable. Their behavior could then be analyzed and conclusions made 
about the magnitude of technology/knowledge-based productivity growth.  In this 
case, technology/knowledge-based productivity growth would become a dependent 
variable in such comparative framework.  The analysis could then be verified with 
actual values for technology/knowledge-based productivity growth, which could 
provide more conclusive answers about the validity of the methodology and its merit 
for further academic exploration.  However, the dissertation has provided an initial 
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